Tom Connally and the New Deal / by Smyrl, Frank H.
ê
This dissertation has been 
microfilmed exactly as received 6 8 -1 7  599
SMYKL, Frank Herbert, 1938- 
TOM CONNALLY AND THE NEW DEAL,
The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1968 
History, modem
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
Frank Herbert Smyrl 1969
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE
TOM CONNALLY AND THE NEW DEAL
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 












After thirty-six years of almost continuous service 
in the United States Congress, Tom Connally retired from pub­
lic life in January, 1953* At first he devoted much of his 
time to writing his autobiography.^ After its publication, 
he lived quietly in Washington, traveled, and generally en­
joyed his retirement. He attended his last Democratic National
Convention in 1956, where he gave his support to Texas' Senator
2Lyndon B. Johnson as a favorite son candidate. Although not
a delegate in I96O, he again supported Johnson for the Demo-
3cratic nomination, accepting in the end the convention's 
choice of John F. Kennedy. During his ten years of retire­
ment, Connally made few public statements, which contrasts 
sharply to his speech-filled Congressional career.
The Connally autobiography is a good, honest survey 
of his career as he remembered it in his old age--with the 
help of manuscript copies of his speeches, memoranda, and 
the Congressional Record. Except for it, little has been
^Tom Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg, Name 
Is Tom Connally (New York, 1954).
^New York Times, August l4, 1956, p. 15.
^Ibid., January I8, I96O, p. 1; ibid., October 29,
1963, p. 1 .
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written about his career. Tom Connally will never be con­
sidered a great man in history, but he played a significant 
role during the administrations of Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
Harry S. Truman. Thus, a more analytical and more complete 
account of his public career than the autobiography seems 
justified. Further need for a study such as this has been 
suggested by Richard L. Watson, Jr.:
Too frequently, the New Deal is thought of simply 
in terms of F . D . R. and the brain trust, with 
little realization of the role that Congress played 
in it. Or, if Congress is considered, the Roosevelt 
critic frequently describes it as a rubber stamp.
Yet both houses of Congress during the Roosevelt era 
were dominated by tough-minded politicians, most of 
whom had emerged from the jungle of local politics 
upon the national scene many years before and had 
kept themselves on the national scene by being ever 
responsive to the demands of their local constitu­
encies. A surprising number of New Deal measures 
were originated by Congressmen; and each enactment 
had to receive the approval of Congress, else it 
would not become law. Unfortunately, few of the 
congressional giants of the New Deal era have written 
their memoirs.^
And few of the "congressional giants," it might be added, have 
been subjects of biographies and monographs. Since Watson 
wrote his historiographic essay a decade ago, biographies
5have been published on William Borah and Key Pittmanj but 
they stand alone in the field.
4Richard L. Watson, Jr., "Franklin D. Roosevelt in 
Historical Writing, 1950-1957?" South Atlantic Quarterly,
LVIII (Winter, 1958), 108-109-
^Marian Cecilia McKenna, Borah (Ann Arbor, 1961);
Fred L. Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman (Lincoln, Nebraska,
1963) .
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The present work is only a partial study of Tom 
Connally's career. It does not deal with the period of his 
life in which he was most famous or in which he made perhaps 
his most important contributions. It is, rather, a study of 
his earlier career when he was principally concerned with 
domestic politics and policies. Briefly it surveys his early 
life and background and his twelve years in the House of Rep­
resentatives. Then, in greater depth, it traces his election 
to the United States Senate in 1928 and the first thirteen 
years of his Senate career.
Connally's interests in the United States Senate from 
1929 to 1941 reflected rather accurately the concern of the 
nation as a whole. The nation was worried about the depres­
sion and how to combat it, about the problems of agriculture 
and industry, and about the maldistribution of wealth. 
Connally supported such projects as inflation of money, in­
creasing the income of farmers, and controlling oil produc­
tion. With senatorial seniority, he became in 1941 chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and was a high- 
ranking member of the Senate Finance and the Senate Judi­
ciary committees. But 1941 marked the beginning of American 
involvement in World War II and a sudden change on the part 
of the American public from concern principally over peace­
time and domestic affairs to interest primarily in world 
affairs, defense, and war. Thus, 1941 serves as a good 
breaking point in Connally's career, and this work leaves
V
Connally ' s role in the development of post war American for­
eign policy for later study.
Many people deserve credit for assisting in the prep­
aration of this work. To each of them the author is deeply 
grateful. Professor John S. Ezell, now Dean of the College 
of Arts and Sciences, University of Oklahoma, first discussed 
Tom Connally as a subject for a dissertation wLth me and en­
couraged me to undertake it. Some of the preliminary re­
search and writing was done in a seminar directed by Professor 
W. Eugene Hollon, now of the University of Toledo. His crit­
icisms of the chapters dealing with Connally's political cam­
paigns were most helpful, and attempts have been made to apply 
his suggestions to the other chapters. Formal supervision of 
the dissertation has been the chore of Professor Gilbert C. 
Fite, and to him I owe the greatest debt.
A number of librarians and archivists have aided in 
the collection and location of primary materials. Dr. Paul 
T. Heffron, Specialist, 20th Century Political History, Man­
uscript Division, Library of Congress, aided me in my search 
for materials in that library, which holds the voluminous Tom 
Connally Papers. Miss Elizabeth Drewry, Director of the 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, and sev­
eral of his staff kindly assembled all the manuscripts in 
that library so that they were ready for immediate use upon 
my arrival there. Dr. Chester V. Kielman, Archivist of the 
University of Texas Archives, Austin, aided me both by per­
sonal conferences and direction as well as through his
vi
invaluable Guide to the University of Texas Archives. Dr. 
Llerena Friend, Librarian of the Eugene C. Barker History 
Center at The University of Texas, Austin, provided advice 
and encouragement in the early stages of the project. No 
one should undertake the study of any Texas subject without 
first conferring with her concerning the whereabouts of man­
uscripts, books and people. Mr. Ronald A. Seeliger, Librarian 
of the Newspaper Collection at The University of Texas supplied 
a seemingly endless flow of newspapers on microfilm available 
only in his ccrllection, and he graciously searched out small
bits of needed information from his files and provided them
by correspondence. Likewise Dr. James M. Day, then State 
Archivist of the Texas State Library, answered numerous in­
quiries and supplied great quantities of statistical infor­
mation. After his resignation, Mr. James R. Sanders, Director, 
Legislative Reference Division, Texas State Library, extended 
services, making additional trips to Austin unnecessary. Dr. 
and Mrs. Guy B. Harrison of the Texas Collection, Baylor 
University, Waco, graciously assisted me in searching for 
Connally material in their repository.
Two collections of government documents have been
used in the preparation of this work, and two librarians
were especially helpful in directing me to the needed docu­
ments. They are Miss Opal Carr of the Bizzell Memorial 
Library, University of Oklahoma, Norman; and Miss Josephine 
Williams of the Library, East Texas State University,
Commerce.
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Invaluable help in straightening out problems of 
genealogy, personal, and family matters related to Connally 
came from Mrs. Frances McKay Andrews (Mrs. Earl C. Andrews)" 
of Tyler, Texas, niece of the Senator. She graciously gave 
of her time and made available without restriction her rich 
collection of Connally material--most of which was origin­
ally assembled by her late mother, Mrs. Sparks McKay, Sr., 
sister of Tom Connally. Encouragement and help have also 
come from Mrs. Lucile S. Connally, Washington, D. C ., widow 
of the Senator, who opened the doors to the Senator's mili­
tary records, and from Judge Ben C. Connally, Houston, only 
child of the Senator.
A number of public officials have meticulously an­
swered inquiries--some in person and some by correspondence-- 
and assisted in locating materials in various county archives. 
They include Margaret W. Denard, County Clerk of Falls County, 
Marlin; Jean Spence, Deputy County Clerk of McLennan County, 
Waco ; Dick Cervenka, County Clerk of William son 
County, Georgetown; and A1 Morales, Chief Deputy County Clerk 
of El Paso County, El Paso.
A number of friends and colleagues have assisted me 
and encouraged me in ways large and small, professional and 
personal, and their interest in my undertaking is greatly 
appreciated. They include Paul D. Casdorph, David D . Webb, 
Raymond E. White, and Allen H. Chessher, as well as an al­
most endless list of fellow-students. To all of them I say, 
"Thank you."
viii
My mother, Mrs. Sammie M. Smyrl, and my late father, 
Eddie Stevens Smyrl, gave me unending encouragement, as have 
my parents-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. W. F. McWilliams. But more 
than any other person I ^m thankful for the assistance, en­
couragement, and love that have come from my wife, Carolyn.
And to my four-year-old, Vivian, who works on her own disser­
tation while her friends play dolls, I apologize for even 
teaching her the meaning of the word.
The reading copies were laboriously typed by my 
wife, Carolyn, and the final copy was prepared by Mrs. Shirley 
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TOM CONNALLY AND THE NEW DEAL
CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND OF A SENATOR
When Tom Connally entered the United States Senate 
in 1929s he was fifty-one years old. A rich and varied back­
ground had prepared him well for the job that lay ahead.
The product of an east central Texas farm, he had firsthand 
knowledge of the problems of agriculture. In college he 
studied law and, in time, became an accomplished prosecutor
and defender. Although he always enjoyed at least moderate 
1prosperity, he developed a sympathetic awareness of the less 
fortunate. To a large extent, these were the forces that 
were to shape his public career.
Thomas Terry Connally, known all his life simply as 
Tom Connally, was the son of Jones and Mary Ellen Terry
^Connally's father was described as a "prosperous" 
farmer. By the time Connally entered Congress in 1917, he 
was reportedly worth $100,000. G. W. Glass to Any Bank or 
Banker, Washington, D. C ., March 23, 191?, Tom Connally Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. 
(hereinafter cited as TCP), con. 2; Tom Connally, as told 
to Alfred Steinberg, My Name Is Tom Connally (New York,
1954), 8.
Connally. His father was born in Walker County, Georgia,
2 3September 25, 1825, and was reared in northern Georgia.
In the early 185O 's , the elder Connally married Ann Hunter.
4After the birth of two sons, in 1859 the family migrated to 
Brazos County, Texas. His first years in Texas were tragic. 
After incurring heavy indebtedness to buy a farm, he volun­
teered for service in the Confederate army at the outbreak 
of the Civil War. While he was fighting with the Twenty- 
first Texas Cavalry somewhere in Arkansas, he learned of 
the sudden death of his wife and two children, all of whom 
had caught "a fever”--perhaps malaria or typhoid. Returning 
to Texas after the war, he tried in vain to cultivate his 
farm alone. Dejected, he returned to Georgia to visit
friends and relatives, where he married his second wife,
5the mother of Tom Connally.
Mary Ellen Terry Connally, born August 8, 1844, was 
also reared in northern Georgia. She married Jones Connally's 
younger brother, Nathaniel, December I5, I86I, but he was 
killed at the battle of Chancellorsville. A daughter, Eddie,
2Tom Connally, Information for the National Cyclopedia 
of American Biography, TCP, con. 3-
3-^Clipping from Marlin Daily Democrat, December 13, 
1930, TCP, con. 594.
4Andrew L. Connally and James B. Connally. Memoranda 
on Connally family history, private collection of Mrs. Frances 
McKay Andrews, Tyler, Texas (hereinafter cited as Andrews 
Ms s.) .
^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 6.
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was born of this m a r r i a g e W h i l e  Jones Connally was in 
Georgia to visit, he called upon the family of his brother's 
widow. Impressed with her optimism in the midst of ruin,
Jones married the twenty-three-year-old widow and returned
- - 7to Texas with his bride and her daughter.
Back in Texas with his new wife, Connally paid for 
the farm after only one year. Cotton sold for twenty cents 
a pound, or about $100 a bale. In l8yi, he moved his grow­
ing family to a McLennan County farm near the little town 
of Hewitt, about seven miles southwest of Waco. There Tom
Connally was born August 19, 1877, the fourth child and only
8son to survive.
Jones Connally continued to prosper in McLennan 
County, raising mainly wheat, but some cotton and corn. As 
he could, he bought adjoining properties until his farm con­
tained 3^0 acres. Then he purchased an additional 900 acres
9in Falls County, near Eddy, Texas, and moved his family 
M̂irs. Meredith Kendrick (l880-1925)«
7Andrews Mss.; clipping from Fort Worth Press, March 
19, 1932, TCP, con. 595; Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 7-
g
Other children were Arizona (Mrs. L. M. Clements), 
1868-1948 ; Amanda Ophelia (Mew Charles N. Smith), 1872-1946; 
Travis Jones, I874-I878; Bertha May (Mrs. Floy Moore), 1879- 
1963; Ola Estelle (Mrs. J. Rufus Laughlin), 1882-1958; Ella 
Jennell, 1882-1884; Rose Dovina (Mrs. William Hiram Staton), 
1884-1946 ; Mary Lila (Mrs. Daniel Sparks McKay), 1886-1967,
See Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, 7-8; clipping from 
Marlin Daily Democrat, December I3, 1930, TCP, con. 3; Andrews 
Mss.
9 Eddy is in McLennan County near the McLennan-Falls 
County line, but the 900-acre tract lay in Falls County.
there in 1882.^® Tom grew up on this farm, and his parents
lived there for the remainder of their lives.
It was a pleasant home, and Connally later recalled:
The house had four tall columns in front, a chimney 
on either end of the house, two porches on the first 
floor, a second-floor front porch and an interior 
arrangement of front-to-rear hallways with rooms 
off the halls. For years it was the finest struc­
ture in the neighborhood, despite the fact that it 
lacked a bedroom for me. I slept in the upstairshall.12
Still standing in 1968, although unoccupied after the death 
of Mrs. Bertha Connally Moore in I963, the stately old home 
is a dominant structure at Eddy and is plainly visible on
13the eastern horizon from Interstate Highway 35 «
Cotton and corn became the principal crops on the 
Connally farm. Tom spent long hours hauling water on a
Ikmule-drawn sled for their cattle during periods of drought.
^^That same year the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Rail­
road was extended through Eddy, which probably explains why 
Jones Connally bought the Falls County property and moved 
his family. Walter Prescott Webb (editor-in-chief). The 
Handbook of Texas (Austin, 1952), II, 217.
^^Jones Connally retired from farming in I89O. He 
died January 9, 1903. Mary Ellen Terry Connally died March 
19, 1932. See Connally, Information . . . , TCP, con. 3; 
clipping from Fort Worth Press, March 19, 1932, TCP, con.
595; clipping from Marlin Daily Democrat, December 13, 1930, 
TCP, con. 3; Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 8-10.
12Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 10-11.
13It was made a "Medallion Home," denoting its his­
torical interest, in 1963* Marlin Daily Democrat, April 30,
1963.
14Clipping from Marlin Daily Democrat, TCP, con. 3*
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But the family had time for interests outside the farm.
Jones Connally, a Democrat, took a lively interest in poli­
tics. His pet project was raising local money to supplement 
State funds for secondary education. The Connally children 
attended school in Eddy, which because of the elder Connally's 
efforts, was open eight months of the year instead of four.
Tom's mother actively supported prohibition and woman 
suffrage. Her special interest was the Baptist Church at 
Eddy, which she attended regularly. She donated most of the 
money for its construction. She could not persuade her hus­
band to join the church, although he studied the Bible care-
   16fully and could "argue well about the need of immersion."
Tom was raised in the Baptist church, but in later life he
17affiliated with the Methodist Episcopal Church.
The value of education had been well instilled in 
Tom's mind early in life. During the l884 presidential cam­
paign, the elder Connally supported Cleveland and wore a 
"Cleveland hat." At the end of the campaign, the boy's father 
-confided in him, "If I had an education, I would like to be
18in Congress." Nevertheless, Tom announced on one occasion 
his intention to quit school and go to work. His parents
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 15-16.
^^Ibid., 5; clipping from Marlin Daily Democrat,
TCP, con. 3.
17Connally, Information . . . , TCP, con. 3*
18Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, 4.
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handled the situation well by permitting him to take a job
as a farm hand on a neighboring farm at a dollar a day. It
was not long before Tom pleaded with his father, "I'm ready
19for more school."
Tom attended the one-room public school at Eddy and 
studied a curriculum which partially prepared him for college. 
Perhaps the most significant development in his secondary edu­
cation came when a new principal, a Mr. Cochran, introduced 
the practice of inviting parents to attend weekly recitals, 
debates, and contests. Tom not only excelled in mental
20arithmetic, but also experienced his first political debate.
At the age of thirteen, Tom completed the Eddy school. 
Already his half-sister had attended Baylor University in 
nearby Waco, but the elder Connallys wondered if such a young 
boy as Tom might need further education before entering the 
university. After considering several schools in Waco, they 
finally conferred with Baylor officials and agreed to place 
Tom in the preparatory department. The officials labeled 
him "woefully deficient in Latin, chemistry and physics," 
saying that he had learned his "own kind of Latin" at Eddy.
But after six months of hard work, and while he was still but
fourteen years old, Connally entered Baylor as a regular
_ 21 freshman.
^^Ibid., 16. 
^°Ibid. ,, 17. 
^^Ibid., 17-19.
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The course of study at Baylor was largely a standard
classical curriculum. It included such subjects as Greek,
Latin, elocution, composition, and mythology, as well as
surveying, geology, zoology, botany, astronomy, and moral
science. Connally studied hard to justify the expense to
his father, and his record reflects his efforts. He achieved
22uniformly high grades.
Besides his regular studies, Connally enjoyed the
monthly "soirees” with the coeds and entertained thoughts of
becoming a journalist. He worked on the campus magazine
Literary, serving as editor-in-chief during his senior year.
2 3He held a similar post on Volume I of the Baylor Annual, 
which he helped to establish. He also worked hard at mili­
tary science. "Sometimes," he admitted, "I pictured myself 
as a future general." By his senior year, he was the first
24lieutenant, third-ranking cadet officer in the Baylor corps.
Of his outside interests, however, he took the great­
est pride in the Erisophian Society, one of two debating 
groups at Baylor. It was customary for the two groups to 
hold an intramural debate to determine which of them would 
represent Baylor in state-wide competition. In I896, during
22 Ibid., 21; Transcript of T. T. Connally, I892- 
1896, Baylor University, Waco, Texas.
2 3The Annual became the Round-Up.
24 —Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 21-22 ; Enid
Eastland, "The Alumni: Rounding Up the 'Round-Up' Editors,"
The Baylor Monthly (April, I928), 8 .
8
his senior year, the faculty decided, without holding the
campus debate, to send the other society and let the Eriso-
phians go in I897. Such an arrangement seemed unfair to
25Connally who "wanted the better team to go."
To protest the faculty decision, Connally arose one 
day at the conclusion of chapel and began to register his 
complaint to Baylor's President Rufus C. Burleson. Pande­
monium broke loose as everyone joined in the argument. Con­
nally shortly found himself seated in Burleson's office, 
fully expecting to be expelled. Instead he won a weak com­
promise as to which team would represent the university in 
the state debating contest. Neither would. But he felt he 
had won a total victory in justifying his behavior when he
was permitted to remain in school.
At eighteen, Connally was graduated from Baylor, the 
youngest boy in his class. He received the degrees of bach­
elor of arts and bachelor of oratory, and a diploma in mili­
tary science. For the moment, he felt prepared to face the
27world.
His experience as editor of the Annual and Literary 
at Baylor enabled Connally to secure his first job as a
reporter on the Waco Daily Telephone at $10.50 a week. The
^^Ibid., 23. -
26Ibid., 20, 23.
^^Ibid., 25-26; Transcript of T. T. Connally, 1892- 
1896, Baylor University, Waco, Texas.
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job lasted but three weeks, and his brief career as a jour­
nalist ended. During those three weeks, however, Connally 
experienced the excitement of the I896 Democratic National 
Convention as it was reported by telegraph to the Daily 
Telephone. Forced into the drudgery of helping out on the 
family farm after his job in Waco failed, Connally determined 
to make politics his profession. With the blessings and 
support of his parents, whose interest in political affairs 
was never-ending, he prepared to enter law school at The 
University of Texas as a first step toward a career in poli­
tics.^®
Studies were Connally's main concern while in law 
school, but he noticed the freer atmosphere of the State- 
supported university at Austin as compared to the Baptist
29institution at Waco. His roommate was a star baseball 
player and a favorite of the girls. Connally, however, "was 
as far from being a lady's man as Amarillo is from Browns­
ville." When he was not in class he was likely studying in 
the Texas Supreme Court Library or participating in the 
Athenaeum Society, a University of Texas debating group. 
Contrary to precedent, he was chosen to represent the Athe­
naeum Society at the 1897 commencement although he was not
30a member of the graduating class.
2 QConnally, Name Is Tom Connally, 26-27 ; Connally, 
typescript of speech, March 1930, TCP, con. 552.
29Charles Batsell of Sherman, Texas.
^^Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 28-29•
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All of his activities were not so commendable, at 
least in the eyes of the school officials. Noting that 
March 2, Texas Independence Day, was not celebrated on the 
campus of the University as it was elsewhere in the State, 
Connally began promoting a celebration with his fellow stu­
dents. The reason for the oversight on the part of the 
school, he decided, was that the president. Dr. George T. 
Winston, was from North Carolina. Winston made a good scape­
goat in Connally's eyes. "My poor opinion of plump Dr. Win­
ston," he admitted, "was reinforced by the fact that a short 
while before, he had objected to an editorial I had written
for the Alcalde, the weekly paper, and had called me to his
31office where he had given me heck."
When a student delegation from the law school ap­
proached President Winston with the idea, he turned them 
down. "Now boys," Connally quoted him as saying, "we have 
the Fourth of July for the whole United States. That in­
cludes Texas and the other forty-four states. That's enough
32 —celebrating for any of us."
3 3The students were not satisfied. They "borrowed" a 
cannon from the Capitol grounds, dragged it to the campus,
^^Ibid., 30-31.
^^Ibid., 32.
3 3Besides the future Senator Connally, the students 
included Morris Sheppard, U. S. Senator, 1913-19^1; Pat Neff, 
Governor, 1921-1925, and President of Baylor University, 
1932-19^7; and J. W. McClendon, a future judge.
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and at noon March 2, I897, began firing the cannon and making
patriotic speeches about Texas' independence. Connally not
only manned.the cannon but also provided one of the "loudest
and most enthusiastic" speeches of the day. At last President
Winston "surrendered" and proclaimed an official half-day
3Z1.holiday from class, a tradition still in practice.
With only two months remaining in his two-year law 
course, Connally's desire for adventure as a soldier in the 
Spanish-American War interrupted his studies. He first at­
tempted to join one of the cavalry regiments being formed at 
Camp Mabry near Austin. He was discouraged by the general 
lack of organization. He also declined an invitation from 
his old Baylor military instructor, B. B. Buck, now a major, 
to join his Second Texas Infantry Regiment being formed at 
Camp Mabry. Instead, he was more attracted by a regiment of 
cavalry being formed in San Antonio under Colonel Leonard 
Wood and Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt. In the com­
pany of Carl Lovelace, a former Baylor classmate, Connally
35went to San Antonio.
For over a week Connally and Lovelace sought an inter­
view with Wood and Roosevelt. Sent away once by Wood but
3/j.Clipping from The University of Texas Daily Texan, 
March 2, 1950, TCP, con. 117j Walter E. Long, "B Hall of 
Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LXII (April, 1959), 
420; Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 30-32.
^^Clipping from The Service News, XIX (June 26, 1931),
TCP, con. 595; Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 33-34.
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successful at last in seeing Roosevelt, both applicants were
accepted subject to passing physical examinations. Lovelace
passed the final test, but Connally failed. "I'm sorry," the
doctor told him, "but you're too light for your height.-" - All
protests were in vain.
On $2.20 borrowed from Lovelace, Connally rode the
train back to Austin. There he found a more sympathetic
medical examiner and enlisted as a private in the Second
37Texas Infantry. Major Buck named him Sergeant Major of 
the regiment almost immediately. Soon they were on their 
way to Mobile, Alabama, where they were mustered into ser­
vice May 31? 1898.^^
Connally did not inform his family of his decision 
to leave school and volunteer for service in the Spanish- 
American War. But at last he wrote them of his action:
Don't cry and weep about me for there is no 
use and it will do no good. All of you are very 
dear to me and I have to go. But remember I am 
in the army of my country fighting for what is 
right and right will surely win. When his country 
called, my father went out as a soldier and I am 
glad to have an opportunity of following his
^^Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 35»
37Sergeant Major was the highest non-commissioned 
rank at that time.
38In his autobiography, Connally states that he left 
for Alabama May 19? I898. According to records in the Nation­
al Archives, that was the date he was enrolled in Austin.
He remained there some time before departing for Alabama.
Ibid., 35-36; clipping from The Service News, XIX (June 26, 
1931)? TCP, con. 595; Record Group 94, Records of the Ad­





example. I will be back some day to se ou all 
again. Love to all and a fond farewell,
As he passed through Eddy on the train, he tossed his civil-
40ian belongings off to his family and waved good-by.
"Keen to get across to Cuba and wallop those Span­
iards," Connally and the Second Texas Infantry trained near 
Mobile into July and then proceeded to Miami, Florida. There 
they fought their biggest battle of the war--against mosqui­
toes and typhoid fever. After nearly a month, the regiment
moved to Jacksonville, and there Connally was hospitalized
4lwith yellow jaundice. Connally's regiment, which was still
in Florida when the war in Cuba ended, voted not to join the
4:;.
43
2army of occupation, but rather to return home. They were
disbanded in Dallas, Texas, November 9, I898.
While Connally prepared to fight in Cuba, officials 
at The University of Texas decided that he had sufficient 
credits in law school to earn a degree, which was awarded
44in absentia. This automatically licensed Connally to 
practice in Texas under the laws of the day. After resting
39Quoted in Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 36.
40Interview with Mrs. Frances McKay Andrews, niece 
of Tom Connally, June 3, 196?•
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 36-38.
42 „Ibid., 38.
^^Ibid., 38, gives the date as November 7, I898. 
According to military records in the National Archives, the 
date was November 9, I898. Record Group 94, Records of the 
Adjutant General's Office, National Archives, Washington, D.C,
44University of Texas Ex-Student Directory (Graduates 
and Non-Graduates), 1883-1923 TÂustin, n. d.), 70.
\
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through the Christmas season at the family farm, Connally
and his father drove to Waco January 2, 1899, to start the
young lawyer in his profession.
The elder Connally used his influence with the law
partners William Sleeper and E. A. Jones to secure his son
a desk in their office. In return, Tom ran errands for the
firm. It was a small beginning, but it looked good to young
Connally at the time. There was no salary, though a few
unimportant matters were occasionally handed over to the
inexperienced young lawyer. Before long, however, he grew
45restive in this position and decided to leave Waco.
In May, 1899, he moved to Marlin, the county seat of 
Falls County. Jones Connally had earlier suggested the small­
er town as a better place for Tom to begin. Now he was ready 
to admit that his father might be right. At first he was 
housed in the office of another family friend, but soon he 
obtained an office of his own. Next, instead of "acting 
like a successful lawyer [sitting] in his office [watching] 
business come pouring through his doors," Connally set out 
to make himself known in the little town which already 
boasted several lawyers. Most of his time, he later ad-
46mitted, he spent only "threatening to practice law." He
45Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 40-42; Connally, 
Information . . . , TCP, con. 3*
46Eastland, "The Alumni: Rounding Up the 'Round-
Up* Editors," 8.
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joined several lodges, attended public gatherings, and made 
speeches whenever possible. Slowly his practice began to
47grow.
One time a colored preacher came to me [wrote 
Connally] with a deed for some land and asked me 
to check his title. When he returned a few days 
later, I had completed the job and told him that 
his title was clear.
"Mr. Connally," he said, "what do I owe you?"
"You're a minister of the Gospel," I told him,
"and 1 as a lawyer make no charges to a minister 
of peace."
Without blinking an eye, he said enthusiasti­
cally, "Well, if that's the case, Mr. Connally, 
then I just want you to know that from now on, 
you're going to be my lawyer."^®
At first the cases were trivial, but soon Connally 
was appointed one of two public defenders for a Negro charged 
with murder. Shortly thereafter an established attorney 
asked his assistance in. another murder case, and in both 
trials his clients won acquitals. The young lawyer soon 
acquired the needed confidence in the courtroom and the be­
ginning of a good reputation.
Connally had looked upon his law career as a gateway
to politics. "Law and politics are a good combination," his
49father had always told him. His opportunity appeared in 
the late spring of 1900 when no one else was interested in 
running for the State Legislature as the flotorial representative





' ' 50of the Seventy-second Texas District. In spite of running
unopposed, Connally wisely made a tour of the district in a 
token campaign to acquaint himself with his future consti­
tuents. After winning a sure victory in his attempt for pub­
lic office at the age of twenty-three, Connally was sworn into 
the Texas Legislature January 8, I9OI. He was assigned to the
51Criminal Judiciary Committee.
In the Twenty-seventh Legislature, Connally gained a
reputation as one of the "young progressives" in the tradi­
ngtion of James S. Hogg. Almost immediately he found himself 
facing one of the State's most powerful political figures, 
Congressman Joseph W. Bailey. During the administration of 
President William McKinley, Bailey rose to the position of 
minority leader in the House of Representatives, and in 1901 
he was a candidate before the legislature for United States 
Senator.
^^In 1900 this district included the central Texas 
counties of Falls, Milam, and Williamson and was entitled 
to four representatives. One was elected from each of the 
three counties, and the flotorial (or floater) representa­
tive ran at large. The district was not very compact. (See 
Map 1, p. 17.) This partially explains the lack of potential 
candidates.
^^Election Records, 13, Falls County Courthouse, 
Marlin, Texas; Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 46-47»
James S. Hogg was Governor of Texas, I89I-I895, 
and remained a symbol of progressivism. Robert C. Cotner, 
James Stephen Hogg; A Biography (Austin, 1959), 516-517» 
Organized labor in the State recognized Connally's efforts 
in its behalf. See newspaper clipping, [I9I6 ,] containing 
facsimile copy of the letter, H. G. Wagner to TTC, March 
16, 1908, TCP, con. 592.
„
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As Connally joined the legislature, charges were
raised against Bailey for maintaining improper relations
5 3with the Waters-Pierce Oil Company. Bailey called Connally 
into a private conference and sought his vote in support of 
a special committee report which not only exonerated the
candidate of the charges but also attacked those persons who.
advanced them. Connally refused, and thus fell out of favor 
with Bailey, who subsequently was found innocent of the
54charges and elected Senator. The two were never reconciled.
Connally accomplished little of importance in his 
first term in the legislature. He secured passage of a mi­
nor road bill aiding Falls County, and on the last day of 
the session made his first speech--against monopolies. Per­
haps Connally's most significant achievement was the estab­
lishment of a lasting political friendship with a fellow 
legislator, John Nance Garner of Uvalde. While the legis­
lature was redistrieting the State, Garner wanted a new Con­
gressional district created which would include Uvalde. 
Connally supported the successful attempt, and Garner won
55election to Congress from the new district.
5 3The Waters-Pierce Oil Company was a Missouri com­
pany which was secretly owned in part by the Standard Oil 
Company of New Jersey and which did business in Texas. The 
court case involving it covered the years 1897-1909, and is 
one of the most famous in Texas judicial history. For a 
brief description of it see Webb (ed.) The Handbook of Texas,
II, 869.
^^Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 47-48; Sam Hanna 
Acheson, Joe Bailey, The Last Democrat (New York, 1932), 139- 
151; Rupert N. Richardson, Texas : The Lone Star State (Engle­
wood Cliffs, New Jersey, 195^), 284-206.
^^Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 48-49.
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In 1902, Connally sought re-election to the legisla­
ture. Because of redistricting, Falls County now lay in a 
district with McLennan and Limestone counties, which included 
populous Waco. (See Map 2, p. 20.) Only two candidates ran 
for the two flotorial seats allotted to the d i s t r i c t , s o  
for the second time, Connally was assured election to office. 
Nevertheless, he again gave considerable effort to the cam­
paign. If he were ever to gain a higher office, it would be 
imperative to have strong support from Waco and McLennan 
County.
In the Twenty-eighth Legislature, Connally made one 
very important contribution. He secured passage of a measure 
which brought labor unions and farm organizations under the 
terms of the Texas antitrust laws. Some members of the Leg- 
islature objected that this was unfair to both farmers and 
laborers. Others agreed with Connally, who usually was in 
sympathy with these groups, that the bill did not prohibit 
the right of farmers and laborers to organize. It simply 
required that they not engage in the restraint of trade.
The purpose of the law was to satisfy recently implied ob­
jections of the United States Supreme Court to the existing 
Texas antitrust law, which did not cover labor and farmer 
organizations. Connally looked upon his proposed change as
_ third candidate announced but withdrew after a
joint debate among the three men.
Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 50-51-
MAP 2
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necessary if the State were to maintain its restrictions on 
business corporations operating within the State. The bill 
passed the House March 23 by a vote of 103 to 2. It passed 
the Senate March 28 by a vote of 28 to 0.^^
Once in operation, the law did not interfere with 
either the farmers or labor unions. It was, however, very 
effective as an antitrust measure. Under its terms, the State 
ultimately collected $1,808,483.30 in fines and interest 
against the Waters-Pierce Oil Company for antitrust viola-
59tions--a judgment upheld by the United States Supreme Court.
Although Connally was responsible for writing the bill, 
it carried the name Connally-Meachum Act as it passed the 
State legislature. The name resulted from a political deal 
made in the 1903 speaker's race. Connally served as campaign 
manager for Pat Neff, his former classmate. Thinking that 
the campaign would be a close one, he approached Meachum, 
whom Connally considered opposed to Neff. "If you line up 
for Pat Neff," Connally told him when the session opened,
"and see what else you can do for him, I'll let you become 
co-sponsor of my antitrust bill." The bargain was struck;
Neff was safely elected by the vote of seventy-three to
^^Texas, Legislature, House, Journal of the House of 
Representatives of the Regular Session of the Twenty-eighth 
Legislature, CCLXXX, 1903, 941-942. H. P. N. Gammel, The 
Laws of Texas (Austin, 1904), XII, 119-123; Dallas Morning 
News, March 29, 1903.
^^Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86 (I908); 
Webb (ed. )~Handbook of Texas, II, 869; Connally, ^  Name Is 
Tom Connally, 57.
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fifty-seven, and shortly thereafter the Connally-Meachum 
bill was introduced and passed.
Despite the possibility of becoming speaker of the 
House of Representatives, local tradition discouraged Con­
nally from seeking a third term. Returning to private prac­
tice, Connally's income increased. After three years in 
Marlin, he no longer required his father's support. In 1903, 
he moved his office into the new bank building in the center 
of town, and his "practice began to amount to something.
In addition, he succeeded in overcoming much competition and 
the interference of Mrs. Fannie R. Clarkson in his courtship 
of her daughter L o u i s e . M r s .  Clarkson was the wealthy 
widow of a prominent Marlin lawyer, and she was slow to 
accept Connally as qualified to be her son-in-law. He per­
sisted and married Louise Clarkson November l6, 1904.^^
^^Connally implied in his autobiography that the Neff- 
Schluter vote was much closer. Connally, Name Is Tom 
Connally, 51; Cotner, James Stephen Hogg, 517; Texas, Legis­
lature, House, Journal of the House of Representatives of 
the Regular Session of the Twenty-eighth Legislature, CCLXXX,
W T
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 44-45.
G^ibid. , 52-53-
^^Ben B. Clarkson, 1845-1891, left a large estate, 
made up mainly of farm land. His widow, as independent 
executrix, posted $34,000 bond--an indication of the value 
of the estate. Probate Records, E, 586; F, 10-11; K, 602, 
Falls County Courthouse, Marlin, Texas.
64The ceremony occurred at 12:30 p.m. in the fashionable 
Clarkson home in north Marlin. It was performed by A. J. 
Weeks, "an elder in the M. E. Church South." A few close 
friends and relatives attended. An hour later the bride
23
Connally restrained his political ambition for a 
time and gave his attention to making a living. After a 
couple of years 1 however, he again turned to politics. This 
time he ran for County Attorney of Falls County against the 
incumbent, George Carter, who was a personal friend. The 
two had roomed together for a while during Connally's first 
year in Marlin. "When George got married," Connally recalled, 
"he said 'I do' while wearing my dress suit." Nevertheless, 
the two fought each other bitterly. Then Carter fell ill 
and was unable to campaign. This and the fact that Carter 
was seeking a third term, explains Connally's large four-to- 
one victory.
During his two terms as county attorney, Connally 
came into contact with all sorts of people and developed a 
compassion for individuals in all walks of life. Sensational 
murder trials brought attention to his ability as a trial 
lawyer, and he kept himself abreast of political develop­
ments around the State. In I908, he was elected delegate 
to the National Democratic Convention from his Congressional 
district. But when he arrived at the State convention, he 
found that of all the delegates, only he and one other were 
not members of the Joe W. Bailey "crowd." The convention 
adopted a resolution that only supporters of Senator Bailey
and groom left for the St. Louis World's Fair. Marriage 
Records, VI, 567, Falls County Courthouse, Marlin, Texas; 
Marlin Ball, November 17, 1904.
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 5^-55*
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be sent to the national convention, eliminating Connally 
and his friend.
After four years as county attorney, during which 
time a son was born,^^ Connally again turned to his private 
law practice. Friends urged him to run for Congress against 
Robert L. Henry, who had served since 1897,^^ but he con­
cluded that such a move would be wasted effort on his part. 
He bided his time and participated in local affairs whenever 
possible. In 1912, he organized local support for Woodrow 
Wilson and assisted in the election of a Wilson delegate to 
the State Democratic Convention. He also was elected to the 
Marlin school board and served as chairman of a commission
69to draft a new charter for the City of Marlin. Congress 
was a goal, to be sure, but as yet it was only something of 
which to dream.
G^Ibid., 55-61.
Ben Clarkson Connally was born in Marlin, December
28, 1909.
S., Congress, Biographical Directory of the 
American Congress, 177^-1961 (Washington" I96I), 10?4; Webb 
(ed.), Handbook of Texas, I, 799.
^^Newspaper clipping [I916,] TCP, con. 592; Connally, 
Information . . . , TCP, con. 3»
CHAPTER II
YEARS IN THE HOUSE
In 1913s Connally journeyed to Washington as a tour­
ist to witness the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson and the 
end of sixteen years of Republican rule. He "caught the 
excitement of the Capitol Building and tried to imagine what 
it would be like to sit in the House with the political 
greats."^ His opportunity to realize that dream came in 
1915 when Congressman Robert L. Henry announced his intended 
retirement at the end of the current session.
Connally announced for the seat January 15s 19l6. 
Within the next few weeks he received the endorsement of
the Falls County Bar Association and numerous area news- 
2papers. For a time he feared that his friend Pat Neff, 
now the popular County Attorney of McLennan County, might 
also join the race. His opposition was already formidable
^Tom Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg, Name 
Is Tom Connally (New York, 195^), 65•
2Clippings from Marlin Daily Democrat, February I6 , 
1916; Lott Tribune, January l4, I9I6 ; January 26, I916;
Moody Courier, April 7$ 1916; Chilton Homestead, March 13s 
[1916,] TCP, con. 592.
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enough. It included District Judge Tom L. McCullough of
3Waco and District Judge John D, Robinson of Belton^
Connally was definitely underdog. Texas' Eleventh 
Congressional District included McLennan, Falls, Bell, Coryell 
and Hamilton counties. (See Map 3, p. 27.) Waco and Temple 
were the largest urban centers and were in the populous coun­
ties of McLennan and Bell, which were also the home counties 
of McCullough and Robinson. The two judges were better known 
in the district as a whole. And in addition, Connally was 
opposed by both Governor James E. Ferguson, who resided in
Bell County, and by outgoing Congressman Henry of McLennan 
4C ounty.
Connally began his campaign April l4, 1916, at his 
old home town, Eddy, which was friendly territory. A big 
turnout, including friends from miles around, appeared for 
"Connally Day" and got him off to a good start.^ He bought 
a new Buick roadster with "the brightest red wheels you ever 
saw and a shiny black body . . . . And everywhere I'd stop,
3It was John D. Robinson whom Connally beat out as 
representative from the Athenaeum Society to speak at the 
1897 commencement at The University of Texas. Connally had 
nominated Robinson for the honor, but the group was so im­
pressed with Connally's nominating speech that he was chosen 
instead. Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 29*
^Ibid., 65-67.
^Clipping from Waco Morning News, [April 15, I916], 
TCP, con. 592.
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[wrote Connally,] a crowd poured into the street to examine 
my Buick.
Connally campaigned on a twenty-five-point platform.
He advocated a child-labor law, government-owned and -operated 
arsenals, higher tax rates for the wealthy, a low tariff, in­
dependence for the Philippines, an international court, a
revision in labor legislation which would favor the worker,
7and national preparedness. Although the principal economic 
activity of the Congressional district was agriculture, Con­
nally made a special appeal to organized labor in the area, 
pointing to his anti-big business record in the Texas leg- 
islature--a position which was also conveniently attractive 
to farmers.^ For the most part, however, the candidates
9differed little on the basic national issues.
Robinson was generally considered the strongest can­
didate since Ferguson and Henry supported him and he was the
10only "wet" candidate in what was considered a "wet" region.
^Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 69-70.
^Clipping from Gatesville Messenger, March 31, 1916, TCP, 
con. 592; Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 68.
^Newspaper clipping, [I916,] containing facsimile 
copy of a letter, H. G. Wagner to TTC, March I6 , I908, TCP, 
con. 592.
^Clipping from McGregor Mirror, February 11, I9I6 ,
TCP, con. 592.
^^McCullough was the only avowed "dry" candidate, 
while Connally maintained the middle position of personally 
favoring prohibition but supporting the principle of local 
option. In 1917, however, he voted for the XVIIIth Amend­
ment in the House of Representatives. U.S., Congressional 
Record, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., 1917, LVI, Pt. T] 469.
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With this in mind, it was Connally's idea to concentrate
mainly against McCullough so as to get as much "dry" and
anti-Robinson vote as p o s s i b l e . I n  the end, his strategy
proved effective. Not only was Connally elected, but also
the prohibition question was submitted to the people.
"Submission," as the issue was popularly called, passed in
the five counties of the Eleventh District by a vote of
10,953 to 9 ,385*^^ This indicated that the "wet" vote in
that area was not so strong as predicted and Connally's
middle-of-the-road stand in favor of local option attracted
votes. Connally safely led both his opponents, as the fel-




Tom Connally 9064 39.7
John D. Robinson 7386 32.4
Tom L. McCullough 6362 27.9
Totals 22,812 100.0
11Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 67-75*
^^Dallas Daily Times Herald, July 30, I916.
13Official returns are not available. Only a certi­
fication of nomination was filed with the Secretary of State 
rather than the exact vote of each of the candidates. Thus 
the newspaper tabulations are the best source available.
These figures were published by some Texas newspapers eight 
days after the election, and are fairly complete. See Dallas 
Morning News, July 30, I916; Dallas Daily Times Herald, July
30, 1916.
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As the nominee of the Democratic Party, Connally
faced only token opposition in the general election the
following November. The Republican candidate, John L.
14Vaughn, was from Mart, in eastern McLennan County; Thomas
15M. De Loach of Waco ran as a Socialist. Connally easily 
defeated both men, as the following chart indicates, and 





Tom Connally Democratic 14,695 87.7
John L. Vaughn Republic an 1,443 8.6
Thomas M. De Loach Socialist 620 3.7
Totals 16,758 100.0
The European war held the attention of the country 
as Connally entered Congress in 1917» Significantly, he 
drew an assignment on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 
Congressman John Nance Garner, in charge of committee assign­
ments for Texas members, noted that it was a minor committee,
14Paul Casdorph, A History of the Republican Party 
in Texas, 1863-1963 (Austin, 1965), 256.
15Polk's Morrison ^  Fourny Waco City Directory 
(Waco, 1916), ^ 6 ; Waco Semi-Weekly Tribune, November 1,
1916.
^^1916 Election Register, Office of the Secretary 
of State, Austin, Texas (mimeographed copy); clipping from 
Lott Tribune, January l4, I916, TCP, con. 592.
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but he encouraged the new Congressman to accept it since the
17special session was called to deal with the German crisis.
Connally's first day in Congress was a memorable one 
by any standard. The day was gloomy, excitement all through 
the capital was great, and Connally was understandably tense. 
The first order of business was the election of Speaker Champ 
Clark, which due to the smallness of the Democratic plurality,
18was in question until the votes were cast. Connally voted
19with the majority.
Later that night President Wilson addressed a joint
session of Congress to request a declaration of war. Then
at ten o'clock, Connally attended his first committee meeting
when the House Foreign Affairs Committee considered the joint
resolution for war. Finally, April 4, the committee reported
the resolution with only one dissenting vote. Although he
gave serious consideration to the grave issue, he never fal-
20tered in his support of the resolution. He again voted 
17Although it lies outside the scope of this study, 
it should be noted here that Connally's principal work in 
the Congress was as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations.
This assignment, then, was the beginning of his work in for­
eign affairs. Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 78.
1 8Ibid., 79; Seward W. Livermore, Politics Is Ad- 
.iourned: Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, I916-I918 
(Middletown, Conn." 19^6), 13-l4.
S., Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1917, LV, Pt. 1, 107.
20Dorsey Shackleford of Missouri was the dissenter 
on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The resolution 
passed the House April 6 by a vote of 373 to 50, Connally 
voting "aye." Ibid., 412; Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally,
78-81. ------------
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with the majority when the House endorsed the declaration 
of war.
It was an awesome beginning for the freshman Con­
gressman. After a month in Washington, he found time to
21write home to his aging mother.
Washington, May 2, 1917
Dear Mother
I'm ashamed that I've not written you before 
but since I've been here there have been so many 
things to keep me busy and so much has had to be 
done that I have had very little time [to] do 
anything. Being a new member, I felt that I 
should give all the time I could to learning the 
way of things here and I think I have succeeded 
fairly well so far.
Fortunately I secured good committee assign­
ments for a new member and have made many new 
friends and acquaintances. We are pleasantly 
located and are keeping house in an apartment.
Louise does her own work and teaches Ben his 
lessons at home. We are all anxious to get home 
again to see all of you but we do not know when 
we shall get away. Some think by the first of 
June but I am fearful that we shall not be able 
to get away until the middle of June or perhaps 
later.
The war presents) many momentous questions. The 
spending of billions of dollars and the raising of 
taxes to a point much higher than ever in the recent 
past. The consequences are terrible to contemplate 
when we think of the blood that must be shed, the 
terrible toll of life and the hardships and priva­
tions that must be endured.
I feel that my duty requires that I stay at my 
post. If circumstances were hot such I think I 
should try to render the country some service in 
assisting in the war. It all brings, back vividly 
the days of I898 when we were at war with Spain.
Louise has heard from Bertha and I am so glad 
that all of you are well and getting along nicely. 
The rains which have fallen since we left home
21Andrews Mss.
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doutless have given much encouragement in the 
hope for good crops. Prices will be good in all 
farm products and with a good yield Texas will 
prosper notwithstanding the war.
Dear Mother forgive me for ray failure to write 
âs often as I should. I'm thinking of you just 
the same and I am grateful to you always for mak­
ing it possible for me to realize some of my am­
bitions. You have always been so good to me and 
have always inspired me to endeavor to accomplish 
something in the world.
With love to all of [you] and especially to 
you in which Louise and Ben join.
Affectionately,
Tom.
After the declaration of war, Wilson's conscription
request was critically debated. The issue was nonpartisan,
22with Speaker Clark leading the opposition, and Julius 
Kahn, Republican of California, sponsoring the administration-
endorsed bill. Most Southern members favored the volunteer
23method of raising an army, but Connally showed both inde­
pendence of sectional pressure and loyalty to the Wilson
24administration by voting for conscription.
Connally accomplished little of importance in those
early years. For instance, he secured for his district one
• 25of the army training camps, Camp Mac Arthur, near Waco.
22The opposition included such other prominent Demo­
crats as Majority Leader Claude Kitchin of North Carolina 
and S. H. Dent of Alabama, chairman of the House Military 
Affairs Committee.
O OLivermore, Politics Is Adjourned, I6-I8.
24 /-U. S., Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1917, LV, Pt. 2, 1557; Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 89.
^^Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 87.
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But he refrained from engaging in debate on the floor of the 
House for quite a while. He finally took that step during 
the controversy over Theodore Roosevelt's request to raise 
a volunteer unit similar to the old Rough Riders. In his 
speech of May 12, Connally opposed "a special privilege to 
appease the desire of one man to lead the 'first' force to 
France." He said that the recently passed conscription act 
would be seriously weakened by approving Roosevelt's request. 
Instead of asking for privileges, he told the House, Roose­
velt ought to say, "Here am I--not as a major general, but 
here am I as a private if need be--here am I; send me wher­
ever thou needest me ; thy will and not mine be done. " As 
the applause broke out, Connally sat down with a dry tongue.
More than a year passed before he again addressed the 
House. Then, September 11, 1918, he delivered what should 
properly be considered his maiden speech. In it he advocated 
the passage of the 1918 revenue bill, which required those 
who were profiting from the war to pay a larger share of its 
cost. The Texas representative developed a theme that he 
would repeat many times during his Congressional career--the 
need for taxing excess and war profits. "If the young man­
hood of the land gladly rushes to arms in the Nation's hour 
of need, ready to make any sacrifice," Connally declared, 
"surely there should be no grumbling when extravagant profits
U. S., Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1917, LV, Pt. 3? 2213-2214; Connally, Name Is Tom Connally,
89.
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27are drafted for the service of the country." The speech 
was a lengthy discourse on American and German military his­
tory, including a summary of the events leading to the war. 
Even though the end of the war was in sight, he argued, the 
American people should not decrease their support of the war 
effort. Burying his appeal under an excess of classical ref­
erences, this speech more closely resembled his college de­
bates than the biting and witty orations for which he was 
later known. But he held the attention of the House for al­
most thirty minutes and received noticeable applause at least
28eight times.
The next day, Connally received his commission as an 
army captain and adjutant of the Twenty-second Infantry Bri­
gade, Eleventh Division, stationed at Camp Meade, Maryland.
He was the first Democratic member of Congress to volunteer 
29for the army. In a statement to the press, he said:
Having had military experience and the army being 
in need of men with such experience, I have decided 
to join the army even though members of congress 
are exempt under the law. All of the great war 
measures have been passed by congress and the work 
of the present session is about concluded. The 
session which convenes in December will only be 
in session a short time and will he devoted largely 
to routine matters. The regular session of the next
S., Congressional Record, 65t-h Cong., 2d Sess., 
1918, LVI, Pt. 10, 10212.
P ftIbid., 10212-10216.
^^Clipping from [Washington?] Star, September I8, 
1918, TCP, con. 592. Four Republicans had already volun­
teered.
36
congress does not convene until December, 1919s 
and all of us hope the war will be ended by that 
t X me # # # #
Since I draw no salary as a member of congress 
until my return from the army I have thought my 
constituencies would be willing for me to have a 
leave of absence. Both of the Texas senators and 
my colleagues in the house from Texas have kindly 
consented to look after departmental business for 
me. On votes in the house I am paired against a 
republican, who is in the a r m y . 30
Although this was the second war in -which he had volunteered,
Connally was not destined to experience combat duty. As late
as October, I918, his division was scheduled for overseas
duty at any moment, but it was still at Camp Meade when the
31Germans surrendered.
Urged by his fellow members to return to Congress, 
Connally quickly obtained a discharge. He did not resume his 
duties in the House, however, until after the passage of a 
resolution to restore to the rolls those members who had 
joined the military. Meanwhile, without any particular ef­
fort on his part, Connally was renominated in the Texas Demo­
cratic primary and re-elected to Congress in the November
32general elections. -
^^^Clipping from Waco Times-Heraid, September 28, 
[1918,] TCP, con. 592.
31Actually Connally spent much of his army service 
seriously ill with a case of flu. There was great relief 
among members of his family at Eddy when news came by tele­
phone that he had passed the crisis and was expected to 
survive. Personal interview with Mrs. Frances McKay Andrews, 
niece of TTC, June 3, 1967; clipping from West News, Novem­
ber 1, 1918, TCP, con. 592.
Q 2Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 95.
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During the immediate post-war period, Connally was
concerned with the peace-making efforts of Congress. As a
member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee he attended
one lengthy session at the White House after Wilson returned
in 1919 from his first European trip. Shortly thereafter
Connally and a group of Congressmen made a tour of Europe on
their own. He had no doubt about the usefulness of a league
of nations, a belief he still held after the next war. In
fact, almost anything Wilson advocated, Connally accepted as
necessary. ’’For,” Connally wrote, ”I admired Woodrow Wilson
more than any man alive . . . .  In government and statecraft,
he was probably the best advised person in the world at that 
3 3time.” Connally played no significant role in the League 
debate in Congress, but he was among the regular Democrats 
Wilson could rely on throughout his administration. Looking 
back on events, however, Connally was a little more cautious 
in his acceptance of all that Wilson did:
At the time, I thought that Wilson had acted 
properly in asking the Senate to reject the Lodge 
reservations [to the Treaty of Versailles]. Cer­
tainly, they watered down the League of Nations.
But now [195 ]̂ I believe that if he had accepted 
the reservations, things might have been better in 
the long run. At least we would have had a toe­
hold. A weak League could have been strengthened 
in the years to come. And American participation 





In the House, Connally continued to back Wilson.
When the Republican-dominated Foreign Affairs Committee re­
ported a joint resolution calling for peace with Germany, 
Connally led the House fight against it. He spoke at length 
April 8, 1920, but the resolution passed. Nevertheless, Pres­
ident Wilson, who was reportedly impressed by Connally's argu­
isments, vetoed the action the following month.
When Wright Patman proposed a bonus for World War 1 
American servicemen, Connally opposed his fellow Texan. He 
argued in the House that it was nothing but a cheap trick to 
get votes just before the 1920 elections. Many of his own 
constituents, he maintained, including veterans, were opposed 
to the measure, and he challenged the idea that veterans would 
benefit from the bonus as much as its supporters claimed.
In 1920, the Congressman attended his first Demo­
cratic National Convention. As a delegate, he followed the 
Texas leadership and supported William McAdoo for president. 
Only on the last ballot did the Texas delegation vote for Gov­
ernor James A. Cox, the nominee of the convention. After the 
convention adjourned, Connally served on the formal committee 
to notify Cox of his nomination, and he continued his activity 
in the presidential campaign by making speeches in Oklahoma
^^Ibid., 103-104; U. S.. Congressional Record, 66th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1920, LIX, Pt. 5, 5352-5358; ibid., Pt. 6, 
5480; ibid., Pt. 7, 7429; ibid. , Pt. 8, 7809.
S., Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 
1920, LIX, Pt. 8, 7936.
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37and Missouri. In the little Mississippi River town of Cape 
Girardeau, Missouri, Connally first met Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
the Democratic nominee for vice president. In the light of
later events, it was a memorable occasion:
F. D. R. and 1 were together for about one hour
at Cape Girardeau [Connally recalled]. He made a
short speech and then rushed off to another engage­
ment. Since he used little of his time at Cape 
Girardeau, 1 had to fill in most of his speaking 
date as well as my own. On that occasion he did 
not strike me as an aggressive speaker. He was 
certainly serious and earnest and showed youthful 
vigor. But he told no stories during his speech 
and didn't try to work up a close feeling between 
himself and his audience. . . . Years later when
F. D. R. became President, 1 recalled to him our 
Cape Girardeau speaking date, and he readily re­
membered it with an embarrassed grin.3"
After the Republican victory in 1920, Congressmen 
such as Connally could accomplish little. He was responsible 
in part, however, for an amendment to the 1921 naval appro­
priation bill to provide funds for the calling of an inter­
national disarmament conference. Connally's original amend­
ment failed in the House, but subsequently the idea was 
sponsored by William E. Borah and restored to the bill in 
Senate action. Accepted by a conference committee, it fin­
ally became law and led to the calling of the Washington
39Conference in 1921.
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 104-106.
^̂ Ibid., 106.
O QU. S., Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 3d Sess.,
1921,, LX, Pt. 5, 4733-4734; Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Con­
nally, 107-108.
4o
Connally normally remained in the background as the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee did its work. Through that 
committee, however, he introduced an amendment to an appro­
priation bill, raising the fee for passports. Against much 
noisy opposition, he argued that his amendment would raise 
from ten to twelve million dollars a year, enough to pay the 
cost of the entire foreign service. His amendment was ac­
cepted in a modified form and the bill passed in February,
1921.4°
When the 1924 National Democratic Convention nomi­
nated John W. Davis, Connally was on his way to Europe with 
a Congressional investigating committee. Upon his return, 
he actively supported the national Democratic ticket. He 
was not especially impressed with his party's candidate when 
he finally saw him, but neither was he pleased with Coolidge's 
victory in November. Connally wrote about Coolidge: "He
no more acted the part of an aggressive President than an
4lold barn door."
During the Coolidge years, Connally secured passage 
of a bill raising the age of army volunteers from eighteen 
to twenty-one and another creating the House Veterans
4°0n the floor of the House, Connally's amendment to 
raise the fee from one dollar to five dollars was removed.
In the Senate the idea was incorporated again and the fee 
was made ten dollars. The House finally accepted the Senate 
version. U. S., Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 3d Sess., 
1921, LX, Pt. 5, 4732 5 ibid. , Ptl 5̂  4008 ; Connally, Name 
Is Tom Connally, 86.
4lHe would have preferred William G. McAdoo as the 
Democratic nominee. Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, 109- 
110.
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Committee. Occasionally he spoke for the Democratic minority 
in House debate on foreign affairs. For instance, he sup­
ported a settlement with Mexico and denounced United States 
interference in Nicaragua. He told the Woman's Democratic 
Club of Houston:
As the representative of mothers and fathers whose 
unwilling sons must carry on war when it is waged,
I protest against such a thing [as intervention in 
Nicaragua]. In the name of the rights of small 
nations as well as of great I protest against it.
In the name of fairness to the people of Nicaragua 
I protest against it. Above all, as an American 
citizen who loves his country and who glories in 
its traditions I protest against it, because it is 
wrong. . . .  We are alienating the respect and con­
fidence of Europe and stirring up the hatred and 
bitter passions of every people in South and Central 
America. . .
In matters more closely related to his constituents,
he gave his support to efforts against the various McNciry-
Haugen bills. Though meant as farm relief, which he strongly
favored, the plan in Connally's view was nothing more than
"levying a tax on everything [the farmers] sold without assur-
43ing them that they would get an increase in prices." More­
over, he complained that although it might benefit the pro­
ducers of a limited number of agricultural commodities, it
44would not help cotton growers.
LlOConnally, speech, April 10, 1928, TCP, con. 551»
43Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 111-113.
44U. s.. Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1926, LXVII, Pt. %  9472-9475. Connally himself owned exten­
sive cotton lands, as did his wife and mother. TTC to W. B. 
Yeary, February 15, 1928, TCP, con. 122.
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In addition, he felt that the proposed tax, or equali-
45zation fee as it was called, was unconstitutional. He told
one audience of constituents:
I was opposed to giving a Federal Farm Board of 
twelve members, only three of whom were from cotton 
growing states, the unlimited power to tax every 
farmer any amount it might see fit on the products 
of his soil and toil. I was also opposed t t h a t  
feature which levied the fee upon every bale of 
cotton and bushel of wheat on every farmer in the 
land, and then turned over the money so collected 
to the co-ops society [sic] to handle and to spend.
His position was appreciated in Texas. One observer comment­
ing upon the last McNary-Haugen bill stated: "The support of 
this measure has grown to be something of a craze, but 1
have not found in Texas any decided tendency among those
47engaged in farming to indorse it. . . ." The regularity
with which Connally was re-elected, and the size of his vote, 
support that impression.
^^Connally voted against the bill in 1924 and 1927, 
although many Southern Congressmen supported it in 1927* He 
would have voted for it in 1928 had the equalization fee been 
removed. Instead, he was paired against it and remained in 
Texas to campaign. U. S., Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 
1st Sess., 1924, LXV, Pt. 10^ 10341; 69th Cong., 2d Sess., 
1927, Pt. 4, 4099; TTC to Victor H. Schoffelmeyer, February 
23, 1928; TTC to A. C. Perry, telegram, April 12, 1928; A.
C. Perry to TTC, telegram, April 12, 1928; A. C. Perry to 
TTC, April 19, 1928, TCP, con. 122; John D. Hicks, Republi­
can Ascendancy (New York, I96O), I98.
46Connally, speech, April 17, 1928, TCP, con. 551;
TTC to Texas Farm Bureau Federation, February 23, 1928,
TCP, con. 122.
122.
^^T. N. Jones to TTC, January 27, 1928, TCP, con.
43
Connally introduced a more beneficial plan for Texas 
cotton interests February 23, 1928. It proposed the creation 
of an export corporation and the inauguration of a tariff de­
benture system, both of which were endorsed by George B. 
Terrell, Texas Commissioner of Agriculture. The export 
debenture idea was not original with the Connally bill.
Rather, it was first considered in 1926 by Congress in the
48McKinley-Adkins bill and was endorsed by the National Grange. 
Connally believed that this plan would relieve the depressed 
price of cotton on the domestic market. Since the proposal 
contained a bounty for exported cotton in the form of a de­
benture certificate, supporters of the plan hoped to stim-
49ulate foreign trade. In explaining his plan to the pres­
ident of the Farmers Marketing Association in Dallas, he 
wrote :
I [favor] the export debenture plan whereby the 
export corporation or any other exporter of cotton 
or other agricultural products would receive a 
treasury debenture which would authorize them to 
import manufactured goods at a reduced tariff rate.
These debentures would be negotiable and the cor­
poration could sell the same to importers. It has
been estimated that in this way the farmers of the
United States would secure an average of $144,000,000.00 
annually in increased values to their product . . .
48George B. Terrell to TTC, February 16, 1928, TCP, 
con. 122; John D. Black, Agricultural Reform in the United
States (New York, 1929), 255-
4qTTC to W. B. Yeary, February 23, 1928, TCP, con.
122; U. S., Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1928, LXIX, Pt. 3, 3490.
^^TTC to W. B. Yeary, February 15, 1928, TCP, con.
122.
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He further desired to create a government corporation that
would guarantee the cost of production to farmers, but the
export debenture was his main concern. Although Connally
pleaded with the House Committee on Agriculture to approve
at least one of the several bills which carried all or some
of his proposals, none passed during the Coolidge Adminis- 
51tration. One was defeated on a roll call vote by l46- 
185.52
The regulation of cotton exchanges was another of 
Connally's projects. Texas farm interests urged such regu­
lation throughout this period as a means of stabilizing the 
5 3cotton market. Connally introduced a bill for this purpose
5 4:February 8, 1928.^ The idea was not to destroy the exchanges
51U. S., Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1928, LXIX, Pt. 3, 2818-2821.
52This vote is not a good reflection of support for 
the export debenture. The proposal was in the nature of a 
substitute for the McNary-Haugen bill, and many of those 
voting for it were actually opposed to all price-raising 
schemes, voting for this for strategical reasons. Connally 
was recorded here as "not voting." See Black, Agricultural 
Reform in the United States, 255-
5 3Examples include Frank A. Briggs, Editor of Farm 
and Ranch, and George B. Terrell, Texas Commissioner of 
Agriculture. Frank A. Briggs to TTC, February l4, 1928;
George B. Terrell to TTC, February I6 , I828, TCP, con. 122.
See also T. N. Jones to TTC, January 27, 1928, TCP, con. 122.
5 4It was proposed to Connally by Frank A. Briggs.
TTC to Frank Briggs, February 9, 1928, con. 122. A similar 
bill was introduced by Carl Vinson of Georgia. TTC to H. 0. 
Cross, February 9, 1928; TTC to George B. Terrell, February 
9, 1928, TTC to George B. Terrell, February 24, 1928, TCP, 
con, 122; U. S., Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1928, LXIX, Pt. 3, 2762.
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but rather to control them, "so as to cut out manipulation,
straddling, fictitious sales, tendering and retendering of
the same dog-tail cotton from time to time with no bona fide
5 5intention of actual sale or delivery. . . He argued
that during the fall of 192? the cotton market had been 
"scandalously manipulated," with prices varying thirty dol­
lars a bale. But just as in the case of his bill for an 
export debenture system. Congress did nothing toward the 
regulation of cotton exchanges.
For twelve years Connally served in the House of 
Representatives5 interrupted only by his brief military 
career. His constituents supported him faithfully at elec­
tion time, and seldom did he have even the slightest hint 
of opposition. In 1922 ¥. D. Lewis announced for the seat, 
but when Connally let it be known that he was not going home 
to campaign, Lewis withdrew. In 1926, he was opposed by 
Lowesco Brann of Hamilton County, but that proved little
57more than a practice exercise for the popular incumbent.
During the campaign, the two candidates met in joint 
debate at a community called Deer Creek. Making use of a 
single lemon lying on the table in front of him, Connally 
would pound the table to emphasize his points, causing the
55ttc to George B. Terrell, February 9, 1928, TCP, 
con. 122.
^^One of the three similar bills by Vinson, with 
which Connally would have been satisfied, was reported from 
committee, but the House took no action on it. U.S., Con-fressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 1928, LXIX, Pt. 8,V tW.
^^Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 113-114.
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lemon to bounce around. Both Connally and the crowd were 
amused. "I proceeded to ignore Brann from then on,” wrote 
Connally, "and let him stumble through the rest of the 
[campaign] without me or the lemon." Connally won an over-£- O
whelming victory,
Connally's six terms in Congress were not extra­
ordinary. He served on no major committees, and he spon­
sored no major legislation. He supported Wilson's war 
effort, favored the League of Nations and the Treaty of Ver­
sailles, opposed the veterans' bonus bill and the McNary- 
Haugen bills, and stood with the Democrats against most of 
the partisan issues in the Republican Twenties. His speaking 
ability was acknowledged and used, both in House debates and 
in political campaigns. His seat in the Congress was safe 
for the foreseeable future, but advancement within the party 
structure in the House of Representatives was restricted by 
others with more seniority. Had Connally left Washington in 
1928, and were he to be judged on the basis of his House 
career, he would be remembered no better than Robert L.
Henry, his predecessor, or Oliver H. Cross, his successor.
Just when he began to consider running for the 
United States Senate is uncertain, but there is little 
doubt that becoming Senator had been his ambition for years.
In the early Twenties he was urged to run by his former
  —   '   - - --
^^Ibid.. 114.
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59college roommate, Charles Batsell, and by Fred Acree, an 
influential Waco s u p p o r t e r . B u t  in both 1922 and 1924, 
there were good reasons not to run. In the first year the 
leading candidates were far better known than Connally, one 
having run for president in 1920.^^ In 1924, the popular 
Morris Sheppard, author of the XVIIIth Amendment, stood for 
re-election. Not until 1928 did Connally see an opportunity 
for political advancement.
^^Charles Batsell to TTC, November 8, 1920, TCP, con.
3.
[Fred Acree] to TTC, April 3, 1922, Fred Acree 
Papers, A 1/8, 60. University of Texas Archives, Austin, 
Texas.
^^In 1922 Earle B. Mayfield defeated James E. Fer­
guson, former governor and candidate for president on the 
American Party ticket in 1920. Mayfield had been a member 
of the Texas Railroad Commission.
CHAPTER III
SENATE CAMPAIGN, 1928
In thirty years of politics, Tom Connally never lost 
a bid for public office. Neither did he attempt a state-wide 
campaign. When he decided to run for the United States 
Senate in 1928, he stood a good chance of losing. Twelve 
years in Congress had gained him little fame outside his 
rural central Texas district, and at the age of fifty, de­
feat in a Senatorial race would seriously damage his polit­
ical future.  ̂ Re-election to Congress, on the other hand, 
would be a simple and entirely predictable matter.
Connally never lacked self-confidence, nor was he 
blind to political signs around the State indicating dis­
pleasure with the incumbent Senator, Earle B. Mayfield.
In 1922, Mayfield utilized a Ku Klux Klan endorsement,
according to general belief, to defeat an avowed anti-Klan 
2candidate. The Klan subsequently declined sharply in
^His predecessor in Congress, Robert L. Henry, had 
not run for re-election in I916 in order to campaign for a 
Senate seat instead. Defeated, he never again held public 
office. Walter Prescott Webb (editor-in-chief), The Hand­
book of Texas (Austin, 1952), 1, 799; Tom Connally, as told 
to Alfred Steinberg, My Name Is Tom Connally (New York, 1954)
119. 2Former Governor James E. Ferguson.
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3power across the State and left Mayfield open to attack.
As Connally looked about in the House of Representatives,
it seemed that his future had definite limitations. John
Nance Garner, Sam Rayburn and two other members of the Texas
4delegation possessed more seniority than Connally. Three 
others had equal seniority.^ After determining that certain 
Texas Democrats did not plan to run,^ Connally entered the
7Senate race January 24, 1928.
OThis was apparent as early as 1924 when Mrs. Miriam 
A. Ferguson defeated the Klan candidate, Felix D. Robertson, 
for governor by nearly 100,000 votes. Charles C. Alexander, 
"The Ku Klux Klan in Texas, 1920-1930," The Historian of the 
University of Texas, 1 (September, 1962), 21-43 j Charles C. 
Alexander, The Ku Klux Klan in the Southwest ([Lexington, ] 
1965)1 199; Rupert Norval Richardson, Texas : The Lone Star
State (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1958), 317i Alexander 
Heard and Donald S. Strong, Southern Primaries and Elections, 
I92O-I949 ([Tuscaloosa, Alabama,] 1950), Ï36.
^Garner entered the House March 4, 1903. He was 
slated to be minority floor leader in 1929 and would become 
Speaker in 1931» If Connally had remained in the House and 
Garner had chosen to keep his position on the Ways and Means 
Committee, some thought Connally would have been the next 
minority leader. Osgood Roberts, "Connally's Ambition for 
Senate Upsets House Democrats," Washington News, January 
28, 1928, (typescript), TCP, con. 551» Rayburn and Hatton 
W. Sumners became members March 4, 19131 while James P. 
Buchanan joined Congress April 5, 1913»
^They were Joseph J. Mansfield, Thomas L. Blanton, 
and Marvin Jones.
g
Connally would have deferred to any of the follow­
ing who might have run: former Governor Pat Neff, Governor
Dan Moody, Garner, Rayburn, or Cullen F. Thomas, a former 
candidate for Senator. Connally, Mŷ  Name Is Tom Connally,
118-119.
nTTC, Press Release, January 25, 1928 (mimeographed), 
TCP, con. 551*
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Besides Connally and Mayfield, four other candidates
g
entered the race. Two of these, Congressman Thomas L.
Blanton and Colonel Alvin M. Owsley, were major contenders. 
Blanton represented the Abilene district in Congress, and 
as the only candidate from West Texas, he would surely be
9strong in that section of the State. Owsley was a former 
national commander of the American L e g i o n . C l a i m i n g  to 
be a friend of the veteran, and better known in the more 
populous eastern half of the State, he was a stronger candi­
date than Blanton. The two additional candidates, Mrs.
Minnie Fisher Cunningham and former Congressman Jeff: McLemore, 
had only small followings.
8A seventh candidate was former Governor 0. B. Col­
quitt, who announced April 1?, 1928, but withdrew June 5 
when it became apparent that New York Governor Alfred E.
Smith would capture the Democratic nomination for president. 
Colquitt said he could not run on the same ticket with Smith.
An eighth candidate, Houston lawyer W. A. Rowe, was in the 
race only briefly. Tyler Courier-Times, February 17, 1928; 
Gainesville Daily Register, June 5» 1928; Washington News, 
January 28, I928 (typescript), TCP, con. 551»
^Austin American-Statesman, April 22, I928.
^^Apparently at one time Connally had planned to make 
a nominating speech for Owsley at the 1924 Democratic Na­
tional Convention for vice president on the ticket with John 
W. Davis. A manuscript for such a speech is in TCP, con.
550. Connally, however, was not a delegate to the conven­
tion, but rather went to Europe to investigate the United 
States Shipping Board. Owsley was nominated instead by 
Thomas H. Ball of Houston, but before the first ballot was 
completed, Owsley's name was withdrawn and Texas changed 
its votes to Charles Bryan, the winner of the nomination. 
Democratic Party, National Convention, New York, 1924,
Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic Na­
tional Convention . . 1924 (Indianapolis, [1924]),
7 3 , 9 9 8 -9 9 9, 1 0 2 7 , 1 0 2 9 .
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Before the campaign was well underway, Washington 
columnist Clinton ¥. Gilbert, in "Mirrors of Washington," 
predicted a Connally victory and encouraged his cause:
Good judges of Texas politics tell me that 
Texas is likely to get a good senator out of 
the welter of candidates who have entered the 
race to succeed Senator Earle B. Mayfield, 
namely. Representative Tom Connally . . . .
If Connally should win the senatorship. . . ,
Texas would send to Washington its best qual­
ified man. John Garner, another Texan, is an 
able man, but he is temperamentally a House 
member and not a senator. Mr. Connally is a 
man of good sense who makes an excellent speech.
With the opportunities of the Senate he should 
develop into one of the best men on the Demo­
cratic side.
Connally conceded from the beginning that Mayfield 
would lead in the first Democratic primary. This left him 
the task of beating Blanton and Owsley for a spot in a run­
off with Mayfield. But since Mayfield was the real opponent,
Connally concerned himself primarily with an attack on the
12Senator's vulnerable record.
Connally opened his campaign April 17 at Belton, in
13his own friendly Congressional district. His long speech
^^Clinton W. Gilbert, "Texas Has a Chance to Send a 
Good Senator to Washington," Dallas Times Herald, February 
l4, 1928 (mimeographed), TCP, con. 551-
12_ Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 119; Amarillo
Daily News, April 28, I928.
13His mother sat on the platform with him just as 
she had at the opening of his campaign for the House in 
1916. This time he was a little more than disturbed by her 
reaction to his campaign. She told him that he "should have 
been satisfied to stay in the House of Representatives." 
Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 120.
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touched practically every current political issue. Subse­
quent speeches were similar. Before the common use of radio, 
it was imperative to develop every theme in each speech. His 
favorite topics--those his audiences seemed to like best-- 
were farm legislation,the Eighteenth Amendment, European war 
debts, immigration, and the tariff. From the outset he prom­
ised to support the nominee of the Democratic National Con­
vention, whoever he might be. The issue of a "wet" Catholic 
for president was serious in Texas, but party loyalty was 
more important to Connally. Speaking in the north Texas 
town of Childress, Connally told a questioner:
. . . I do declare that the Democratic party is the
one hope of the nation in this hour when Republican 
corruption and an orgy of graft and bribery has 
brought high officers in Washington to the lowest 
state in the nation's history, and I shall give 
loyal support to my party. It has always been my 
uniform practice to support the nominee of my 
party.
Connally scored his biggest points, however, when he 
launched personal attacks on Mayfield, the only opponent he 
ever mentioned by name.^^ Once during the campaign Mayfield 
offered a suit to anyone who could show that Connally had 
accomplished anything as a Congressman. "Make him give you
14Quoted in Wichita Falls Record News and Amarillo 
Daily News, April 27, 1928.
15Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 120; Austin 
American Statesman, April 22, 192Ô; Amarillo News and Globe, 
April 22, 1928; Amarillo Daily News, April I8, I928.
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a good suit," Connally replied, "and not that old second­
hand thing he ran in in 1922--that sheet and pillow case. 
Make him give you a good suit that can be worn in the day­
time as well as at night Although the Klan was hardly a 
political issue by 1928, Connally made Mayfield the "bed- 
sheet-and-mask candidate.
Beginning with a disadvantage, Connally started his 
campaign six weeks before Mayfield. He worked hard to make 
himself known to the voters, whereas Mayfield was a veteran 
state-wide campaigner. His strategy was to appear in the 
rural areas during the early stages of the campaign and to
concentrate on the more populous areas in the last weeks--
17after Congress adjourned and Mayfield returned home. iHe
was gratified by news of support as it came to him through
18letters and the press. He was especially pleased to re­
ceive the public endorsement of S. P. Brooks, President of
Baylor University. Brooks issued the following letter for
19mass distribution.
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 121.
^^Tyler Courier-Times, May 11, 1928; ibid., May 28, 
1928; Wichita Falls Times and Record News, May 27, 1928; 
Austin American-Statesman, April 22, I928.
1 o
TTC to A. H. Britain, February 22, 1928; TTC to 
Mark L. Goodwin, March 8, I928, TCP, con. 4.
P. Brooks to "My Friends," June 9, 1928, Samuel 
Palmer Brooks Papers, Political Correspondence, 1928-1929, 





I am going to vote for Tom Connally for United 
States Senator. This vote will be made with great 
heartiness, with no reservations. I invite my 
friends to join in this service to the state.
/S/ S. P. BROOKS
First Connally toured the Texas Panhandle. Then 
he headed south to the Rio Grande Valley, stopping at small 
towns, crossroads, and at the "forks of the creek." Recep­
tion seemed good everywhere. In fact, the only disturbance 
he encountered during the entire campaign was in his opening 
speech at Belton, where a heckler in an airplane caused
minor annoyance for a while with a loudspeaker that could
20drown out even Connally.
Next he moved into East Texas, where strong racial 
prejudice made Mayfield popular. At Marshall, his voice 
failed and the audience wondered "if they had come by mis­
take to the silent movie instead of the new 'talkie.'"
Little harm was done, since Connally could not hope to re­
ceive much support from that section. After two days' rest,
21his voice returned, and he moved on. Following a swing 
POConnally, Name Is Tom Connally, 120-121;
Tyler Courier-Times, April 20, I928.
21Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 124-125.
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through south central and southeast Texas, and a second ex­
cursion to the Texas Panhandle where Blanton was so popular,
Connally concentrated on the urban votes of Galveston, Austin,
22 21 Houston, and Fort Worth.




FOR U. S. SENATE
Tune of Casey Jones
HON. TOM CONNALLY, is the man we need.
He's been in Congress and sent us seed.
He had a clean record--he's earned his pay 
Let's put him in the Senate of the U.S.A.
CHORUS
Tom Connally, we want him in the Senate,
Tom Connally, I'm gonna help him win it,
Tom Connally, when the race is run.
Will sit in the Senate in Washington.
2nd Verse
He was raised near Eddy, two miles from
The town of Bruce but don't blame Tom,
He drove good horses with master minds,
Tom, lecirned to read between the lines.
22 One of his Houston supporters was Oveta Culp, Sec­
retary of the local Tom Connally Club. Miss Culp, later as 
Oveta Culp Hobby, would receive Connally's endorsement as 
commander of the Women's Army Corps. Under President Eisen­
hower she became Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
21Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 125. The only 
other major urban center, San Antonio, was visited on the 
earlier trip to the Rio Grande Valley. TTC, Press Release, 
1928, TCP, con. 551.
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3rd Verse
He practiced law it was his pet,
He moved to Marlin, he lives there yet,
They kept him in hot water, now so they say.
He ran for Congress just to get away.
4th Verse
Hon. Tom Connally, is a name,
That should live forever in the Halls of Fame,
Tom, is capable, deserving too.
So vote for Tom, whatever you do.
5th Verse "
Tom's climbed the ladder step by step.
So let's give him a little help.
He's helped us all so what do you say.
Let's help Tom, on Election Day.^4
Few differences separated the candidates on the major 
questions. Consequently they resorted to personal criticisms, 
Owsley said Connally's brain worked like "molasses in Janu­
ary," and both he and Mrs. Cunningham said they were seeking
25to fill the "vacancy"--meaning Mayfield's seat. Mayfield, 
in turn, claimed that Texas owed him a "full" term, since he 
had spent two of his six years in Washington explaining to 
the Senate the manner of his election. To this Connally re­
torted, "He drew his pay . . . didn't he?"^^
At Wichita Falls, Connally delivered a crucial blow
2 4-G. B. (Red) Harris, "Hon. Tom Connally for U. S. 
Senate," copy in TCP, con. 86.
^^Gainesville Daily Register, June l4, 1928; Wichita 
Falls Record News, July 12, 1928.
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 123.
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to Owsley's senatorial aspirations when the two candidates 
spoke to a meeting of war veterans. The program committee, 
which favored Owsley, requested him to eulogize the World 
War I veterans. Connally was told to talk about the Spanish- 
American War, which had fewer veterans.
Connally spoke first. When he finished his story
of the war in Cuba, he "forgot" to stop:
I rushed headlong into World War I . . . .  I 
turned on my full patriotic oratory and praised 
at great length our World War I soldiers as 
the equals of "Caesar's Tenth Legion" and 
"Napoleon's Old Guard." I went through the 
Argonne Forest, Chateau-Thierry, St. Mihiel 
and Belleau Wood as I relived that war. When 
I finished speaking the ovation sounded like a 
cannon roar and a long two- or three-minute echo.
27Owsley was left with little to say.
Concentrating on Mayfield, Connally charged that the 
Texas Senator voted with Republicans more often than any 
other Southern Democrat. Not once, Connally maintained, did 
he raise his voice against the scandalous Republican activ-
28ities of the 1920's. He also contended that Mayfield, as 
a member of the Texas Railroad Commission (the State's oil 
regulatory agency), had "shaken down" Wichita Falls oil men 
to finance his 1922 campaign. Had Mayfield lost the race, 
and remained on the Commission, oil men who had not contrib­
uted would have been in an awkward position. "I don't want
^^Ibid., 122.
Q QAmarillo News and Globe, April 29, 1928.
58
your money,” Connally told a Wichita Falls rally. ”I won't
2 9shake you down." He might have added, "I just want your 
votes.”
The year 1928 was especially exciting in Texas poli­
tics. State offices were being contested bitterly, and it 
was also a presidential election year. Adding to the excite­
ment, the Democratic National Convention met in Houston June 
16-19. Connally and his opponents watched the proceedings 
while they campaigned, knowing that the outcome in Houston 
could effect their own efforts. Mayfield appeared before the 
Platform Committee and unsuccessfully sought the convention's
endorsement of the McNary-Haugen bill, which he had support- 
30ed. When the convention ended, Connally confirmed his 
earlier statements on party loyalty by saying that he would 
support the national ticket, that he was willing to work for 
it, and that he was pleased with the platform adopted by
31the national convention.
As the first primary campaign neared its end, there 
was growing optimism at Connally's Dallas headquarters. The 
Austin American-Statesman informed its readers in a front-page
29TTC, speech, quoted in Wichita Falls Record News, 
July 4, 1928.
^^Clipping from Fort Worth Star-Telegram, [July 1, 
1928,] TCP, con. 55I; Democratic Party, National Convention, 
1928, Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic 
National Convention . . . , I928 (Indianapolis, [I928J),
189-191.
31Canyon News, July 9, 1928.
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editorial that the Marlin Congressman would come in second 
or third in the primary, and it advised its readers to vote 
for him:
Speaking purely politically, there is nothing 
fundamentally wrong about Mayfield; speaking 
purely personally there is nothing fundamentally 
wrong with Owsley, but speaking for those voters 
who read this, we feel that Tom Connally in his 
personal and political life, in his service at 
Washington, and in his promise of consistent and 
loyal service to come, best represents the major­
ity vote of Texas. He should be in the run-off 
primary and he should be elected.
The Lamar County Echo was even more optimistic:
All guns from the camps of senatorial candidates 
are being turned on Tom Connally, the brilliant 
democrat from central Texas, who seems to be lead­
ing the field. No candidate wants to be in the 
run-off with Connally. Senator Mayfield thinks 
he has a chance to defeat either Owsley or Blanton 
in the second round, but knows his doom is sealed 
if he is pitted against Connally. Some very ques­
tionable methods are being used to influence voters 
to desert Connally, but the democrats of the State-- 
those in all walks of life who believe in a square 
deal to all and special privileges to none--will 
not be hood-winked by any last minute mud-sling.
If the vote could be taken to-day, Connally would 
easily lead the ticket.33
A poll based on inquiries in seventy counties showed Con-
34nally leading during the last week of the campaign.
Another poll, probably more thorough than the first, con­
cluded on election eve that Mayfield would lead Connally
3 2Austin American-Statesman, July 1, 1928.
3 3Lama
TCP, con. 551.
O 3 r County Echo, June 29, 1928 (typescript)
34 nAustin American-Statesman, July 23, 1928.
6o
35into the run-off. The Congressman concluded his campaign 
with a radio broadcast, the first political speech delivered 
exclusively to a radio audience in Texas. He later wrote, 
"I merely voted [on election day] . . . and then sat about
37nonchalantly chewing my nails while awaiting the returns.”
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Connally's 26 per cent of the popular vote assured him a 
place in the run-off with Mayfield. An analysis of the 
voting (See Map 4, p. 6I) revealed several factors im­
portant in planning the run-off campaign. Three candidates 
did well in the more heavily populated eastern half of the
^^Gainesville Daily Register, July 27, 1928.
^^Tyler Courier-Times, July 27, 1928.
37Connally, Name Is Tom Connallv, 125.
38Heard and Strong (comps.). Southern Primaries and
Elections, I67, 170.
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state--Mayfield, Connally, and Owsley. As expected, Con­
nally ran strongest near his home county, Falls, but he also 
received a large part of the boss-controlled counties in 
the Rio Grande Valley. Blanton practically monopolized the 
scantily populated western half of the State. The winner 
in the pending run-off, then, would be whoever received the 
Blanton and Owsley vote. Noting that Mayfield's urban vote 
declined from the 1922 election, Connally hoped that it
showed most of his strength and that the remainder of the
39vote cast was anti-Mayfield. Optimistically, he observed 
that the total Blanton-Owsley vote exceeded that of Mayfield.
The second Democratic primary was only a month away, 
so the run-off campaign began immediately. McLemore, who 
received an insigificant vote in the first primary, was the 
only defeated candidate to endorse Mayfield. "Owsley ducked 
out of the State while Mrs. Cunningham supported Connally 
"weakly and noiselessly." Blanton, on the other hand endorsed 
Connally openly, and his influence in West Texas proved
+ 41great.
Connally began the run-off campaign with a futile 
challenge to Mayfield for a joint debate. Too clever for
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 126.
4oTTC, Press Release, c_a. August 1, 1928, TCP,
con. 551 •
/j-1Blanton even introduced Connally at an Abilene 
rally. Tyler Courier-Times, July 20, 1928; ibid., July 
31, 1928; Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 126.
40
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kothat, Mayfield tried to prove Connally an unimportant 
figure in Congress by stressing that he served only on the 
Foreign Affairs Committee. Connally engaged the support 
of John Nance Garner to explain that bit of campaign trick­
ery to the voters. By the House rules, Garner told the 
press, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee could serve
44on no other committee.
At first few new issues arose during the run-off. 
With only two and a half weeks left, Connally found some 
mud to sling. Mayfield and A. P. Barrett, a power magnate 
and known Mayfield supporter, reportedly met with James E. 
Ferguson in an Austin hotel. Mayfield and Ferguson were 
thought of as political enemies, but so were Ferguson and 
Connally. Connally alleged that money passed from Barrett 
to Ferguson on behalf of Mayfield's candidacy. Whether 
true or not, the Ferguson Forum, a weekly political jour­
nal, came out in support of Mayfield, and Connally made 
the most of the story of the meeting.
It was Ferguson whom Mayfield defeated for the 
Senate in the bitter and controversial 1922 election. So 
when the former governor announced that "old sores" were 
healed, Connally asked: "Was it electric power ointment
koGainesville Daily Register, August 13, 1928.
43Austin Statesman, August 21, 1928.
44Ibid.; Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 12?.
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45or Hiram Evans' Klan salve that healed those sores?" 
Connally told a crowd in front of the Alamo that "Ferguson 
and the power magnate and Earle [Mayfield] are all in the 
same bed, and it's a single bed at that." The deal, ac­
cording to the story, transpired in Room 428 of the Stephen 
F. Austin Hotel. Thus "Room 428" became Connally's battle-
46cry.
Connally campaigned vigorously throughout August 
in East Texas, hoping to pick up Owsley's vote. At Tyler, 
he excited a crowd of 3,500 by asking: "What did Jim
[Ferguson] say to you, Earle [Mayfield], and what did you 
say to Jim there in room 428 and what did the other man
[Barrett] say to you both, there in room 428?" Though poorly
48
47phrased, the question went over well at the rally, and
Connally continued the theme in other East Texas speeches 
He pointed out that voters now had the unique opportunity
49to vote against Ferguson and Mayfield with a single ballot.
In desperation, Mayfield struck back only three days 
before the election. His followers spread the rumor that 
at one time Connally applied for membership in the Ku Klux
Klan.
45Hiram Evans was Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux
46Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 128-129*
4? nAustin Statesman, August 10, 1928.
48Ibid., August 12, 1928; ibid., August 21, 1928.
49TTC, Press Release, ca. August 1, 1928.
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Klan. A photostatic copy of his alleged application was 
50produced. It was dated August 9, 1922, and bore a sig­
nature remarkably like that of the Congressman's. If the 
document were authentic, then Connally was something less 
than honest in his attack on the Klan. With the little 
time left, Connally did his best to disprove the rumor.
He went to considerable expense and effort to convince the
voters that any such document was a forgery--a cheap and
51dishonest trick. Coming to his aid was J. M. Kennedy, 
publisher of the Marlin Daily Democrat, with an open letter 
which was reproduced for mass distribution:
Nothing could be further from the truth than 
the charge or report that Tom Connally is now or 
ever has been a member of, or in sympathy with 
the organization known as the Ku Klux Klan.
It is well known in Central Texas and else­
where that the undersigned was one of the first 
in Texas to oppose the klan, and that such oppo­
sition has continued personally through the columns 
of The Marlin Democrat, and will so continue, as 
long as the klan is in politics, or attempts to 
thwEirt justice and freedom as it has in the past.
Frequently in 1922 and other years I conferred 
with Tom Connally and discussed with him the Ku 
Klux Klan.
Unequivocally and positively, Connally declared 
that he had no sympathy with the klan or any other 
secret political organization, or group, that sought 
to control the politics of the country, or the govern­
ment .
Tom Connally is a Jeffersonian democrat. His 
faith in, and adherence to the fundamental principles
^^A photographic print of such a document is in 
TCP, con. 85.
^^Austin Statesman, August 24, I928.
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of this government--freedom of speech, freedom of 
the press, freedom of religion and absolute sep­
aration of church and state--is as well grounded 
as that of any statesman of modern times.
When I think of Connally as a candidate for 
Senator, I think of the illustrious and lamented 
C u l b e r s o n , 52 whose defeat was brought about by a 
combination of circumstances in which, singular[ly] 
enough, the same forces and the same figures were 
dominant as are now undertaking to defeat Connally.
I note also, that the same ku klux personage, 
under a different title, who was instrumental in 
lining up the klan for Mayfield in 1922 is now 
undertaking to defeat the national democratic ticket 
by the same methods employed in the 1922 Senatorial 
Campaign in Texas, and I have no doubt is now sup­
porting Mayfield for re-election.
Those who whisper around or publish that Connally 
is now or was ever in secret or public sympathy with 
the klan are resorting to the same methods suggested 
to klansmen by the imperial wizard, W. J. Simmons, 
that of systematic misrepresentation of an opponent 
or candidate, not to the wizard's liking.
Also it is well known that any public man or can­
didate who opposes the klan is marked by the klan 
bosses for political "banishment," by fair means 
or foul.
I, an original and constant opponent of this 
secret political organization called the klan, am 
positively convinced that Tom Connally was never in 
sympathy with the klan or its methods, nor had any 
affiliation or connection therewith for any minute 
of his life.
Sineerely,
/S/ J. M. KENNEDY
Publisher of The Marlin Democrat
Mayfield's allegations were potentially damaging to the Con­
nally campaign but they were apparently ineffective.
Connally received 320,071 votes to Mayfields 257,7^7,^^
52Charles A. Culberson, United States Senator from 
Texas, 1895-1923-
M. Kennedy, signed statement (mimeographed), 
n.d. [1928], TCP, con. 551-




polling over 55 per cent of the vote. Mayfield gained 
only a little over 50,000 votes in the second primary, 
and Connally almost doubled his own previous vote. It 
was a stunning victory, predictable after the first pri­
mary, but hardly foreseeable five months earlier when the 
campaign began.
Connally ran well in nearly every part of the State 
in the second primary. (See Map 5, P- 68.) As expected, 
Mayfield ran strong in East Texas. Connally also drew major­
ities in nineteen rural Panhandle counties and in scattered
South Texas counties where political bosses controlled large
55numbers of Latin voters. But even in those sections, he 
did not carry the counties with the urban centers of Amarillo, 
Lubbock, Abilene, Brownsville, and Laredo. In fact, Connally 
captured every major population center and the bulk of the 
Owsley and Blanton vote, deciding factors in the election.
Since nomination by the Democratic Party was tanta­
mount to election in Texas before I960, the general elec­
tion in November, 1928, was relatively insignificant. The 
following chart shows the ease of Connally's election over
the nominees of the Republican, Socialist, and Communist
, . 56parties :
55Connally was cautioned by one supporter: ". . .
be sure and get the Sheriff's support at Edinburg, Texas.
I don't know him but he votes all the Mexicans in that 
[Hidalgo] County and runs things politically. He was the 
sole cause of J. R. Ball['s] carrying that County for State 
Treasurer two years ago." J. H. Pouree to Bob [Robert H. 
Higgins, Connally's campaign manager in 1928,] TCP, con. 86.
^^Heard and Strong (comps.), Southern Primaries and 
Elections, 170.












Tom Connally Democratic 566,139 81.2
T. M. Kennerly Republican 129,910 18.6
David Curran Socialist 690 0.1
John Rust Communist 144 0.o57
Totals 696,883 99.9
Connally carried every county except three: Bandera,
Edwards, and San Augustine. In seven of the traditionally
c O
Republican "German counties," Connally received a surpris­
ing majority, although in three of them--Gillespie, Guadalupe 
and KendaU— Kennerly received a strong minority vote. A large 
Republican vote always existed in Bandera County, where in 
1928 no Democratic primary was held. But Kennerly's lead in 
Edwards and San Augustine counties is more difficult to explain 
since neither was a traditionally Republican county. It might 
be noted, however, that neither of them gave Connally much 
support in either the first or second Democratic primary, 
indicating opposition to Connally personally rather than to 
the Democratic Party.
S7More exactly 0.02.
^^They were Austin, Comal, De Witt, Fayette, Gilles­
pie, Guadalupe, Kendall, Lee, Medina, and Washington counties. 
See Seth Shepard McKay, Texas Politics, 1906-1944 (Lubbock,
1952), 9.
70
The state-wide popularity of the Republican presi­
dential nominee probably accounts for the three counties
59in the Republican column. Herbert Hoover carried Edwards 
County by an overwhelming vote and was also popular in San 
Augustine County, in "dry" and Protestant East Texas.
In fact, the popularity for Hoover probably explains why 
Kennerly drew as many votes as he did. Running against 
Morris Sheppard for the Senate in 1924, Kennerly received 
101,252 votes, or l4.? per cent of the total, as compared 
to 129,910 or 18.6 per cent in 1928.^^ More significant 
was the size of Connally's victory in the face of defeat 
for the national ticket in Texas. This is explained by 
extensive cross-voting in 1928, as indicated by the com­




A1 Smith Democratic 340,080 45,2
Tom Connally Democratic 566,139 81.2
Herbert Hoover Republican 367,242 51.8
T. M. Kennerly Republican 129,910 18.6
59See Paul Casdorph, A History of the Republican 
Party in Texas, I865-I965 (Austin, 1965TT 136.
^^Heard and Strong (comps.). Southern Primaries and 
Elections, 170-172; Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Presidential 
Vote, 1896-1932 (Stanford, California, 1934Tj 3^6.




President Hoover called Congress into session April 
159 1929, to consider modifying farm and tariff policies. 
The freshman Texas Senator was the only new Democrat to 
enter the Upper House, which convened in special session 
March 4, as numerous Republicans swept into office on the 
strength of the national ticket.^ Throughout the Hoover 
years, the Democrats remained in a minority in the Senate. 
Although it was a bleak period for Democrats who wished to 
pass party legislation, this circumstance ironically proved 
beneficial to Connally, who began to climb the seniority 
ladder.
After serving for twelve years on the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Connally hoped to gain a seat on the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Failing that, he
1Whereas Earle B. Mayfield was the only Senator, 
Democratic or Republican, who sought re-election and was 
defeated, numerous Republicans replaced Democrats who did 
not seek re-election. In the ?Oth Congress (1927-1929), 
the Republican majority in the Senate was 49 to 46; in the 
71st Congress (1929-1931), it was 56 to 39* Dallas Times 
Herald, November I8, 1928; U. S., Bureau of the Census, 
Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times 
to 1957 (Washington, 19^oT^ 69I.
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expressed a preference for either the Interstate Commerce
2Committee or the Finance Committee. As a new member, he 
did exceedingly well, drawing assignments to four committees 
Finance, Banking and Currency, Public Buildings and Grounds,
3and Privileges and Elections. The first two were major 
committees, and the others were important.
Similar to his entry into the House in 1917, Con­
nally 's first Senate term began with a special session to 
deal with an emergency. Instead of an international crisis 
and war. President Hoover told Congress in 192 9 to consider 
"further agricultural relief and legislation for limited 
changes of the tariff," which, he said, "in justice to our 
farmers, our labor, and our manufacturers [cannot] be post-
Lj.poned." There were other differences as well. Where 
Congressman Connally followed the lead of President Wilson 
and House leaders almost blindly, the new Senator had de­
veloped his own political philosophy and possessed little 
respect for President Hoover and his Republican policies.
In Connally's mind, "Hoover was an inept President from the
2Texas' other Senator, Morris Sheppard, was on the 
Commerce, Manufactures, Irrigation and Reclamation, and 
Military Affairs committees. Clipping from Houston Press, 
February 27, 1929; clipping from Bishop News, April 26,
1929, TCP, con. 594.
3U. S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1929, LXXl, Pt. 1% 246 ; clipping from Bishop News, April 
26, 1929, TCP, con. 594.
4U. S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1929, LXXl, Pt. 1, 19.
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5 -start.” The two men were sworn into office on the same
day, and, as pointed out in the press, while they were "as
opposite in political views as black and white, they were
both the choice of [Texas].
The Hoover Administration recommended the Agricul­
tural Marketing Bill to the special Congressional session.
It proposed a Federal Farm Board made up of nine members, 
who in turn were to be advised by a series of special com­
mittees interested in particular commodities. The Board 
was supplied with $500 million revolving fund to provide 
loans to cooperative associations or to create stabiliza­
tion corporations if needed to deal with unusual farm sur-
7pluses. This plan was not satisfactory to the agricultural 
interests. Farm spokesmen amended the House bill by includ­
ing in it a system of export debentures similar to those 
proposed in 1926 as an alternative to the McNary-Haugen bill. 
The plan called for the government to give debenture certif­
icates to farmers who exported surplus commodities to the 
extent that those commodities were protected by tariff 
duties. These certificates could be sold to importers and 
used to pay tariff duties on other imports. Farmers,
^Tom Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg, Name 
Is Tom Connally (New York, 1954), 134.
^Clipping from Tri-City News Herald, March 8, 1929, 
TCP, con. 593.
7 Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United 
States, I79O-I93O : A Study of Their Origins and Develop­
ment (New York, 1953T, 240.
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therefore, would realize a higher price for their exports 
while meanwhile relieving some of the pressure on the de­
pressed domestic market caused by the surplus. According 
to the amendment, the debenture feature could be employed
g
at the Farm Board's discretion.
Connally strongly favored the export debenture plan. 
As he told the Senate in his maiden speech May 2, 1929:
Mr. President, in view of the short time I 
have been a Member of this body, I should not so 
soon lift up my voice in the Chamber were it not 
for the fact that I, in part, represent one of 
the greatest agricultural States in the Union, 
and its interests are vitally concerned in the 
legislation now pending . . . .  I am heartily 
in favor of the measure . . . .
I congratulate the chairman of the Committee 
on Agriculture and Forestry and that committee 
for reporting this bill, including what is known 
as the debenture plan. Frankly I believe without 
the inclusion of that plan it will give little aid 
to agriculture. While I am opposed to the amend­
ment offered by [Senator Watson of Indiana] to 
strike that plan from the bill, I shall support 
the measure regardless of the fate of the amend­
ment. I am anxious to secure relief for the 
American farmer and I shall take whatever I can 
get, imperfect though it may be.°
Connally chided the Administration for not fulfilling the 
promise of the Republican platform of 1928. One sentence 
in it had read: "The vigorous efforts of this administra­
tion toward broadening our export markets will be
g
John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 1921-1933 
(New York, I960), 217; Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, 
Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West, 1900-1939 
(Madison, 1^51 ) , 406 .
9 U. S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1929, LXXl, Pt. 1, 786.
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c o n t i n u e d . H e  maintained that the e3q)ort debenture plan
would do just that. But, Connally said, with contempt for
Hoover and Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon:
To meet the approval of the administration and Mr. 
Mellon, a plan must be found which will not bene­
fit the farmer, which will not give him any relief,
[and] which will not relieve him of any of the bur­
den under which he is now staggering. If such a 
bill can be found and, thereby, the farmer can be 
fooled, the Secretary of the Treasury and the admin­
istration will be happy to support it!11
Senator Watson's move to strike out the debenture provision
12failed in the Senate, but the House succumbed to White
13House pressure and insisted that the provision be removed.
Connally and Senator Peter Norbeck of South Dakota 
headed a stalling action which lasted a few days. With Demo­
cratic and Republican farm interests combining, the Senate 
voted at first to reject a conference report calling for 
abandonment of the debenture plan. This forced the House 
to bring to a vote its objection to the plan. Both Con­
nally and Norbeck knew that they would not get the House to 
change its mind, and they readily admitted that they would 
eventually have to acquiesce. But they achieved a certain 
victory by getting House members on record in a vote of 250
l°Ibid;
^^New York Times, May 3, 1929, p. 4.
12U. S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess.,
1929, LXXl, Pt. 1, 997-99»; ibid., Pt. 2, 1269.
^^Ibid., Pt. 3, 2788-2789.
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14to 113 against the provision. For the first time they 
knew exactly how much strength they had in the lower cham­
ber, and they had ammunition to work with during the next 
Congressional e l e c t i o n s . A l t h o u g h  disappointed by the 
removal of the export debenture provision from the bill, 
Connally still supported the Agricultural Marketing Act 
in June as it passed the S e n a t e . A s  soon as was prac­
ticable, he urged the newly created Farm Board to give 
early consideration to the cotton situation which was of
17concern to Texas farmers.
President Hoover also suggested that the special 
session of Congress revise the protective tariff to alle­
viate the farmers' plight. Congressman Willis C. Hawley 
of Oregon introduced such a bill in the House on May 7, but 
Congress was slow to reach an agreement on the measure.
Hoover had intended that Congress consider only limited re­
visions in the agricultural schedules, and for a time the 
House respected his wishes. But under the pressure of 
powerful lobbyists, more and more upward revisions were 
made in nonagricultural schedules by logrolling methods.
l4U. S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1929, LXXl, Pt. 3, 2661, 27ÔÜ-2769.
^^New York Times, May 20, 1929, pp. 1, 12.
S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1929, LXXl, Pt. 3, 2886.
^^New York Times, July 20, 1929, p. I6.
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There was an attempt by a coalition of Democrats and Repub­
licans in the Senate to pass a resolution limiting revi­
sions to agricultural products, which Connally supported,
18but it failed passage by a single vote.
Senator George ¥. Norris of Nebraska received the
export debenture plan and succeeded in getting it amended
to the Hawley bill. Connally was very pleased with the
19forty-two to thirty-four vote, but he was not optimistic 
about the future of the plan in the light of its recent re­
moval from the Agricultural Marketing Act. In addition to 
this major change, the Senate favored repealing the "flexible" 
provisions of the existing law which permitted the president
to alter tariff rates without specific Congressional approv- 
20al. Connally's attitude toward these provisions was clear. 
He long supported the debenture, but of the "flexible" pro­
vision, he told the Senate: "that power, surrendered in
1922, ought to be recaptured by Congress and redeposited
where it belongs, in the legislative department of the 
21Government."
Connally attacked the bill when it reached the 
Senate and warned of its consequences on foreign trade.
18Hicks, Republican Ascendancy 219-220; U. S., 
Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 1929, LXXl,
Pt. 3, 2975.
19U. S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1929, LXXl, Pt. 5, 4694.
20Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 220-221.
21U. S .. Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1929, LXXl, Pt. 4, 4026.
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Germany, he said, was ready to buy surplus fruit grown in 
California and Florida, but it could not be expected to 
pay for this product in gold. Several nations were pre­
pared to buy American pork, cotton and wheat, he said, 
but they would be unable to do so if American tariff sched­
ules shut out their goods as payment. Furthermore, he asked, 
how could the United States expect European nations to re­
pay their war debts if trade were reduced or prohibited?
Bringing his argument even closer to home, Connally 
pointed out the inconsistency of the Hoover Administration's 
bid for improved hemispheric relations and Republican efforts 
to raise the tariff:
President Hoover made his famous South American 
goodwill tour [just prior to his inauguration] to 
encourage cordial relations with the countries of 
South America and to build up our foreign trade.
If the present tariff bill is to follow the tracks 
of the President through Central and South America, 
it will destroy the good effects of the President's 
tour and arouse resentment instead of good-will.
If we are to sell American goods in South America, 
we must buy some of their products.^2
Meanwhile, Connally introduced amendments to the 
tariff bill that favored interests in Texas. He spoke in 
favor of stronger restrictions against the importation of
cattle from Argentina where he claimed hoof-and-mouth dis-
2 3ease was widespread. Such restriction would, of course, 
improve the domestic market for Texas cattle. Higher rates
22New York Times, July 23, 1929, P* l4.
2 3■ U. S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1929, LXXl, Pt. 4, 357.
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on cattle were eventually adopted through several Connally
oIlamendments. He defended the right of antique dealers to 
use Texas ports as ports of entry for their goods rather 
than to give the Secretary of the Treasury the power to
25limit the number of such ports. Opposed to the protective 
tariff in principle, Connally could neither resist seeking 
protection of American-smelted antimony, an industry with 
a potentially bright future in Texas, nor maintaining a high 
tariff on winter tomatoes from Mexico which would compete 
with Rio Grande Valley tomatoes from Texas. Similarly, 
he wanted to retain high schedules on wool and figs, both
27of which were produced in his State. In other words, 
Connally was for lower tariffs in principle, but he favored 
protection when his constituents were involved. He reflected 
the inconsistent and paradoxical position of so many polit­
ical leaders in the 1920's.
Later he^attacked an attempt by northern Senators 
to remove a House provision in the tariff bill banning Cana­
dian flour milled in the United States from entering the
28Cuban market as American flour. Such was fair neither to
^^Ibid., 2d Sess., 1920, LXXlI, Pt. 4, 3862-386?;
New York Times, February 19, 1930, p. 15*
25U. S., Congressional Record, ?lst Cong., 1st Sess., 
1929, LXXl, Pt. 4, 4329.
2^Ibid. , Pt. 5, 5417-5420, 5660-5662.
^^Ibid., 5604, 5891.
oQIbid., Pt. 4, 3760.
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the American farmer nor the southwestern miller, he contended. 
With his usual ability to make his opponents look bad, he 
argued :
It does seem to me that in a Congress which has 
been consuming the summer in the pretense of doing 
something for the American farmer through the 
avenue of a protective tariff, when we get to the 
point where we can do some little [sic] for the 
wheat farmer by reason of the tariff, there should 
not be raised all manner of objections, that it 
will put people out of employment at Buffalo, and 
that it will rob the Cubans of this particular 
type of flour, for which only their anatomies are
suited.29
He pictured the issue as one of choosing between five millers 
and thousands of wheat farmers. Then he turned on Senator 
Reed Smoot, the sponsor of the Senate bill, from the sugar 
beet State of Utah, and asked if he would like to permit 
Java sugar milled in Cuba to enter the United States as 
Cuban sugar? After debates lasting several days, the Senate
30move was defeated eighteen to fifty-one.
Connally continued his assault on the bill. He 
asked the Republican leaders if they had understood the 
President when he asked for "limited revision" of the tar­
iff. Or was it that they did not intend to follow his 
suggestion? "'Limited revision' seems to be limited by 
the sky alone," he said. Finally he challenged Hoover:




It remains to be seen if President Hoover will courageously 
intervene and stop this raid upon the American people. It
is to be hoped that he will make good the words of his mes-
1.31 sage."
Connally, however, held little hope for such inter­
vention. All though the summer of 1929, he fed the Demo­
cratic National Committee with partisan propaganda. Typ­
ical of his statements through this organization was a slur 
on Hoover the Engineer. "President Hoover, as reported in 
the press, is 'interested in a sugar tariff which would pro­
tect both the producer and the consumer.' If President
Hoover can find such a sugar tariff he will perform a mar-
32velous engineering feat."
When the regular session of Congress convened in 
December, 1929, the Senate had reached no agreement on the 
tariff bill. Debate and stalling continued through the win­
ter and into the spring. Finally, the Senate passed its 
version of the bill March 24, 1930, by a vote of fifty-
three to thirty-one, with Connally voting with the minor-
33ity. In the House, the majority refused to accept either 
the debenture or the cancellation of the "flexible" pro­
visions. The Texas Senator remained far from optimistic
^^New York Times, July 3, 1929, p. 3.
^^Ibid., August 4, 1929, p. 4.
3 3U. S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 
1930, LXXlI, Pt. é, 6015.
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about the future of these provisions which he favored.
"The men who will serve as conferees on behalf of the House 
and the Senate," he warned, "are opposed to the debenture,
and over in the White House sits an Executive who is opposed
34to all [the Senate amendments]." Thus the deadlock con­
tinued.
The White House and Republican leaders in Congress
exerted pressure on Democrats and insurgent Republicans by
saying that the delay in action on the tariff was the prime
cause of growing unemployment. Connally retaliated by-
accusing the Administration of trying to evade the issue
and escape the responsibility for failure to deal with un- 
35employment. Eventually the House, with Hoover's open 
support, had its way, and the Senate accepted the Hawley- 
Sraoot Tariff bill June 13, 1930, by a vote of forty-four 
to forty-two. Again Connally voted "nay." Little support 
in either house came from the agricultural West and South 
for the final version, which increased rates on twenty-five 
agricultural items and on seventy-five industrial products.
Shortly after the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act was signed, 
Secretary of the Treasury Mellon predicted it would benefit
34New York Times, March 25, 1930, p. 2; Hicks, 
Republican Ascendancy, 221.
^^New York Times, March 10, 1930, p. 2.
S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 
1930, LXXII, Pt. 10, lOë35 ; Hicks, Republican Ascendancy,
221.
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the nation's economy. "American industries now know where 
they stand," he said, "and will, I am confident, adjust them­
selves without difficulty to the new conditions." Connally, 
who detested Mellon, quickly answered:
Yes, the farming industry now knows where it 
stands. It knows that it will pay more for the 
necessities of life which it must buy and will 
continue to be forced to sell its surplus in a 
world free market. It knows that its outgo will 
be greater and its income will be smaller.
Other American industries also know where they 
now stand. The Aluminum Company of America now 
knows that it owns practically 50 per cent of 
aluminum deposits throughout the world. It knows 
that the Conference Committee, dominated by the 
Mellon school of thought, increased rates on alum­
inum fixed by the Senate bill.
Secretary Mellon, with the spirit of a courtier 
of the Stuart kings, glorifies the flexible tariff 
provision, giving the Executive, rather than Con­
gress, the power to revise individual schedules.
Let the Executive make the laws, rather than the 
representatives of the people, is the essence of 
bureaucracy and tyranny.
It may be hard on the people, but it is splen­
did for those who either wield the power or have 
sufficient influence to dictate how such power 
may be executed.3?
During the special session of the Seventy-first 
Congress, Texas' junior Senator sponsored or co-sponsored 
three bills with limited success. Two concerned agricul­
ture, and one dealt with Senate procedure. The first one 
was a renewed attempt to regulate cotton exchanges. He
was no more successful in 1929 than previously, for the
38bill never came out of committee. His second bill
^^New York Times, June 22, 1930, p. 22.
o Q
U. S., Congressional Record, ?lst Cong., 1st Sess., 
1929, LXXl, Pt. 1, 335; ibid., Pt. ê, 245.
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proposed the -abolition of secret sessions in the Senate while 
discussing executive business unless voted by a two-thirds 
majority. The proposal had been a part of his personal cam­
paign platform in the 1928 election, and he was deeply com­
mitted to it :
The people of the United States do not believe 
in secret government. The Senate, in passing on 
nominations of the President to office, is exer­
cising a power conferred by the people. The people 
have a right to know how their Senators vote on 
such important questions.
The power of Federal judges affects the property, 
the lives of the people. There is no reason why 
action confirming or rejecting their appointments 
should be taken behind closed doors, and still less 
reason why a vote on confirmation should be kept 
secret. The Senate ought to open its doors.39
Much to his disgust, no action was taken to change the 
40Senate rules. Finally, he was one of six co-sponsors 
of a bill giving Congressional approval to the Rio Grande 
Compact, an agreement among the States of Colorado, New 
Mexico, and Texas authorizing control of the Rio Grande.
No action was obtained in the first (special) session of 
the Seventy-first Congress, but a similar bill co-sponsored
4lby Connally in the second session passed June 17, 1930.
While Congress argued how best to "relieve" the
39lbid., Pt. 2, 1889; ibid., Pt. 3, 3048-3049; New 
York Times, May 27, 1929, P» 2.
40U. S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1929, LXXl, Pt. 6 , 273.
^^Ibid., Pt. 3, 2759; ibid., Pt. 6 , 26O; ibid., 71st 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1930, LXXII, Pt. 10, 10478, 1053Ü, 10541;
U. S., Statutes af Large, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 1930, XLVI, 
Pt. 1. 767-773.
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farmer, the nation was stunned by the stock market crash in 
October, 1929* Hoover's request for a tax cut in December 
encountered little opposition in Congress. Connally sup­
ported the measure willingly, but the economy continued its
42decline. By the following spring, and for the remainder 
of the Hoover years, the farmer was not alone in needing re­
lief. Protectionists contended that the Hawley-Smoot Tariff 
Act would alleviate the sag in business conditions but events 
proved that it further restricted foreign trade. Other meas­
ures were necessary to combat the depression. Although some 
of Hoover's attempts to deal with depression problems went 
far beyond anything done by previous depression presidents, 
Connally was among those Democrats and insurgent Republicans 
who favored even stronger measures. Along with others, he 
anticipated the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt. As the 
depression gradually grew worse, the Democrats optimisti­
cally began to plan for the 1930 elections, the outcome of 
which greatly effected the career of the Texas Senator.
Throughout the nation sentiment definitely favored 
Democratic candidates. The depression, which was so easily 
blamed on the Republicans, and the usual anti-administration
trend in "off” election years account for the shift in pol-
43itical sentiment. Although not himself a candidate for
42U. S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 
1929, LXXII, Pt. 37̂ 670; Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 235.
43Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 237-
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re-election, Connally accepted frequent requests from his 
Democratic colleagues in Congress to aid them in their cam­
paigns. In Texas, he made a special effort to defeat Harry 
M. Wurzbach, Texas' only Republican Congressman, who resided 
in the San Antonio District. He spoke numerous times in
behalf of Henry B. Dielmann, Wurzbach's opponent, but it
-, • 44was a losing cause.
In the midst of the campaign, Connally received an 
urgent summons from national Democratic leaders to aid Sena­
tor Sam G. Bratton of New Mexico in his bid for re-election. 
At about the same time, Alben Barkley made a similar request 
for his services in Kentucky, as did Thomas P. Gore in Okla­
homa, but the Democratic National Committee asked him to
speak in New Mexico. There he was a major attraction in
45Bratton's successful campaign.
While the 1930 elections failed to establish a 
Democratic majority in the Senate, they did improve Con­
nally 's position on Senate committees. He still labored
44Harry L. Sexton to TTC, October 11, 1930; TTC to 
Frank C. Davis, November 19, 1930, TCP, con. 92; Paul Cas­
dorph, A History of the Republican Party in Texas, I865-I965 
(Austin, 1965)Î 139-140.
^^Millard E. Tydings to TTC, telegram, October I6 ,
1930; Jouett Shouse and Joseph W. Byrns to TTC, telegram, 
September 30, 1930; T. P. Gore to Tom Conley [sic], October 
13, 1930; TTC to Thomas P. Gore, November 3, 1930; TTC to 
James V. McClintick, telegram, October 21, 1930; Alben W. 
Barkley to TTC, telegram, October 23, 1930; TTC to Alben 
W. Barkley, telegram, October 23, 1930; TTC to Sam G. Bratton, 
telegram, October 20, 1930; Millard E. Tydings to TTC, Octo­
ber 30, 1930; Sam G. Bratton to TTC, telegram, November 1, 
1930, TCP, con. 92.
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under the handicap of belonging to the minority party, but 
he now possessed seniority not usually held by a Senator 
in his first term of office. Connally entered the Senate 
in 1929 with eight others. Below them in seniority in the 
first session was only one Senator, Henry J. Allen, who
46was appointed to replace Vice President Charles Curtis.
When the second session opened in 1931, twenty-one Senators
4?were below or equal to Connally in seniority. At this
point he gained a seat on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and at the same time maintained his place on the
48Senate Finance Committee.
The depression worsened in the United States during
491931 as Europe's economy collapsed. Hoover's efforts to 
improve the economy through the volunteer National Credit
46Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 239; U. S., Bureau 
of the Census, Historical Statistics. . . tô  1957, 691; U.
S., Congress, Official Congressional Directory, 71st Cong., 
1st Sess., 1929 (Washington, 1929), I66.
47U. S., Congress, Official Congressional Directory, 
71st Cong., 2d Sess., 1931, 16I-I62.
48He gave up his seat on the Banking and Currency 
Committee, but remained on the Committee on Privileges and 
Elections and the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds. 
U. S., Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 1931,
LXXV, Ptl 1̂  439-440 ; Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 134; 
clipping from Ennis News, December 18, 1931-
49Connally got a firsthand view of the European sit­
uation and talked with his counterparts from several European 
nations when he attended the Interparliamentary Union con­
ference in London in the summer of 1930. It was his second 
such meeting. He had attended the Geneva session in 1924. 
Later he attended sessions in Constantinople in 1934 and 
in Rome in 1948.
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Association and the President's Unemployment Relief Organ­
ization simply were insufficient to stem the tide. Connally
was disgusted with the President, who, he said, limited
50"the relief business" to "business relief." The major 
effort of the Hoover years to deal with the depression was 
the creation early in 1932 of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation. Although Connally admitted that "there was 
nothing wrong with this bill if it had been part of a broad 
relief program," he voted against it when it passed the 
Senate.
Connally and other Democrats secured passage of a
bill, known as the Garner bill, authorizing over a billion
dollars for public works to ease the growing unemployment
pressures. "But," according to Connally, "President Hoover
bragged that he vetoed the bill ten minutes after it reached
52his desk for signature." The Emergency Relief and Con­
struction Act represented a compromise between the President 
and the liberal spenders. Connally supported that act, 
which provided $300 million in 3 per cent loans to the
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 135.
S., Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 
1932, LXXV, Pt. 2, 1705.
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, I36. The bill
passed the House 202 to 157 and the Senate 43 to 31 « No
attempt was made to override Hoover's veto. U. S., Con­
gressional Record, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Pt.
13, 14020; ibid., Pt. l4, 14957-
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5 3States, though he had preferred grants to loans. Connally
throughout the contest supported a large-scale program of
relief for the needy, whether the city jobless or the drought-
54stricken farmers.
Hoover was especially concerned about the lack of 
credit and the safety of creditors * loans. Connally com­
plained that the President was far more interested in the 
mortgage holders than in the home owners who were losing 
their homes. To ease the credit problem, whatever the mo­
tive, Congress created the Federal Home Loan Bank System 
at Hoover's request. Connally voted for the bill which 
passed in July, 1932.^^
Early during the depression, Connally spoke in be­
half of the nation's war veterans. In May, 1930, Hoover 
vetoed a pension bill for Spanish-American War veterans.
On a motion by Connally, the Senate reconsidered the bill 
and passed it over his veto.^^ Shortly thereafter, in .
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 136; Hicks,
Republican Ascendancy, 271-272. At one point Connally at­
tempted to amend the bill with a provision that the States 
would have to pay back only one half of the loan. This
failed passage in the Senate 32 to 42. U. S., Congress­
ional Record, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 1930, LXIV, Ft. 1, 572, 373-3751
34U. S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 
1930, LXXIV, Pt. 1, 42, 1112-1113, 1118.
55Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 133; Hicks,
Republican Ascendancy, 27^; U. S., Statutes at Large, 72d 
Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXVII, Pt. 1, 725-?4l.
S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 
1920, LXXII, Pt. 9, 9722, 9876; New York Times, May 29,
1930, p. 6; ibid., May 30, 1930, p. 12.
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conjunction with Senator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts,
Connally sponsored a bill to increase World War I veterans'
5 7pensions to equal those of Spanish-American Wair veterans.
58They were, however, only partially successful.^
In January, 1931, Connally introduced "a bill to
provide for the payment to veterans of the cash surrender
59value of their adjusted-service certificates." The bill 
did not pass, but eventually during that session Congress 
passed an act over Hoover's veto giving some aid to vet­
erans. The statute authorized loans of up to 50 per cent 
on their certificates. Connally supported the bill both 
times it came before the S e n a t e . D u r i n g  the next session, 
Connally led the fight to lower the interest on such loans 
from 4% per cent to 2 per cent.^^ But when it came to Con­
gressman Wright Patman's "Bonus bill," he continued to ques­
tion its net effect just as he had as a Congressman and 
voted "No.
^^New York Times, June 29, 1930, p. I6 ; U. S., Con­
gressional Record, ?lst Cong., 2d Sess., 1930, LXXII, Pt.
11, 11481.
^^TTC to R. E. Merritt, October 7, 1930, TCP, con. 
95; U. S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 1930, 
LXXII, Pt. 11, 124l4-124i&%
S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 
1931, LXXIV, Pt. 3, 3117.
G°Ibid., Pt. 5, 5386; ibid., Pt. 6, 623O; Hicks, 
Republican Ascendancy, 275»
^^New York Times, April 24, 1932, p. 2.
^^TTC to T. F. Harwell, July 5, 1932, TCP, con. 95; 
U. S., Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, 
LXXV, Pt. 12, 13274.
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While Connally displayed wide interests in legisla­
tion during the Hoover Administration, the need for farm 
relief remained his primary concern. In 1931, the most 
pressing agricultural problem was the year-long drought 
that plagued much of Texas and other States. On numerous 
occasions Connally urged the Senate to pass drought relief 
legislation. The following telegram from what Connally 
described as "the chamber of commerce of a large and ordi­
narily prosperous county" typified the sense of emergency 
and tragedy:
One thousand two hundred families in various 
sections of this county in dire need. No money 
to finance crops or buy food. Have no security 
outside of prospective crops and can not borrow.
Local charity organizations short of funds.
Think Congress should take action to relieve 
distress.«3
Much of the time Connally spoke to a near-empty 
chamber. On one such occasion he was interrupted by a 
quorum call. When it was completed, he shamed the ninety 
Senators who answered the roll:
. . . I desire to apologize to Senators who 
were enjoying their luncheons and were inter­
rupted by the quorum call. It must, indeed, be 
distressing when, in the midst of a comfortable 
and luxurious meal, Senators are disturbed by 
some hoarse-voiced individual pleading that 
other men who have no food and who have no money 
with which to buy food should be given an oppor­
tunity not to feast on choice viands but to secure 
a mere crust in order that they may preserve their 
own lives and the lives of their f a m i l i e s . 64
S., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 
1931, LXXIV, Pt. 2, 2058-2060, 2143-2144; ibid., Pt. 5, 
4390-4595; ibid., Pt. ?, 6622-6623.
^^Ibid., Pt. 5, 4590-4595.
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Even after Congress appropriated some $20 million for loans 
to dr ought-stricken farmers, Connally spent much of his time 
appealing to Secretary of Agriculture Arthur M. Hyde for 
faster and more efficient administration of the loans and 
urging upon the Administration a more liberal policy in col­
lecting the loans.
As if the plight of the cotton farmer were not bad 
enough in the summer of 1931s prices dropped sharply due, 
according to Connally because the government predicted a 
large cotton crop. Connally protested to Secretary Hyde 
that not only was the publication of such an estimate poorly 
timed, but also it was of questionable a c c u r a c y . A g a i n  
he made a futile attempt to secure passage of a bill regu­
lating transactions on cotton e x c h a n g e s . A n d  for a third 
time he spoke for and voted in favor of an export debenture 
program, which for the third time was defeated.
Although Connally voted against the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, he sought to use the agency for direct 
benefit to agriculturalists. He submitted a bill which per­
mitted that agency to loan up to $250 million to exporters 
or foreign purchasers who would dispose of surplus cotton
69and wheat, but the bill was not acted upon. He was
^^Ibid., Pt. 7, 6622-6623.
^^New York Times, August 10, 1931, P* 17*
67U. S., Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 
1931, LXXV, Pt. 1, 203.
68Ibid., 1932, LXXV, Pt. 10, 10942, 11010, 11013-
11014.
9Ibid., Pt. 11, 11966-11967.
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successful, however, in a campaign to force the Post Office
Department to use cotton twine rather than imported jute for 
70tying bundles.
Two more serious questions which the nation faced 
during the Hoover years were the cancellation of European 
war debts and a proposed national sales tax. On both issues, 
Connally took an early and definite stand. He spoke against 
Hoover's moratorium on the repayment of European debts as a 
step toward cancellation and urged the immediate reduction 
of tariff duties against European products so that those 
nations could balance their payments due the United States. 
Further, Connally advocated an international conference on 
currency and coinage as another aid to international trade.
As soon as he heard rumors of a Mellon-supported
sales tax proposal, he voiced his opposition. Speaking in
Uvalde, home town of John Nance Garner, who later supported
President Hoover's sales tax measure, Connally attacked it
as regressive:
Such a tax would be a burden upon the poor. It 
would tax food and clothing and the necessities 
of life. I am utterly opposed to such a Federal 
tax. If new Federal taxes are to be levied, I 
shall favor the increase of inheritance taxes on 
the great fortunes of the land. Sur taxes in the 
higher brackets of the income tax should also be 
increased. The ability to pay is a fundamental 
element in all sound taxation. The great aggre­
gation of wealth in the hands of a relatively few 
people is a direct threat at our economic indepen­
dence and competence. Great inheritances must bear 
a fair share of the burdens of government. 71
?Ottc to J. R. McCarl, July 11, 1932, printed in 
ibid., Pt. 14, 15032.
71TTC, Press Release, Uvalde, Texas, October 5,
1931, TCP, con. 552.
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Connally could not stop the moratorium, but a large group
of Democrats and insurgent Republicans, strengthened by
the stand of President-elect Roosevelt, combined to kill
72the sales tax proposal.
While Connally favored deficit spending as a means 
of combating the depression, he advocated the need for econ­
omy in government. Although his statements sometimes seemed 
contradictory, his appeals for economy usually took the form 
of attacks on wasteful and inefficient spending and urging use of 
savings for productive projects. Particularly Connally 
favored a reduction in government salaries. "While salary 
reductions alone will not bring about large savings in 
amount," he said, "let me suggest to Senators that they
will have one of the most splendid psychological effects
73upon the country."
Also in the interest of "economy," Connally fought 
the removal of troops from posts along the Rio Grande, such 
as Fort D. A. Russell at Marfa and Fort Brown at Brownsville. 
Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley justified his decision 
to abandon some of the older posts on the Mexican border 
by arguing that the troops were serving no proper function
72ttc to Paul H. Brown, December 28, 1931; TTC to
C . W. Cotton, December 22 (?), 1933, TCP, con. 135; Arthur 
M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of
the Old Order (Boston, 1957 ) , ”"^48-450 ; ÜT S., Congressional 
Record, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Pt. 10, 11664 ;
Harris Gaylord Warren, Herbert Hoover and the Great Depres­
sion (New York, 1959), 274-276.
73U. S., Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 
1932, LXXV, Pt. 7, 7653.
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there. Connally replied that it was wasteful to abandon 
usable government-owned property, moving the troops to loca­
tions where new quarters would have to be built. Hurley 
charged that Connally was acting like a "pork barrel" poli­
tician. Contending that Hurley was simply trying to pull 
troops together near the larger cities in order to protect 
them against an imagined Communist threat, Connally replied 
that Hurley himself had an "inordinate appetite for pork" 
when the Secretary of War prevented a similar removal of 
troops from Fort Sill in the Secretary's home State of Okla­
homa. Such was nothing more than "autocracy" and "false
7keconomy," he charged.
Democrats succeeded in controlling the House of 
Representatives in the Seventy-second Congress as a result 
of deaths and Democratic victories in special elections. 
Democratic politicians, in turn, did their best to make the 
voters aware of Congressional efforts to cut unnecessary 
spending on the eve of the national political conventions. 
Speaking to a national radio audience May 12, 1932, on be­
half of the Democratic National Committee, Connally pro­
claimed :
No government has the right to spend a single 
dollar of the people's money above that necessary 
for the maintenance of an economical administration.
^^Ibid., Pt. 14, 15116-15117; clipping from Wash­
ington Post, December 31» 1932; clipping from Dallas Dis­
patch, January 1, 1933» TCP, con. 596.
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Waste can not be defended. Extravagance is a 
breach of public faith. Squandering of public 
money is a form of embezzlement.75
This speech was delivered more to malign Hoover than to re­
duce government spending. Connally favored both deficit 
spending and the election of a Democratic president.
Although Connally was active in previous presiden­
tial contests, his role was more prominent in 1932. Nearly 
two years prior to the national conventions, newspaper re­
porters requested Connally to list the likely 1932 Democratic 
presidential nominees. He suggested six as strong possibil­
ities: former Secretary of War Newton D. Baker of Ohio,
Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas, Governor Franklin
D. Roosevelt of New York, former Senator Jim Reed of Miss­
ouri, and Senator Walter F. George of G e o r g i a . N o  mention 
was made of John Nance Garner. It cannot be determined if 
such a possibility crossed his mind, but, in any event.
Garner was not mentioned as a potential candidate until
77his election as Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Meanwhile Connally continued to think in terms of 
other men. His favorite among the various possibilities 
was former Secretary Baker, but in the spring of 1931 he 
recognized Roosevelt as the front-runner:
75U. S., Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 
1932, LXXV, Pt. 9, 10201.
^^New York Times, October 2, 1930, p. 2k; clipping 
from Texarkana Gazette, October 1, 1930; clipping from 
Ranger Times, October 2, 1930, TCP, con. 59^-
77Bascom N. Timmons, Garner of Texas : A Personal
His tory (New York, 1948), 152-153*
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I think Governor Roosevelt would make a fine 
candidate; and it is likely that he would win 
against Hoover. I am somewhat inclined to favor 
Baker of Ohio, but recognize that he might arouse 
antagonisms on account of the war, particularly 
among German-Americans. At this time it looks 
like Roosevelt. He is progressive--and that 
suits me. He would carry Texas easily, but in 
view of the depression almost anyone else 
could.7°
After a series of editorials appeared in numerous
Hearst newspapers favoring the candidacy of Garner, a Texas
movement quickly developed in his behalf. Garner was the
first Texan to be speaker of the House of Representatives
and the first since Sam Houston to be considered seriously
as a presidential candidate. The two Texas Senators made
a joint statement February 17, 1932, to the effect that
Garner would be a candidate at the Democratic convention
the following summer. The statement read in part:
. . . we have no hesitation in averring that John 
Garner by training and experience in national 
affairs and by his wide grasp of national problems 
is the most highly qualified of all those who are 
being mentioned as candidates in either the Re­
publican or Democratic parties. Texas presents 
him to the nation as a man grounded in the fun­
damentals of democracy, a rugged and militant 
champion of the American people.79
From that point on, Connally gave his full effort to Gar­
ner's candidacy. Unquestionably Connally supported Garner 
as a fellow Texan. But Connally was undoubtedly impressed
Memorandum, ca. March 26, 1931, Democratic Na­
tional Committee, 1932, Correspondence, 1928-1933, FDR 
Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
^^Timmons, Garner of Texas, 156.
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by Garner's presidential qualifications and the Speaker's 
excellent chance of being elected. Without suggesting any 
personal dislike or political distrust one for the other, 
Connally and the Speaker were not the closest of friends. 
Their personal relationship was cordial, and their poli­
tical association was always firm, but neither considered
80the other among his staunchest allies. The State Demo­
cratic Convention, which met in May, 1932, elected Connally
8 3.as a delegate to the Chicago national convention. Sam 
Rayburn, chairman of the Texas delegation, announced in 
June that Connally would make the principal nominating
82speech for Garner.
The Roosevelt camp early realized that Connally 
was a key to Texas politics and their efforts to acquire 
delegate support. A memorandum prepared for use by the 
Roosevelt organization in the 1932 pre-convention campaign 
made the following evaluation of the Texas Senator:
O ̂ Connally's closest personal friends and political 
allies on the Texas delegation were Marvin Jones, Congress­
man from Amarillo, 1917 to 19^0, and Congressman Luther 
Johnson, Congressman from Corsicana, 1923 to 1946. Connally 
maintained good relations also with Senator Morris Sheppard, 
but their primary interests were too different for them to 
develop a really close political alliance.
81This was in spite of his moderately "dry” position 
on the liquor question, one of the most potent of all poli­
tical issues in Texas. The State Convention voted to sup­
port a move to submit the question to the States, and it 
omitted Senator Morris Sheppard from its list of delegates. 
Clipping from Austin Statesman, May 25, 1932; clipping from 
Greenville Herald, May 25, 1932; clipping from Marshall 
News-Messenger, May 29, 1932, TCP, con. 96.
82New York Times, June 10, 1932, p. 2.
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The most influential political leaders in Texas 
today are Tom Connolly [sic], Gov, Ross Sterling, 
former Governor Dan Moody, and former Governor 
Pat Neff.
These four men are drys. If any one of them 
took a favorable position either expres[s]ed or 
implied, the effect would be most helpful and 
would probably control the decision of Texas.
Connally, the most powerful, is not unfriendly, 
but his chief purpose in life is to be re-elected 
senator. He is unlikely to do anything which in 
his judgment promised to make difficult his re- 
election. °3
As the convention opened, both Senators Key Pittman of
Nevada and Harry B. Hawes of Missouri urged Connally to
84give his support to Roosevelt. Although no reply to 
their telegrams seems to exist, surely Pittman and Hawes 
realized at least a slight possibility for such a move on 
Connally's part.
Connally was the first choice of the Texas delega­
tion to serve as its representative on the important Plat­
form and Resolutions Committee of the national convention. 
He declined to serve, however, saying he would be busy
o c
working on the Garner campaign. On the third day of the 
convention, nominating speeches began. Immediately, Ala­
bama's chairman yielded to New York and Roosevelt's name 
was placed in n o m i n a t i o n . T h e  galleries were filled with
M. F, (?), Memorandum, FDR Papers, Box ?l8.
84Fred L. Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman (Lincoln, 
Nebraska, 1963)1 98.
o c
Clipping from Dallas News, June 20, 1932, TCP,
con. 596.
^^Democratic Party, National Convention, Official 
Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Con­
vention Held at Chicago, Illinois, June 27th to July 2nd, 
Inclusive, 1932 ([Chicago” 1932]), 206-211.
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Al Smith supporters, who booed and hissed. When California 
was reached on the roll call, that chairman yielded to Texas,
O
and Connally obtained "a respectful hearing” as he pre­
sented the "Andrew Jackson of 1932," "Field Marshal of the
Armies of Democracy, the great Speaker of the House, John
at
89
88Nance Garner." Next A1 Smith was placed in nomin ion.
followed by half a dozen less important candidates.
On the first ballot Roosevelt led with 666^ votes,
Smith was second with 201% votes, and Garner was third with
90%  votes. On the second ballot, Roosevelt gained 11% votes.
Smith lost 7% votes, and Garner remained steady. On the
third ballot, completed about nine o'clock in the morning
after an all-night session, Roosevelt gained a little.
Smith lost slightly, and Garner added eleven votes to his 
90total. As the convention adjourned for the day, it was
clear that Garner would have to move quickly to the front
as a compromise candidate, give his support to soneone else,
91or be responsible for deadlocking the convention.
O ̂
Timmons, Garner of Texas, I6I-I62.
88TTC, Speech at Chicago National Convention by Tom 
Connally, Placing John Garner in Nomination for President, 
June 30, 1932, TCP, con. 552; Democratic Party, National 
Convention, Proceedings. . . 1932, 2l4-2l8; Ü. S., Congres­
sional Record, ?2d Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Pt. 13, 
14608-14609.
89Democratic Party, National Convention, Proceedings
. . . 1932, 218-287.
9°Ibid., 288-289, 301-302, 315-316.
91Timmons, Garner of Texas, I64.
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To gain nomination, a candidate needed approximately 
92770 votes. Only ninety votes were pledged to Garner-- 
those of Texas and California. During the second ballot, 
Arthur F. Mullen, floor leader for Roosevelt, approached 
Connally and discussed Garner's receptivity toward the vice 
presidential nomination on a ticket with the New York gover­
nor. "The subject has never been broached to Garner," Con­
nally replied, but he reportedly agreed that such a move 
seemed the only way to avert a deadlock. But when he sought 
an adjourment, presumably to gain time to talk with Garner, 
objections were raised by New York's delegation. After the 
third ballot, an adjournment was gained, and during the day,
while the delegates rested from their long night's work,
93Garner made his decision to withdraw.
The Speaker was in Washington during the Chicago 
convention. Talking only with members of the Texas delega­
tion by telephone, and refusing a call from A1 Smith, Garner 
determined that unless Roosevelt won on the fourth ballot, 
a long and costly deadlock would result. Whether urged or 
not by Connally, but certainly not discouraged by him, Gar­
ner released the Texas and California delegations, and
92The number needed for nomination varied in accor­
dance with the number of votes cast on a given ballot.
^^Clipping from Fort Worth Press, July l4, 1932 ;
New York Herald-Tribune, July l4, 1932; clipping from 
Dallas Dispatch, July l4, 1932; clipping from Dallas News, 
July 15, 1932, TCP, con. 596.
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94Roosevelt was nominated on the next ballot. As a reward 
for his cooperation, Garner was selected as the vice presi­
dential candidate by the convention on the first ballot, 
while Connally presided as acting chairman.
According to Mullen, the Roosevelt floor leader, 
Connally was largely responsible for Garner's switch to 
Roosevelt. Questioned at the time, Connally refused to 
verify or deny Mullen's version of the proceedings, but in 
his autobiography he claims much of the credit. Frank 
Freidel, the principal Roosevelt biographer, dismisses the 
Mullen version and Connally's significance as no more valid 
than a number of others. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., however,
gives some credence to the significance of the Mullen- 
95Connally talks.
After the convention was over, Connally announced 
from his home in Marlin that he would accept the request 
of Democratic Chairman James A. Farley to campaign in behalf
96of the national ticket. Again he and Roosevelt were on 
the same campaign trail. "The paramount issues," he said, 
"are economic. . . . The American electorate cannot be
'befuddled' by the old time protective tariff slogan."
^^Timmons, Garner of Texas, l64-l66; Frank Freidel, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt : The Triumph (Boston, 1952), 305-311.
^^Clipping from Abilene News, July 15, 1932; clip­
ping from Dallas News, July 15, 1932, TCP, con. 596; Con­
nally, M^ Name Is Tom Connally, l4l-l45; Freidel, Franklin 
jD. Roosevelt : The Triumph, 309-310.
96Clipping from Marlin Daily Democrat, August 12, 
1932, TCP, con. 596.
103
Poking fun at the Republicans, he said, "The Republican 
Committee still has on hand a large supply of the 1928 
Hoover coin, upon which is stamped, 'Good for Four Years of 
Prosperity.' What will they do with them in 1932?" Through­
out the campaign he stressed the unfulfilled promises made 
by the Republicans for farm relief and lower taxes. And, 
Connally pointed to the high Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act and
the depression that followed as "proof" of what happens
97under Republican administrations.
After Roosevelt's victory in November, Connally 
returned to Washington for the last of the "lame duck" 
Congresses. Little of what he proposed was enacted into 
law during that short session, but by Roosevelt's inaugura­
tion, Connally had formulated some ideas which would become 
part of the New Deal. Connally was indeed elated for the 
"Happy Days" to resume.
07New York Times, July 25, 1932, p. 3
CHAPTER V
THE EARLY NEW DEAL
Shortly after the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt 
in November, 1932, Connally received an invitation to confer 
with the President-elect at his retreat in Warm Springs, 
Georgia.^ The Senator accepted^he nomination of Roosevelt 
with enthusiasm and campaigned diligently for the Roosevelt- 
Garner ticket. Pleased as he was with the resulting Demo­
cratic victory, however, he did not look upon Roosevelt as 
a magical cure-all for the national depression. Connally's 
support for the New York governor came more from his deep 
belief in party loyalty. Often during and after the cam­
paign, he worried about Roosevelt's presidential potential. 
His apprehensions deepened when he attended a Roosevelt
victory dinner in New York City and again when he met with
2Roosevelt in Georgia December 1, 1932.
When the two men met privately, they discussed taxes,
^Clipping from Austin Ferguson Forum, November 24, 
1932, TCP, con. 596,
2Tom Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg, My 
Name Is Tom Connally (New York, 1954), 14?.
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relief, and the budget. Connally claimed to be speaking 
for several Democratic Senators as well as himself when he 
urged Roosevelt to support a program that included drastic 
tax reductions as a means of increasing purchasing power 
among consumers and federal borrowing as a source of income 
for relief programs. It alarmed the Senator, however, to 
hear the President-elect stressing the need for a balanced 
budget and the importance of strict constitutional limita­
tions in dealing with the depression. As a lawyer, Connally 
was fully aware of the Constitution, but now he argued for 
emergency action. "If it was constitutional to spend forty 
billion dollars in a war," he protested to Roosevelt, "isn't 
it just as constitutional to spend a little money to relieve 
the hunger and misery of our citizens?"
Perhaps Connally succeeded in convincing Roosevelt 
that a balanced budget was not the immediate objective.
Or, as suggested by historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 
perhaps Roosevelt appeared conservative in front of the 
Senator at this time simply to test his reaction.^ In any 
event, Connally had limited faith in the new administration 
as it took office March 4, 1933»
qClipping from Dallas Dispatch, December 1, 1932, 
TCP, con. 596.
^Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, l4?-l48.
^Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, 
Vol. I: The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933 (Boston,
1957), 452.
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Generally there was little difference between Con­
nally 's and Roosevelt's suggestions for fighting the depres­
sion. Connally favored both government economy and deficit 
spending, and although his statements appeared as uncertain 
and contradictory at times as Roosevelt's, he was sincere 
in his proposals. He talked a great deal of the time about 
cutting expenses and a balanced budget to impress upon the 
general public the responsible nature of the incoming ad­
ministration. "The way to economize," he told the Senate, 
"is to economize." He urged a reduction in expenditures by 
the Treasury Department and voted to cut back air mail ser­
vice contracts. To help balance the budget, he proposed a 
definite plan. First, he said, every appropriation must 
be reduced "absolutely to the lowest practicable poinf." 
Second, President Roosevelt should be given the power to 
reorganize the executive departments. Third, Connally pro­
posed that the new Secretary of the Treasury call in all due 
bonds bearing the high interest rate of 4% to 4% per cent. 
This alone could save the government up to three million 
dollars which could be spent, Connally said, aiding a more 
needy segment of the population. Finally, he urged that 
Congress refrain from any additional taxation.
In his earlier talk with Roosevelt, Connally did 
not think a yearly balanced budget absolutely imperative. 
"Any sound program of balancing the Budget," he said,
"ought to be spread over a longer period than a year." He
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was one of those who favored deficit spending and lower taxes 
in time of depression, to be evened out by higher taxes in 
time of prosperity--a full three years before the publication 
of John Maynard Keynes' The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest, and Money (I936), To him it seemed a practical 
approach. Again he compared the emergency of the depression 
to that of World War I:
When we have a great war we do not undertake 
to pay all the running expenses of that war dur­
ing its continuance; we borrow for the future, 
trusting that the American people will redeem the 
obligations thus incurred, as they have always 
redeemed them. We are in war to-day, not with 
men, not with an enemy with guns in his hands, 
but we are in war; we are in war with great eco­
nomic forces which are more unconquerable than 
are men with guns in their hands. We are in a 
war with the unseen forces of a terrible depres­
sion . . . .So, it is as justifiable now to take
care of any reasonable or temporary deficit by a 
reasonable amount of borrowing on the future or 
any future prosperity as it would be in any other 
crisis.G
Connally hoped only to approach a balanced budget in 
1933 by curbing wasteful spending. For example, he criti­
cized excessive appropriations for army equipment which he 
felt unnecessary. He tried unsuccessfully to delete one-
half million dollars from the 1933 army appropriation
7 8bill and urged similar economy in naval appropriations.
^U. S., Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., 
1933, LXXVI, Pt. 3, 3077, 3O8O-3O8I.
7Ibid., Pt. 4, 3784-3787.
^Ibid., 3506-3507.
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But savings such as these were only a small part of Con­
nally 's ideas on fighting the depression. Huge government 
expenditures were even more important, as were government 
controls in both agriculture and business.
On inauguration day, Connally was ill with influ-
9enza. As he listened to Roosevelt's address by radio, he 
felt encouraged by such phrases as "This nation asks for 
action, and action now. Our greatest primary task is to 
put people to work . . . .  I am prepared under my constitu­
tional duty to recommend the measures that a stricken nation 
in the midst of a stricken world may require.
Just as the 1930 elections improved Connally's rela­
tive position in the Senate and within his various committees, 
so did the general election of 1932. In 1933, forty Sena­
tors ranked below him and the nine others who had entered 
the Senate in 1929^^--nineteen more than in 1931. Moreover, 
after only four years service, he had climbed the seniority 
ladder about halfway on two major committees. On the Senate 
Finance Committee, he ranked sixth among thirteen Democrats,
and on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he ranked
12seventh among thirteen.
9Clipping from Dallas News, March 3, 1933; clipping 
from Dallas Times Herald, March 3, 1933, TCP, con. 596.
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, l48; Samuel J. 
Rosenman (ed. ), The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D̂. 
Roosevelt (New York, 193&-1950), II, 12-15.
S., Congress, Official Congressional Directory,
73d Cong., 1st Sess., 19331 161-162.
^^Ibid., 176-177.
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During the early years of the New Deal, domestic
economic legislation received most of Connally's attention.
As a member of the Finance Committee, he was often at the
center of action. He respected Roosevelt's aggressive
attitude in declaring a banking holiday and calling Congress
into special session, and he supported without qualifica-
13tion the Emergency Banking Act of March 9, 1933* Among 
the various pieces of major legislation which were before 
Congress in the early days of the Roosevelt Administration, 
the two which most interested Connally in 1933 were the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act and the National Industrial 
Recovery Act.
As a Senator from Texas, Connally was naturally con­
cerned with farm problems. A product of a Texas farm, and
l4now a large landowner, he had a good understanding of the 
problems. The whole farm issue, he thought, could be reduced 
to the need for more money--more real purchasing power--for 
farmers. In early March he spoke to Roosevelt about this. 
Connally saw only two alternatives--either issue great 
volumes of paper money or reduce the gold content of the 
dollar. To him, reducing the gold content of the dollar 
seemed the better choice. It would create more money while
13U. S., Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 
1933, LXXVII, Pt. 1,67.
14Besides cotton land already owned by Connally 
and his wife, additional lands were inherited upon the 
death of the Senator's mother in 1932.
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maintaining the basically hard money policy called for in 
the 1932 Democratic platform.
In the final days of the Hoover Administration, 
Connally had proposed gold devaluation in Senate debate.
In a hearing before the Senate Finance Committee, he tan­
gled with Bernard Baruch in a hopeless argument. The Sena­
tor maintained that if the gold content of the dollar were 
cut in half, it would take twice as many gold dollars to 
make a given purchase, or, in other words, that the price 
of the item would double. Baruch denied this, and although 
he admitted that to cut the gold content of the dollar would 
have the effect of raising prices, he said that internal 
prices especially would not be effected nearly so much as 
Connally thought. He argued that Connally's idea would be 
disastrous, since it would cause a rush on the gold held by 
the Federal Reserve System, and that the reserve would dis­
appear between the time the proposal was discussed and the 
time it went into effect.
^^New York Times, January 25s 1933, pp. 1, 7j ibid., 
January 26, 1933, P* 2.
S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 
Hearings, to Make Investigation and Study of Present Eco­
nomic Problems of the United States with View to Securing 
Constructive Suggestions with Respect to Solution of Such 
Problems, ?2d Cong., 2d Sess., 1933, 22-351 59-^0 ; TTC, 
Speech, January, 193^, TCP, con, 553; New York Times, 
February 13, 1933, P* 1; clipping from Houston Press,
January 20, 1933, TCP, con. 133; clipping from Austin 
American, February l4, 1933, TCP, con. 596; clipping from 
ibid., February 15, 1933, TCP, con. 133-
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Connally continued to maintain, throughout his ques­
tioning of Baruch, that his plan would be beneficial. He 
claimed there would be an immediate increase of 5 0 per 
cent in cotton and wheat prices, creating a greater purchas­
ing power for farmers. Baruch finally admitted that infla­
tion was needed, and soon, but he denied that Connally's
17scheme would work. Anyway, as Connally readily admitted, 
there was no chance that any inflationary measure could be
18passed while the Republicans still had control. Response 
to Connally's proposal varied from complete approval, to 
admission that the Senator meant well but was perhaps mis-
19taken, to absolute disapproval.
When the Seventy-third Congress met, however, the 
Democrats controlled both houses. The debate shifted from 
whether an inflationary measure should be passed to aid the 
farmers to what kind of inflationary measure would be passed. 
The agriculture bill, providing for the Agricultural Adjust­
ment Act, came before the Congress soon after the banking 
crisis settlement. Most of its features pleased Connally,
17Uo S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 
Hearings, to Make Investigation and Study of Present Eco­
nomic Problems of the United States with View to Securing 
Constructive Suggestions with Respect to Solution of Such 
Problems, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., 1933s 59-60; TTC, Memorandum 
[1933,] TCP, con. 515.
18’•Hoover would veto it,” he wrote his old college 
friend Carl Lovelace. TTC to Carl Lovelace, January 30,
1933s TCP, con. 133.
B. Bizzell to TTC, January 26, 1933; clipping 
from Houston Post, February I8, 1933; clipping from Houston 
Chronicle, January 20, 1933, TCP, con. 133-
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and he supported each feature that promised aid to the 
farmer. He took an active part in the Administration's 
fight to keep the meaning of the term "basic commodities" 
within bounds, admitting corn, cotton, wheat, rice, hogs,
and dairy products, but eliminating sugar cane, sugar beets,
, 20 and peanuts.
Connally did not become involved in the debates on 
acreage control and benefit payments, leaving those issues 
to others interested in the farmer's welfare. Of more imme­
diate concern to Connally was Title III of the proposed 
Agricultural Adjustment Bill, which called for a new mone­
tary policy. The leading figure in the fight for inflation 
was Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma, who proposed that a large 
number of greenbacks be issued. Burton K. Wheeler of Mon­
tana, supported by Huey P. Long of Louisiana, favored the
21free coinage of silver. But the Texan had his own solu- 
tion--the devaluation of the gold dollar--that he had pro­
posed during the Hoover Administration:
. . .  I submit [he told the Senate] that if the 
purpose of the proposed legislation is to reduce 
the value of the gold dollar, the best and most 
practical way of reducing the value of the gold 
dollar is to reduce the value of the gold dollar, not 
indirectly, not by a backstairs method, not by 
going around and climbing in the kitchen window 
but by the exercise of the sovereign power of the 
Congress vested in the Congress by the Constitution
PONew York Times, April 22, 1933 s P* 6 .
21Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, 
Vol. II: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston, 1959), 4l.
113
to coin money and--to do what? Not to fix its 
value but to regulate the value of the gold 
dollar.22
During the course of Senate debate, Connally intro­
duced a new bill which reduced by one-third the gold content 
of the dollar. It also provided for the establishment of 
a government agency to adjust the gold content further in 
accordance with an index of commodity values. Speculation 
was discouraged by a special tax of 100 per cent on all
profits made through gold transactions. But Connally's bill
2 3was buried in committee along with numerous others.
His idea, however, was not completely lost. As the 
inflation drive gained momentum in Congress, the President 
continued to oppose the plans which required specific infla­
tionary action. Finally Senate leaders and the Administration 
reached a compromise which embodied not just one of the pro­
posals but a combination of them. And rather than making 
them mandatory, the amended version of the bill authorized 
the president "in his discretion" to purchase up to 
$200,000,000 of silver for coinage, to issue paper money 
up to $35000,000,000, or to devalue the gold dollar by as 
much as 50 per cent. Thus, the policy which Connally
2kadvocated became part of the law. Soon it was put into
22U. s.. Congressional Record, ?2d Cong., 2d Sess., 
1933, LXXVI, Pt. 3, 2363-2371.
^^New York Times, April k, 1933, P* 27; U. S., Con­
gressional Record, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1933, LXXVll, Pt.
1892-1894; clipping from San Antonio Express, April 5,
1933, TCP, con. 133.
24u. S., Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 
1933, LXXVll, Pt. 2, 2171; New York Times, April 29, 1933, 
pp. 1, 4.
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practice in conjunction with other ideas and the Senator
expressed his approval of the over-all Roosevelt monetary 
25policy.
While Connally favored the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act and its important Thomas amendment, he opposed the pas­
sage of the National Industrial Recovery Act. From the 
beginning, he held that the proposed law was an unconstitu­
tional delegation of power by Congress. When witnesses 
appeared before the Senate Finance Committee in April, they 
included Hugh Johnson and Donald Richberg, spokesmen for 
the Administration, who explained how various industries 
would be regulated by rules of its own members. Connally 
respected both men, but he nevertheless made clear his 
opposition to the proposed law:
What you intend doing [Connally told Johnson 
and Richberg] is to turn over a man's business 
to this group and have it tell him how to oper­
ate under what rules. Don't you know that the 
government has no power to delegate the direction 
of an industry to a committee of its own members?
Such control has to be granted by Congress to a 
government agency operating under strict rules 
set by Congress.
25Dexter Perkins, The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt, 
1932-45 (Chicago, 1957), 20; Basil Rauch, The History of 
the New Deal, 1933-1938 (New York, 1944), 104-105 ; New York 
Times, December 1, 1933, p. 2; ibid., December 20, 1933, p. 33-
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, l60. The April 
hearings were not published. The committee met again May 
22-June 1, during which time Richberg was again questioned, 
and Connally's tone toward him and the bill was similar.
These hearings were published. See U. S., Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Finance, Hearings, on S_. 1712 and H. R. 5755, 
Bills to Encourage National Industrial Recovery, to Foster 
Fair Competition, and to Provide for the Construction of Cer­
tain Useful Public Works, and for Other Purposes, 73d Cong., 
1st Sess., 1933, 22-34.
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Connally challenged Richberg's later statement that the bill 
would provide fair competition:
What is fair competition? [Connally asked.]
This fair competion is a fine, mouth-filling phrase 
that tickles our ears, but what is fair? Who is 
going to say? Is it fair from the standpoint of 
the corporation? Fair from the standpoint of the 
corporation might be all that the traffic will bear, 
catch the consumer, gouge his eye out and bite off 
his ear. But what is fair, now? This is too broad 
a term for me to understand in all its ramifica­
tions. Maybe you, having drawn the bill, know what
it means.27
Connally seemed to realize that he was fighting a 
lost cause. He told the two men: "The only thing on your
side is that the times are so out of joint and the country 
is so out of shape that many Congressmen are grasping at 
anything that seems to offer a hope for stopping the depres-
28sion." Only two members of the Senate Finance Committee 
opposed the bill, and only twenty-four Senators voted against 
it when it came to the floor in June. Connally was in the 
minority both times. But his opposition to the Administra­
tion-sponsored measure, which Roosevelt chose to ignore, 
was one of the few such instances throughout the New Deal.
His vote was not essential to the success of the NIRA, and
Roosevelt considered him too valuable an ally to chastise 
29needlessly.
2?U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 
Hearings, on S_. 1712 and H. R. 5755, Bills to Encourage 
National Industrial Recovery, to Foster Fair Competition, 
and to Provide for The Cons true t ion of Certain Useful Public 
Works, and for Other Purposes, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1933,
^^Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, 55^; U. S., 
Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1933, LXXVII,
Pt. 6, 5424.
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While the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the National 
Industrial Recovery Act drew little of his attention, Con­
nally did sponsor important New Deal legislation which would 
aid his State and section. In Texas, petroleum, cattle, and 
cotton were vital elements of the economy, and in the case 
of each, prices were dangerously low in the early 1930's.
To pleas for relief from Texas and other States, he responded 
with three laws or parts of laws that represent his chief 
contributions to the early New Deal.
The first of these is known as the Connally Hot Oil 
Act. The need for the law stemmed from the discovery in 1930 
of the fabulous East Texas oil field and the resulting col­
lapse of crude oil prices as production reached new heights. 
By 1933, crude oil was selling for as little as twenty-five
30cents a barrel, whereas the normal value was over a dollar. 
Attempts by the State government to control production failed 
miserably, as oil companies, large and small, ignored allow­
ables set by the Texas Railroad Commission and sold their
31illegally produced oil in other States.
Connally discussed the oil problem with the Presi­
dent. Roosevelt urged that a solution be found and made a 
part of the pending National Industrial Recovery Bill, to
30i,por a period in 1931 • • • production mounted to
a million barrels daily (one-third of the nation's require­
ments), and the price declined to ten cents a barrel."
Rupert Norval Richardson, Texas: The Lone Star State
(Englewood Cliffs, 1952), 39#.
^^Ibid., 398-399; Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally,
162-163.
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which Connally was opposed. But the President persisted,
and Connally agreed to follow his strategy. The President
appointed Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes to work on
the problem for the Administration, which also displeased 
32Connally. Ickes advocated a stronger measure than that 
proposed by Connally. The Secretary wanted a law which 
authorized the president to appoint a federal agent with 
the power to set the production of each individual oil well 
in the entire nation. Under this plan, Texas' share of 
production would be drastically reduced. The Senator fav­
ored leaving control of production in the hands of the States
and using the power of the federal government only to enforce
33the various State laws.
As a member of the Senate Finance Committee, Con­
nally had a decided advantage over Ickes during the hear­
ings on the bill. When the original recovery bill came be­
fore that committee, Connally succeeded in amending the 
House version in the manner that suited him despite Ickes' 
testimony. The Connally amendment, labeled by an irritated 
Ickes as "useless," empowered the president to prohibit the 
interstate or foreign transportation of any petroleum
^^Connally, M%. Name Is Tom Connally, I63.
^^Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L.
Ickes, Vol. I: The First Thousand Days, 1933-1936 (New
York, 1953)5 ^9-50; Connally, Name Is Tom Connally,
163.
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produced in violation of the law of any State.
But the opposition persisted. Roosevelt favored
the stronger idea, and he authorized Senator Elmer Thomas
to introduce a substitute amendment to the recovery bill
35when it reached the floor of the Senate. The clash be­
tween Connally and Thomas occurred June 8 , 1933* Thomas 
argued that broad powers to control production were essen­
tial to the president since some States made no attempt to 
restrict production. Aided in the debate by Senator Arthur 
Capper of Kansas, Thomas was hampered by instructions from 
Roosevelt not to press the issue too far for fear of endan­
gering the success of the entire bill.^^ As a result, the
Thomas amendment failed, and Connally's plan cleared a major 
37hurdle. The Senate proceeded to pass the recovery bill 
as reported by the Finance Committee June 9, ironically with
o QConnally voting against his own proposal. The House of 
Representatives readily accepted the Senate version, and the
34U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance,
Senate Report to Accompany National Industrial Recovery Bill, 
Rept. No. Il4, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1933,2; Ickes, Secret 
Diary, I, 4?; clippings from Dallas Times Herald, June 6 , 
1933,*» and Washington Star, June 6, 1933, TCP, con. 596. Con­
nally credits Jack Blalock, Houston lawyer, with helping write 
his amendment. Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, I63.
35Ickes claimed authorship of the substitute amend­
ment. Ickes, Secret Diary, I, 49.
3^ibid.
37U. S., Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 
1933, LXXVII, Pt. 6, 5294-5299.
^®Ibid., 5294.
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National Industrial Recovery Act, containing the Connally 
Hot Oil Amendment, was signed by the President June l6 ,
1933.39
The effect of the law was immediate, as the price
4oof crude oil rose quickly to over a dollar a barrel. The 
law, however, did not go unchallenged. In January, 1935, 
the Supreme Court held Section 9(c)--the hot oil section-- 
of the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional 
in the case Panama Refining Co. et al v. Ryan et al. "If 
[this law] were held valid," said the Court, "it would be 
idle to pretend that anything would be left of the limita­
tions upon the power of Congress to delegate its law-making 
function." Connally's amendment to the National Industrial 
Recovery Act was thus guilty of an unconstitutional dele­
gation of power, the same accusation he had leveled against _ 
the National Industrial Recovery Act. The Court, however, 
suggested to Connally how he might write an acceptable law. 
Instead of giving the president such broad powers as found 
in Section 9(c), the Court indicated that it would approve
4la specific delegation of authority to the executive branch.
S., Statutes at Large, LXXVII, Pt. 6, 200. 
Roosevelt put the Connally proposal into effect first by 
executive order two days after the Senate approved the bill 
and nearly a week before it became law. See Panama Refin­
ing Co. et al V .  Ryan et al, 293 U. S. 405 (1935)•
^^Connally, Mjr Name Is Tom Connally, l64.
4iPanama Refining Co. et. .âi v. Ryan et al. 293 
U. S. 430 TÏ935T.
120
Between January 7 and l8 , 1935? Connally introduced 
three bills into the Senate. The third one, which was acted 
upon, incorporated suggestions made by Senator Thomas and 
provided for the appointment of a government oil adminis­
trator who would exercise the enforcement power prohibiting
42interstate shipment of illegally produced oil. The Com­
mittee on Mines termed it "a substantial but somewhat elab­
orated re-enactment of section 9(c)," and urged its accept­
aia nee by the Senate.
Connally found it more difficult to secure passage 
of the Hot Oil Act in 1935 than in 1933- The emergency 
atmosphere had disappeared, and those who originally op­
posed the law were now joined by those who opposed it as 
simply unnecessary. In the House of Representatives, numer­
ous objections were raised. The Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce amended the bill by limiting the federal 
government's involvement to only the regulation of production 
as opposed to refinement and processing. Instead of allow­
ing a permanent law, the House committee demanded a tempor­
ary one. Finally, it made more specific the duties and 
limitations of the executive in enforcing and suspending
42U. S., Congressional Record, ?4th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1935, LXXIX, Pt. 1, 254, 407, 635-636, 694.
43U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Mines 
and Mining, Senate Report to Accompany Regulation of Ship­
ment in Interstate and Foreign Commerce of Petroleum Bill, 
Rept. No. 14, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1935, 1; U. S., Con­
gressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1935, LXXIX, Pt.
1, 649.
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Il  I Ithe law. For the most part, Connally and the Senate ac­
cepted the House changes, although they did achieve a minor 
victory while the bill was in conference by getting the House 
expiration date of June 1, 1936, changed to June l6, 1937»
The President signed the bill February 22, 1935*^^
In later years the fight for a permanent hot oil 
law continued. Secretary Ickes, Roosevelt's oil adminis-
k6trator, supported these moves, while the courts defended
4?the validity of the law against numerous attacks. In 
1937, after extensive hearings on an attempt to make the 
act permanent, an amendment to the 1935 law extended it to
44U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives Report to 
Accompany Regulation of Petroleum Shipments in Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce Bill, Rept. No. l48, ?4th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1935, 1-5•
^^Ibid.. 3; U* S., Statutes at Large, XLIX, Pt. 1, 
30-33; U* S., Congressional Record, T^th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1935, LXXIX, PtT 3, 245Ô. William E. Leuchtenburg, Frank­
lin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York,
1963T, 161, 162n, discusses the Connally riot Oil Act as a 
part of "'minor' legislation of the Second Hundred Days" 
which attempted "to salvage something from the NIRA ex­
perience." Actually, the Connally Act of 1935 was en­
acted before the Schechter decision invalidated the NIRA, 
Section 9(c) of the NIRA having already been invalidated 
by Panama Refining Co. et al v. Ryan et al in 1935-
46Harold L. Ickes to TTC, January 13, 1937, TCP,
con. 145; Harold L. Ickes to TTC, August I5, 1941, TCP,
con. 557.
4?TTC, Press Release, containing excerpts from the 
1936 annual report of the Attorney General of the State 
of Texas, January I6 , 1937, TCP, con. 643.
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1939-^^ In 1939? another amendment continued it to 1942.^^ 
Finally, in 19^2, Connally secured the repeal of the time 
clause from the 1935 law, and the Connally Hot Oil Act 
beeame perraanent.^^
Connally was also largely responsible for the Jones- 
Connally Act of April 7, 1934. This measure simply proposed 
to define beef and dairy cattle as "basic commodities," 
bringing them within the scope of the Agricultural Adjust­
ment Act of 1933. He and Congressman Marvin Jones of Ama­
rillo, Texas, introduced in January similar bills into their 
respective houses. Hearings on the House bill began almost 
immediately before the House Committee on Agriculture, of
51which Jones was chairman.
48The Senate favored making the law permanent, but 
the House objected. U, S., Statutes at Large, L, Pt. 1,
257; U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee 
on Finance, Hearings on S_. 790, to Repeal Section 13 of the 
Act Entitled "An Act to Regulate Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce in Petroleum and Its Products Produeed in Violation 
of State Law, and for Other Purposes," Approved February 22, 
1935. 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1937; Statement of Senator Tom 
Connally Before the Sub-Committee of the Committee on Inter­
state and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives, 
April 26, [1937,] (typescript), TCP, con. l44; Henry D.
Ralph, "Continuance of Connally Law Is Endorsed at Hearings," 
Oil and Gas Journal, XXXV (February I8, 1937), 9-10.
4qU. S., Statutes at Large, LIII, Pt. 2, 927-
5°Ibid., LVI, Pt. 1 , 381.
51U. S., Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 
1934, LXXVIII, Pt. 1, 59; U. S., Congress, House, Committee
on Agriculture, Hearings, on H. R. 6133 and H. R. 7153, to
Include Cattle as Basic Agricultural Commodity, 73d Cong., 
2d'"Ses's. 7 1 ^ ,  T .  ------- ------- -------------
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Testimony on the bill revealed that cattlemen were
divided sharply on the need for the proposed bill. Typical
of those speaking against it was Senator Robert D. Carey of
Wyoming, who expressed the common fear that a processing
tax on cattle would cause producers to realize even less
profit than they were making without the assistance of the
5 2Agricultural Adjustment Act. Connally appeared before
the committee to argue in favor of the bill. He pointed
out that while cattlemen were solidly opposed to inclusion
in the Act of 1933, there had since "been a radical and
vital change of opinion among cattlemen"--at least in his 
5 3own section. He told the committee, "I have telegrams
from the presidents of the Texas and Southwest Cattle Raisers
Associations to the effect that . . . p e r h a p s  95
per cent of the cattlemen in my State want cattle included
54in the Agricultural Adjustment Act as a basic commodity."
He also pointed out that other basic commodities were bene­
fiting from the agricultural program and argued that cattle
55could and should be helped as well.
The original House bill took several forms before 
the Agriculture Committee reported it to the House.
52U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, 
Hearings, on H. R. 6133 and H. R. 7153, to Include Cattle 






Unquestionably Senator Connally worked closely with Congress­
man Jones in the various redraftings. The finished version 
had two purposes. In addition to defining beef and dairy 
cattle as basic commodities, it authorized expenditures of 
up to $250,000,000 for emergency aid to the cattle indus-
try.^^ Production control was actually secondary to surplus
57removal as an object of the Act.
When the House passed the Jones bill, Connally 
abandoned his original Senate bill and worked for Senate 
approval of the Jones-Connally bill. In his explanation 
on the floor of the Senate, he noted that both the Secre­
tary of Agriculture and representatives of the cattle in­
dustry who had met in Washington recently favored its enact­
ment. Most of the debate centered around the discretionary 
power of the Secretary of Agriculture in levying a process­
ing tax against cattle.
Connally admitted that although the bill was vague 
as to when a tax would be levied, he defended its vague­
ness. He explained that the Secretary of Agriculture would 
call in representatives of the beef and dairy industries for
S., Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, 
Report to Accompany H. R. 7478, to Amend the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act So As to Include Cattle As Basic Agricul­
tural Commodity, Rept. No. 453, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1934; 
Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 
1790-1950' A Study of Their Origins and Development 
T n ^  York, 1953) , 309, 309n.
S 7Edwin G. Nourse, Joseph S. Davis, and John D. 
Black, Three Years of the Agricultural Adjustment Admin­
istration (Washington, 1937), 42-44, Î7-48.
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consultation before levying a processing tax. To this Sena­
tor Carey retorted, "I wish I had the faith that the Senator 
from Texas has in what the Secretary of Agriculture might 
d o . C o n n a l l y  nevertheless persisted. He warned the 
Congress;
the cattleman has been paddling his own canoe,- 
and he has paddled it to the point where cattle 
have been at the lowest price for years and years 
and years. If he continues to paddle it, the 
chances are the cattlemen will get no corres­
ponding advance in their prices along with the 
prices of other commodities under the Agricul­
tural Adjustment Act.
59Thus, he concluded, cattlemen must be aided.
Connally faced opposition on two fronts. Cattlemen 
feared that a processing tax might be passed back to the pro­
ducer in the form of lower prices. Also, most conservatives 
opposed expansion of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and 
they questioned the law's effectiveness in helping cattle­
men. Senator William E. Borah of Idaho had evidence to show 
that in the case of hogs, the tax had been passed back to 
the producer instead of being passed on to the consumer.
He feared that this would occur in the case of cattle. 
Connally pointed out that it would be unfair to aid the 
farmer without asking him to accept the possibility of a 
processing tax to cover costs--even if some of it came
p O
U. s., Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 
1934, LXXVIII, Pt. 4% 3W15-3Ü18.
59ibid., 3818.
^^New York Times, March 13, 193 4, p. 20.
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directly out of his pocket, as it probably w o u l d . H e  
conceded that the law might not work at all, but he asked 
that it be tried. "It is experimental," he said, "and we 
never move the world forward an inch except by the process 
of experimentation."^^
As the debate on the bill continued, Connally was 
insured needed support when various Senators began adding 
other commodities to the bill. Eventually peanuts, tobacco, 
rye, flax, barley, and sorghum joined cattle as new basic 
commodities, and in a greatly amended form the Senate ap­
proved the bill March 10, 193^i by a vote of thirty-nine 
to thirty-seven.^^
A month later the House and Senate worked out the 
differences in their respective versions, and the Jones- 
Connally Act was signed. In addition to enlarging the scope 
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the bill provided for 
the expenditure of $50,000,000 for the purchase and slaugh­
ter of diseased cattle as one means of improving the indus- 
64try. And in order to make the law as effective as pos­
sible, the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to act 
if any of the specified commodities were "in the current
5., Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 
1934, LXXVIII, Pt. 47 390Ü.
G^Ibid., 5715.
^^New York Times, March 11, 1934, p. I8 ; Benedict, 
Farm Policies of the United States, 320n; Nourse, Black 
and Davis, Three Years of Agricultural Adjustment Adminis­
tration, 42.
5., Statutes at Large, LXVIII, Pt. 1, 528.
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of or in competition with, or [were] so as to burden, ob­
struct, or in any way affect, interstate or foreign com-
,,65merce.”
The effect of the act in the drought-stricken South­
west, where the cattle industry was in great peril, was 
highly beneficial. In the western States where opposition 
to the bill was stronger than support, cattlemen took advan­
tage of the law once it went into effect. Some 8,280,000 
cattle were saved from starvation and thirst, while a 20 
per cent market surplus was eradicated through the destruc­
tion of 8.3 million head of cattle. The drought of 1934 
removed the need of marketing agreements and a processing 
tax, and the passage of the supplemental Emergency Appro­
priation Act of June 19, 1934, insured the success of the 
program by adding $525,000,000 in f u n d s . A c c o r d i n g  to 
Connally, the Jones-Connally Act "put a floor under the 
cattle market and enabled [the industry] to eventually get 
back on its feet."^^
Cattle was not the only agricultural commodity 
important to Texas that suffered low prices in the 1930's.
^^Ibid.; Benedict, Farm Policies of the United 
States, 305n.
66ttc, Excerpts from Speech of Senator Tom Connally, 
Texas, Before the Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raising 
Association at San Antonio, Texas, March 8, 1938, type­
script, TCP, con. 554; U. S., Statutes at Large, XLVIII,
Pt. 1, 1056; Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 
309, 309n.
6 7Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 162.
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Cotton also needed help. To aid in raising agriculture
prices in general, Connally and others again advocated the
adoption of an export debenture plan. Dissatisfied with the
Agricultural Marketing Act of 192 9» the Grange continued
to support this proposal, increasing its demands for such
an experiment when Roosevelt took o f f i c e . O n e  debenture
bill was introduced in March, 1933, by Congressman Luther
69Johnson of Texas, but Congress failed to act on it.
Finally, in 1935» Connally and Congressman Marvin Jones
cooperated in a new proposal which substituted a bounty
on exports for debenture certificates.
A general revision of the Agricultural ^iustment
Act was being considered to head off a possible invalidation
70of the law by the Supreme Court. Connally and Jones sup­
ported an amendment at this time which encouraged farm ex­
ports to relieve surpluses on the domestic market and to 
cause higher prices. In addition, their amendment provided 
for expenditures to divert agricultural products "from the 
normal channels of trade and commerce." Surpluses purchased 
by the government would then be used for relief of the poor 
or sold abroad, and would not compete with regular markets.
^^Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Agricultural 
Discontent the Middle West, 1900-1939 (Madison, 1951)» 
423» 452.
6 9U. S., Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 
1933» LXXVII, Pt. 1, 90.
70U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, 
Report to Accompany H. R. 8492, Rept. No. 1241, 74th Cong., 
1st Sess., 1935» 1.
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A third provision permitted government purchase or lease of 
submarginal agricultural and grazing lands--provided funds 
were still available after the first two provisions were
carried out. Unmanufactured cotton was excepted from the
71amendment, although manufactured cotton was included.
After it passed the House, the Senate Committee on 
Agriculture and Forestry deleted the amendment before re­
porting the bill, at the insistence of the Treasury Depart-
72ment. Connally then led a fight to restore the plan.
Two major criticisms confronted Connally. First 
the Treasury Department objected to the plan. Because it 
called for setting aside 30 per cent of the proceeds 
from import duties for the purpose of subsidizing exports, 
the plan would upset the entire national budget. Treasury 
officials said. Second, Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg of 
Michigan argued that by encouraging the exports of agri­
cultural commodities, the United States would be charged 
by other nations that it was dumping its surpluses on the 
world market and unreasonably depressing prices. He argued 
that new and serious problems would arise for the State De-
73partment in negotiating trade agreements with other countries.
71Ibid., 6-7; U. S., Congressional Record, 7^th Cong., 
1st Sess., 1935» LXXIX, Pt. 10, 11399; Rainer Schickele, 
Agricultural Policy: Farm Programs and National Welfare
(New York, 1954), 211.
72U. S., Congressional Record, 7^th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1935, LXXIX, Pt. 10, 10930,
T^Ibid., 11393-11397; New York Times. July 21,
1935, Sec. Ill, p. 10.
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To these and various minor objections, Connally 
answered:
I do not care if the Cabinet or the State Depart­
ment or anybody else advises against this amendment,
I am in favor of trying out the export bounty plan.
It has been before the country for years. It has 
been before the Senate on two different occasions.
If it will not work, we had better find it out.
If it does work, we may then develop it and elab­
orate it as the exigencies of the time may require.
"If it does work," added Senator Borah in support, "it will
far more than take care of any loss to the Treasury," Con- 
7knally agreed.
Connally was especially hampered by the lack of
Democratic support. Both Chairman Ellison D. Smith of the
Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry and Majority
Leader Joseph T. Robinson opposed his amendment. It lost
75by a vote of thirty-four to forty-one.
But Connally was not defeated. Behind the export 
bounty plan was the entire cotton textile industry, which 
helped carry on the fight. A conference committee met to 
settle the differences between the House and Senate, and 
although Connally was not appointed to the committee, Con­
gressman Jones was.^^ Upon his insistence, the amendment 
was reinstated in the bill and subsequently accepted by 
both houses, and Roosevelt signed the law August 24,
74U. S., Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1935, LXXIX, Pt. 10, 11396.
f^lbid. , 11400.
f^Ibid. , Pt. 11 _____
21, 1935, Sec. Ill, p. 10; ibid., July 24, 1935, p. 32.
7 , 12004, 12047; New York Times, July
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1935*^^ The provision failed, however, to have much more 
effect than a similar idea which was a part of the Agri­
cultural Adjustment Act as originally enacted. Wheat farm­
ers benefited to some extent, while surpluses of tobacco, 
flour, prunes, pears, walnuts, and pecans were not meas­
urably reduced. Cotton surpluses were not diminished as a
78result of this new provision.
During the years 1933-1935, Connally worked hard,
paced by the recovery-minded Roosevelt Administration. He
spent a great deal of time getting Texas’ share of govern- 
79ment jobs, discussing public works projects with Harold
Ickes, and presenting Texas relief projects to Harry Hopkins.
He was in part responsible for the establishment of Big Bend 
8 iNational Park. Much of the time he was literally on the run.
77U. S., Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1935, LXXIX, Pt. 1 2 , 13026, 13239; U. S., Statutes at Large.
LXIX, Pt. 1, 775-776.
78Carl T. Schmidt, American Farmers in the World 
Crisis (New York, 19^1), I88-189.
79Among the more significant recommendations Connally 
made were: R. A. Tullis to the Federal Farm Board, Ernest
0. Thompson to the Oil Control Board, Marvin Jones to the
Court of Customs Appeals in New York, Hampson Gary to the
Corporation of Foreign Security Holders, and Carl Estes as 
Administrator of the Civil Works Administration. See Louis 
McH. Howe to Morris Sheppard, March 20, 1933, FDR Papers,
PPF 1549; Memorandum, _£a. June 22, 1933, FDR Papers, White 
House Alphabetical File (1941-1943[sic]), Box 792; Memoran­
dum, August 3, 1933, FDR Papers, White House Alphabetical 
File (194I-I945), Box 792; Memorandum, August 19, 1933,
FDR Papers, White House Alphabetical File (1941-1945), Box 
792; Louis McH. Howe to TTC, November 10, 1933, FDR Papers,
PPF 1599.
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 153-157*O T
New York Times, February 24, 1935, Sec. IV, p. 8;
U. S., Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1935,
LXXIX, ptT 3, 2822.
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In evaluating Connally's contribution to the early 
New Deal, one might ask what would have happened had he not 
been on the scene. Would things have differed? Could some­
one else have done as good a job or better?
His role in advocating the devaluing of the gold 
dollar seems an important contribution. Roosevelt used the 
power effectively as an inflationary weapon. Although Con­
nally was not alone in his support of this means of infla­
tion, he was certainly its leading exponent in the Senate. 
His opposition to the National Industrial Recovery Bill was 
ineffective, but his objections were sustained by the subse­
quent decision of the Supreme Court. Some kind of federal 
control over the unhealthy oil industry would have been en­
acted without Connally, and possibly in the exact form of 
the Connally Hot Oil Act, since the Houston lawyer Jack 
Blalock in large measure wrote the bill. But had it not 
been for Connally's strong resistance to Administration 
pressure, the "dictator" plan advocated by Ickes might have 
become law. Connally also played an important part in pas­
sing the Jones-Connally Act of 193^, and in enacting the 
eaport bounty plan in 1935, though it might be argued that 
Congressman Jones deserves as much if not more credit in 
both cases. Had Connally not been the junior Senator from 
Texas, there were other men with equal potential in Texas 
politics. He certainly was not indispensable.
But care must be taken not to minimize his contri­
bution, He was a loyal Democrat, and seldom failed to
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support a New Deal proposal. In terms of service, it should 
be remembered that Connally was yet a "new” Senator. He 
brought to the Senate legislative experience, legal ability, 
and maturity, and compiled a record during the early New Deal 
alone that would make almost any Democrat proud.
CHAPTER VI 
SENATE CAMPAIGN, 1934
When he sought re-election in 1934, Tom Connally 
found himself in a much stronger political position than 
six years earlier. His part in the early New Deal had made 
him better known across the State, and the success of the 
monetary and relief legislation which he had supported and 
helped create had made him popular both with the Texas 
voters and the national Democratic establishment. He was 
riding the tide of a popular movement, and his chances for 
re-election were excellent.
Two candidates announced that they would oppose 
Connally. One was Guy B. Fisher, an opponent of the Roose­
velt Administration. Fisher’s supporters were few, however, 
as Connally already knew. Although Fisher began his cam­
paign over a year ahead of the election, it was only a 
token one.^ ’’You need not worry about Guy Fisher. . .
one of Connally’s supporters wrote him shortly after Fisher
2announced. "He moves pretty slow." Another correspondent
^Austin Statesman, July 2, 1934; Wichita Falls 
Record News, July 28, 1934.
^R. W. Wier to TTC, May 22, 1933, TCP, con. 94; 




wrote: "I presume that the reason he has announced is that
he didn't use all of his literature in his race for Congress
[in 1932] and deems it expedient to utilize it in his race
3for United States Senator." Indeed, his hand-outs did 
include brochures from his previous campaign with the old 
date and office sought marked out and the new information 
stamped over it. Connally gave the Fisher campaign little 
thought.
A more serious opponent and one with potential
power was Joseph V. Bailey, Jr., son of Connally's long-
5time political enemy. Besides a good name, Bailey had 
several other political advantages. Only two years earlier 
he had been elected Congressman-at-large from Texas, mean­
ing that he had conducted a successful state-wide campaign 
more recently than had Connally.^ In addition, Connally 
had come under recent attack by those who did not benefit
from his handling of Civil Works Administration patronage 
7in Texas. So in this campaign, the incumbent's usual 
advantage of patronage became a burden. A third Bailey
^Mark McGee to TTC, May 25, 1933, TCP, con. 9^.
^One such brochure is in TCP, con. 94.
^Joseph W. Bailey, United States Senator from Texas, 
1901 to 1913, died April 13, 1929.
^Gainesville Daily Register, July 19, 1934; Tom 
Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg, M^ Name Is Tom 
Connally (New York, 195 4), 173•
^New York Times, January 21, 1934, Sec. IV, p. 7»
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advantage was his residence in populous Dallas County, where 
the "home-town boy" was naturally popular. Further support 
for Bailey came from the State's "wet" element, especially 
around San Antonio, who remembered Connally's "pussyfoot" 
position as a moderate "dry" during the State's struggles
g
over prohibition. He also received the endorsement of
9former Senator Earle B. Mayfield.
Bailey announced his candidacy in the fall of 1933 
and opened his formal attack on Connally the following May 
with a speech at Henderson. In contrast to Fisher, Connally 
and Bailey conducted an especially hard-fought contest, 
described by one journalist as "war to the knife and the 
knife to the hilt."^^ Connally remained in Washington 
throughout the spring where he was active on behalf of 
Texas cattlemen and farmers.
In his well organized and well financed campaign, 
Bailey leveled a vicious and personal attack on Connally. 
Connally never mentioned his opponent by name, and notice 
was often taken of Connally's calm tone when talking about 
oJ. R. Hunnicutt to TTC, June 28, 1933s TCP, con.
94; newspaper clipping, April, 1933s TCP, con. 596; clip­
ping from San Antonio Light, June 28, 1933s TCP, con. 94.
9Tyler Morning Telegraph and Tyler Daily Courier- 
Times, November 28, 1933s typescript copy, TCP, con. 94 ; 
clipping from McAllen Monitor, April 8, 1934.
^^Quoted in New York Times, January 21, 1934, Sec.
IV, p. 7.
^^New York Times, March 11, 1934, p. 20; Wichita 
Falls Record News, July 12, 1934,
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Bailey and other critics. "Senator Connally slings no mud.
Others should follow his excellent example," maintained the 
12Cuero Record. But Bailey and his supporters, denounced 
the Senator at every opportunity. One of Bailey's favorite 
targets was the Bankhead Cotton Control Act, which Connally 
had supported. The Congressman claimed that the law was 
unneeded and dangerous regimentation, while the Senator re­
plied that it was largely responsible for raising the price 
of cotton from three or four cents a pound to ten or twelve 
cents. Bailey did his best to keep the issue of prohibition 
before the voters, seeking the vote of the "wets" by remind­
ing them that Connally had voted against repeal. Connally
13maintained that the issue was settled.
In his first campaign for the Senate, Connally had
challenged Senator Mayfield to a joint debate. When Mayfield
had refused, Connally reportedly said, "If a candidate will
not debate the issues he is not entitled to hold office."
Now Bailey issued a similar challenge to Connally. When he
refused, Bailey contended that "according to his own state-
14ment, he does not deem himself worthy of election."
Bailey and his supporters enq)loyed at least two 
deceitful tactics against Connally during the campaign.
12Quoted in Seth Shepard McKay, Texas Politics, 
1906-1944 (Lubbock, 1952), 286.
^^Ibid., 283-285.
l^Handbill, TCP, con. 94.
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From Washington Bailey issued a press statement saying that
he would not oppose Connally if Roosevelt objected. Then
he arranged a meeting with the President and alerted newsmen.
When he left the White House, he told reporters, "Well, I'm
still in the race," creating the impression that he had the
President’s endorsement. He said he asked the President two
questions: first, whether he preferred Connally or Bailey
as Senator; and, second, if Vice President Garner were to
issue a statement in behalf of Connally's candidacy, could
that be taken as the voice of the Administration? Bailey
refused to quote the President's answers to newsmen, but he
15repeated with a smile, "I'm still in the race."
This episode proved difficult for Connally to over­
come. And in the light of Roosevelt's tremendous popularity 
in Texas, it was a serious matter. The President was almost 
as perturbed as Connally, however, and let it be known that 
he was not responsible for stories which reached the news­
papers about his relationship with Bailey. He said that if 
he should approve or disapprove any particular candidate, 
he himself would make his position very plain. Not long 
afterward, Roosevelt went out of his way to praise Connally 
at a White House gathering as an "old friend" and "stalwart 
supporter" while obviously ignoring Congressman Bailey, who
^^Clipping from Decatur Messenger, March 29, 193^, 
TCP, con. 94; Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 1?4.
^^Memorandum, March 27, 1934, FDR Papers, PPF 1549.
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Anti-Connally Campaign Cartoon, 1934
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17■was also present. Roosevelt used his influence again 
later when he instructed Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins 
to see about "helping him a bit in Texas between now and
18the Primaries." The Secretary replied that she thought
she had already "satisfied" Connally, but she would inquire
19if more help were needed. Connally thus succeeded in 
identifying himself much closer than Bailey with the Roose­
velt Administration, although Bailey continued to present
20himself as a New Deal Democrat.
A second device used by Bailey attempted to prove 
Connally a liar. As a part of his campaign, the Senator 
ran advertisements in numerous Texas newspapers in which 
the Congressional Record was cited as proof of how the can­
didates had voted on selected legislation. These citations 
were to the temporary Congressional Record. Bailey took 
advantage of this by carrying with him a copy of the perm­
anent Congressional Record, in which the page numbers dif­
fered from the temporary edition. Then, in the course of 
a speech, he would call an unsuspecting listener to the 
platform to verify for the audience that no such vote was 
recorded on the stated page as Connally had maintained.
17Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 1?^»
18F. D. R. to Secretary of Labor, carbon of memor­
andum, June 11, 1934, FDR Papers, PPF 1549.
19Frances Perkins to Franklin D. Roosevelt, memor­
andum, June l4, 1934, FDR Papers, PPF 1549.
20Austin Statesman, July 13, 1934; Austin American- 
Statesman, July 22"J 1934; Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 
174. By 1936 Bailey was opposed to Roosevelt.
I4l
21Thus Connally appeared dishonest.
The Senator finally began an active campaign June 
30, just a month before election day. Although he spent
only twenty-four days making speeches, it was an intense
22campaign. He began at Greenville, in northeast Texas,
where he had been weak in 1928 and where Bailey was thought
to be strongest. He reminded the voters in this first
speech that he had authored two pieces of farm legislation
providing needed relief to Texas--the Jones-Connally Act
2 3and an amendment raising the tariff on cattle.
For the most part, the Administration did what it 
could to aid Connally. He experienced embarrassment when 
Postmaster General James Farley transferred an airmail 
terminus from Dallas to Fort Worth without first consult­
ing or warning him. But on other occasions, both Farley 
and Secretary of the Interior Ickes provided assistance by 
telling him where money was about to be spent on Texas 
relief programs. Connally could then make the announcement 
first in a political speech. For example, during a speech 
at Orange, he announced that Roosevelt had just approved 
an $800,000 irrigation and drainage project for the county.
^Hîichita Falls Record News, July 27, 193^; Connally, 
My Name Is Tom Connally, 175•
p pWichita Falls Record News, July 27, 193^5 Austin 
Statesman, June 29, 1934.
2 3Austin Statesman, June 29, 193^5 Austin American- 
Statesman, July 1̂  1934.
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It was especially well timed since at that very moment the
streets were flooded by a rainstorm. In another speech,
he expressed his confidence that the federal government would
"participate liberally" in the forthcoming Texas centennial 
24celebration.
In his first full week of campaigning, Connally made
a conspicuous trip to the Rio Grande Valley. There he and
Josephus Daniels, Ambassador to Mexico, inspected irrigation
projects and discussed international water problems with
local civic leaders. The attention given this by the press,
not to mention personal contact with South Texas politicians,
25aided his cause greatly.
Connally next moved into the Houston area, and then 
he took an extended tour of the Texas Panhandle. There he 
spoke mostly about agricultural relief and monetary reform, 
emphasizing his own legislative r e c o r d . A t  Wichita Falls, 
still a major oil center, he took full credit for the passage 
of the Connally Hot Oil Act and its stabilizing effect. West 
Texas in general had given him wide support in his first
campaign, and in 1934, with both his opponents from the
eastern half of the State, he was even more popular. The 
Senator was pleased with his West Texas tour. "It was
24Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 176; Austin 
Statesman, July l8, 193?I
^^Austin Statesman, June 20, 1934.
Austin Statesman, July 10, 1934; Wichita Falls
Record News, July 12, 1934.
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wonderful. On every hand I received assurances of a tremen- 
dous victory out there,” he said. Then, toward the end of 
the campaign, he toured East Texas for a second time, speak­
ing at Bonham in the north, Galveston in the south, and 
numerous places in between. He permitted his friends to 
make cracks about Bailey as "somebody else's boy,” but he
talked only about himself and his record--mainly in the area
28
27of farm relief. He ended his campaign with a rally in
Austin, while Bailey made his final appeal at Gainesville.
In an attempt to attract the votes of Czecho-Moravian 
voters living in Texas, Connally distributed handbills printed 
in their native language. He pointed out the inexperience 
of his opponent, his over-zealous ambition and his ”hot 
blood.” In a peculiar appeal that fits even less into the 
general pattern of this and other campaigns by Connally, the 
handbill admitted that Bailey had ability and it encouraged 
him to "wait until the expiration of the term of the well- 
known fanaticist of prohibition--Senator Morris Sheppard.
Then he [Bailey] will have enough chance for [election].
2 7Clipping from Houston Chronicle, July I6 , 1934, 
TCP, con. 598.
28Gainesville Daily Register, July 27, 1934.
29 — 'It is more likely that this handbill was written 
by a supporter, for it is doubtful that Connally was per­
sonally responsible for such a statement. He and Sheppard 
differed on many issues and voted against each other many 
times. But they considered themselves friends, politically 
and personally, and no other such attack by one on the other 
has been uncovered. Usually when they did not agree, they
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Before the end of his campaign, Connally received 
several important endorsements which certainly strengthened 
his campaign. One came from William Green, President of the 
American Federation of Labor. Green addressed a public 
letter to the Executive Secretary of the Texas Federation 
which said: ’’Senator Connally has not only supported labor,
but also the farmer, and the masses of the people . . . .  I 
wish you to know that the American Federation of Labor ex­
tends hearty indorsement to the candidacy of Senator Con­
nally. . . The Grand President of the Brotherhood of
Railway and Steamship Clerks also circulated a letter in 
which he said of Connally:
There is no question as to his fidelity to the 
cause of the common people. He has at all times 
spoken, acted and voted particularly to the best 
interests of organized railroad labor and has 
never hesitated to oppose legislation which would 
be detrimental to the cause of the common people 
It would indeed be a calamity should he be de­
feated. 31
He received similar endorsements from the Order of Railway 
Conductors, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen,
simply ignored their difference of opinion. Campaign pam­
phlet and attached translation by V. Gsovski, ”To îfy 
Countrymen Electors,” TCP, con. 93*
^^William Green to Wallace Reilly, April 2, 1934,
TCP, con. 93; also quoted in Tyler Courier-Times-Telegraph, 
July 22, 1934; Wichita Falls Record News, July I3" 1934, 
contains a similar letter from William Green to George H. 
Slater, another Texas labor leader.
George M. Harrison to Texas Lodges [of the Brother­
hood of Railway and Steamship Clerks], May 15, 1934, TCP, 
con. 93.
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Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Brotherhood of Maintenance 
and Way Employees, and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. 
And his name appeared in the Political Bulletin of the Joint 
Labor Legislative Association in Austin with the notation 
that "as a member of the State Legislature and of the United 
States Congress for the past thirty-three years he has been 
a steadfast friend of Labor.
Toward the close of the campaign, Connally also re­
ceived the public support of Vice President John Nance Garner. 
Theirs was a political friendship of over a quarter century, 
and the endorsement was no surprise. But it was neverthe­
less important. In a letter made public with the consent 
of the author. Garner wrote : "I do not believe there is a
man in Texas who could represent the interests of this state
as well as he . . . . In my opinion it would be a great mis-
3 3fortune to fail to return Tom Connally to the Senate."
In spite of rumors that there would be a light turn­
out on election day, the voting was heavy and strongly
34favorable to Connally:
32Arthur J.Lovell et. âi. to the Officers and Members 
of the State Legislative Boards and the Divisions and Lodges 
of the 0. R. C., B, of L. F. & E., B. R. T., and B. M. W. E. , 
State of Texas, May 8, 1934; A. Johnson ejb al to the Chairman 
and Secretary of the State Legislative Board and all of the 
B. of L. E. Divisions in the State of Texas, July 6, 1934; 
Joint Labor Legislative Association, Political Bulletin,
June, 1934, TCP, con. 93»
^3john Nance Garner to W. A. Keeling, quoted in 
Tyler Morning Telegraph, July 24, 1935; New York Times,
January 21, 1934, Sec. IV, p. 7; Wichita Falls Record News, 
July 14, 1934.
3^New York Times, July 8, 1934, Sec. IV, p. 7; Alex­
ander Heard and Donald S. Strong, Southern Primaries and Elec­
tions, 1920-1949 ([Tuscaloosa,] 1950), 172.
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Tom Connally 567,139 58.8
Joseph W. Bailey, Jr. 355,963 36.9
Guy B. Fisher 41,421 .. 4.3
Totals 964,523 100.0
Connally led in or carried all but 20 of the 254 
counties. (See Map 6, p. l48.) Fisher carried only San 
Augustine County, where he resided. Elsewhere he polled 
very few votes. Bailey ran a strong second in most of the 
rest of the State, but he lost practically every heavily 
populated county--including Dallas, his home. The three 
West Texas counties which he carried were insignificant in 
total vote. The Central and South Texas counties which voted 
for him were among the typically Republican and boss-controlled 
counties, respectively, reflecting genuine anti-Connally sen­
timent. Bailey also carried Cooke County, doubtlessly be­
cause it was his birthplace and long-time home of his father. 
There is, however, no readily apparent explanation for his 
strength in tiny Somervell County and populous Jefferson 
County. But over-all, Bailey proved much weaker as an 
opponent than had been anticipated. The magic of the Bailey 
name undoubtedly drew some votes for the young Congressman, 
but to many old-time Bailey supporters he lacked a great deal 
of equaling his famous father.
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Connally's widespread strength can be explained by 
a combination of factors. Having served well for one term, 
he was given a second partly as a matter of custom. For 
his role in the popular New Deal government, most voters 
were willing to reward him with a second term. Moreover, 
he had the backing of organized labor, the support--some- 
times indirect but highly significant— of the Roosevelt 
Administration, and the personal endorsement of Vice Presi­
dent Garner. He was virtually unbeatable in 1934.
As in 1928, the November general election in Texas 
was largely a matter of form for candidates who had won 
the Democratic nomination in the summer primary. The Re­
publicans nominated U. S. Goen of El Paso for Senator in 
their primary. Like other candidates of that party in Texas, 
Goen made no active campaign. He had been nominated in a 
primary that drew a total of 1,554 votes--a reflection of 
thé fact that the Texas Republican Party existed more as 
an organization to hand out federal patronage than as a
35machine to work for the election of its members to office.
But in 1934:, the Republican ticket drew even fewer votes 
than usual. Voting was light throughout the State, but 
Connally knew he would win without further campaigning.
McKay, Texas Politics, 289; Paul Casdorph, A 
History of the Republican Party in Texas, 1865-I965 (Austin,
I9Ü5), i W .
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The size of his victory over Goen and two other opponents 




Tom Connally Democratic 439,375 96.7
U. S. Goen Republican 12,895 2.8
W. B. Starr Socialist 1,828 0.4
L . C . Ke e1 Communist 310 0.1
Totals 454,408 100.0
Connally carried every county in the general elec­
tion. Even the three counties which voted for the Repub­
lican candidate against Connally in 1928 voted for him by 
a wide margin in 1934. Of the traditionally Republican
counties of Central Texas, only three— Gillespie, Guadalupe
37and Kendall--gave Goen even a strong minority. Even El 
Paso County, Goen's home county, voted overwhelmingly for
o QConnally. With such an impressive victory, especially in 
the Democratic primary, he was now prepared to return to 
his duties in Washington and play a vital role in the later 
years of the New Deal.
^^Heard and Strong (comps.), Southern Primaries and 
Elections, 1?2. U. S. Goen is listed in this reference book 
as "U. S. Green" by error.
37The Connally-Goen vote was: Gillespie, I783-
937; Guadalupe, 3038-IO6I; Kendall, 801-335. Ibid., 173.
^^The vote was 5034-158. Ibid.
CHAPTER VII 
THE LATER NEW DEAL
Only once during the early New Deal did Tom Connally 
oppose the Roosevelt Administration on a serious matter.
In 1933, he had viewed the National Industrial Recovery Act 
as unconstitutional and voted against it. But during the 
period commonly known as the "Second New Deal," which coin­
cided largely with Connally's second term in the United 
States Senate, the Texan found himself more and more often 
at odds with the President on issues small and great.
Throughout his first two terms, and for a part of 
his third, Connally was technically the "junior" Senator 
from Texas. But from almost the beginning of his Senate 
career, and especially after the Texas vote in support of 
the repeal of prohibition in 1933, he enjoyed greater in­
fluence in the State’s political affairs than did his senior 
colleague, Morris Sheppard.^ One journalist, describing
^Sheppard campaigned hard for the losing side in 
the prohibition referendum in 1933, aud thereafter his in­
fluence was decidedly less in political affairs. He was, 
however, overwhelmingly re-elected to the Senate in 1936.
It may be observed in the newspapers of the period that not 
only did Connally command a great deal more space than 
Sheppard, but also that frequently when the two men were
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Texas political struggles in Austin and Washington in terms
of a poker game, noted that "Sen[ator] Sheppard does not 
2play cards." He might have added, "Connally does."
As the "Second New Deal" got under way shortly after 
Congress met in 1935s Connally happily supported a number 
of important measures which were basic to the Administra­
tion's program. Not in every case was he personally active 
in seeking passage of the bills, but he gave them his back­
ing and his vote. This was partially to repay the Adminis­
tration for its support in his own recent campaign for re- 
election and partially to help maintain a solid front for 
the Democratic Party as the 1936 presidential election ap­
proached. But in some measure his support came because he 
basically favored the legislation being considered. He 
voted with the heavy majority of sixty-eight to sixteen in 
the Senate to approve the Emergency Relief Appropriation 
Bill of 1935» This provided for the Works Progress Admin­
istration which greatly benefited Texas. When the Senate 
approved the Soil Conservation Bill, no r e c o r d
mentioned in the same story, it would read "Senators Con­
nally and Sheppard" rather than "Senators Sheppard and 
Connally," For voting statistics on Sheppard, see Alexan­
der Heard and Donald S. Strong, Southern Primaries and 
Elections, 1920-19^9 ([Tuscaloosa,] 1950), 1?4-177.
2Clipping from Austin American-Statesman, February
10, 1936, TCP, con. 92.
3U. S., Congres 
1935, LXXXIX, Pt. 4, 436ë.
O s sional Record, 7^th Cong., 1st Sess.
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vote was taken, but indications are that Connally favored
lithe bill and probably voted for it. He voted in favor of 
the National Labor Relations Bill,^ the Social Security 
Bill,^ the Public Utility Holding Company Bill,^ and the
g
Farmers' Home Corporation Act, all of 1935* And although 
no record votes were taken on them in the Senate, he un­
doubtedly supported what becajme the Banking Act of 1935 and
9the Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Moratorium Act.
Connally's public career was momentarily eclipsed 
in August by the death of his wife. Louise Connally seldom 
involved herself openly in the Senator's life as a politi­
cian and lawmaker, preferring rather to remain in the back­
ground and live a quieter life. But their marriage had been 
a happy one, and Connally's love for his wife was in no way 
less because she participated little in his public life. 
Statements such as "Tom loved his Louise dearly" are commonly
4He made no remarks on the bill during debates--a 
strong indication that he did not oppose the bill. There 
was a motion in the Senate to recommit the bill, which would 
have been a perfect opportunity to express opposition, but 
again Connally was silent. Ibid., Pt. 5s 5664; ibid., Pt.
6 , 6011-6018.
^Ibid., Pt. 7, 7681.
^Ibid., Pt. 9, 9650.
?Ibid., Pt. 8 , 9065.
- ®Ibid., Pt. 9s 9960.
9 Connally expressed disgust with the Supreme Court 
in ruling the Frazier-Lemke Act of 1935 unconstitutional.
Tom Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg, M^ Name Is Tom 
Connally (New York, 1954), I85.
154
made by those who knew them and observed them during their 
nearly twenty-one years of marriage.
Mrs. Connally, known to have suffered a heart condi­
tion for some years, fell ill in downtown Washington while 
shopping for a trip home to Marlin. She arrived at the 
Senator's office gasping for breath, and shortly fell into 
a coma. Connally was summoned from his desk in the Senate 
Chamber, where he was engaged in clearing up details on the 
final day of the session. He arrived at his wife's side
only minutes before she died without her having regained 
11consciousness.
The following handwritten note was received by the 
Senator among the many messages of condolence:
Dear Tom--
X am deeply shocked my dear fellow--The very sad 








Your generous and touching note has done 
much to console me while crushed by sorrow 
and grief.
^^Interview with Mrs. Frances McKay Andrews, June
3, 1967.
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 178-179*
^^FDR to TTC, [August 26, 1935,] Franklin D. Roose­
velt Papers, PPF 66, PPF 55.
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No one except a noble man and a great man 
could have written such a tender message.
For my motherless son and myself I want to 
express our gratitude with affectionate regards.
TOM CONNALLY.
Following the funeral and burial services in Marlin, 
Connally withdrew beiefly from the public scene. In the com­
pany of Congressman Luther M. Johnson, husband of one of Mrs. 
Connally's cousins; Dr. N. D. Buie, husband of one of Mrs. 
Connally's sisters; and Ben Connally, the Senator's only 
child, he took a vacation of approximately a week near Sal­
tillo, Mexico. The trip did little to relieve his feeling 
of depression. One of his few public statements for several 
weeks came as he passed through Laredo on his way to Mexico. 
Reporters there quizzed him as to his feelings on the death 
of Senator Huey Long of Louisiana, a Southern Senator whom 
Connally had never admired and with whom he had tangled on 
numerous occasions in the Senate. Connally disappointed 
reporters when he refused to say more than "The violent
death of Senator Long is regrettable. Assassination is
1^never justified as a political weapon."
For over a month Connally continued in a state of 
depression. Finally he shook off his feeling of remorse,
13ttc to FDR, August 28, 1935> Franklin D. Roose­
velt Papers, PPF 15^9»
l4Clipping from Marlin Democrat, September 13, 1935; 
clipping from Laredo Times, September 10, 1935, TCP, con.
600.
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accepting an invitation to attend the inauguration of Manuel 
L. Quezon, first President of the Philippines. Not only did 
the ocean voyage and gaiety of the occasion give him needed 
relief, it also provided the Senator with his only first­
hand look at the Orient. He was impressed at the apparent 
poverty of the Japanese countryside which contrasted boldly 
with the nation's industrial development. He was also dis­
turbed by the hunger and unrest he observed during stops 
15in China. The day would come, and sooner than Connally 
could possibly have imagined at the time, when he would re­
flect on what he had seen and wonder why he and other Amer­
icans had not better read the signs in the East earlier.
Little was accomplished in the second session of 
the Seventy-fourth Congress, which met in 1936. For the 
most part. Republicans attempted to embarrass the Democrats 
as much as possible during the months prior to the elections 
of 1936, and the Democrats worked to maintain political sta­
bility through the conventions and campaigns. For his part, 
Connally gave most of his attention to problems of farm re­
lief and taxation.
The Supreme Court's decision of January 6, 1936, in­
validating the Agricultural Adjustment Act, opened again 
the subject of government control over agriculture and the 
nature of farm relief. The Administration pushed for the
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 179-l80.
157
widening of the Soil Conservation Act of 1935i which though 
it had seemed relatively unimportant at the time, suddenly 
loomed as the way to continue crop production control. 
Connally favored giving the Administration what it wanted: -
the power to continue subsidizing farmers through cash pay­
ments- -now for cooperating in conservation programs which 
would limit productioi^^^^^B^^rops as cotton, corn, wheat 
and tobacco. But to write his own
modified version e plan into earlier
laws, he now sough^^^^^^^^^^^^^^V the farm bill of 1936.
"If you farmer ['s] getting a
better price," the Se n S ^ ^ ^ P ^ ^ ^ i s  colleagues, "vote for 
this amendment. But if you just want to give a little star 
dust for political purposes, don't." Connally received 
some support for his controversial plan from both sides of 
the aisle. It would have authorized bounties on farm ex­
ports equal to half the import tariff on the commodity. It
17was, he said, a "reversal" of the industrial tariff. Con­
nally reminded the Senate that it had passed a similar pro­
vision before. "If it was good enough to help Mr. Hoover 
out of the bog in 1929," he argued, "it ought to be good
x8enough now . . .  to keep us on the highway."
Basil Rauch, The History of the New Deal, 1933- 
1938 (New York, 1944), 213-2l4.
^^New York Times, February l4, 1936, p. 6 .
1 QIbid., February 15, 1936, p. 2.
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widening of the Soil Conservation Act of 1935» which though 
it had seemed relatively unimportant at the time, suddenly 
loomed as the way to continue crop production control. 
Connally favored giving the Administration what it wanted: 
the power to continue subsidizing farmers through cash pay- 
ments--now for cooperating in conservation programs which 
would limit production of such crops as cotton, corn, wheat 
and tobacco. But just as he had tried to write his own 
modified version of the export debenture plan into earlier 
laws, he now sought to include it in the farm bill of 1936.
"If you want to insure the farmer['s] getting a 
better price," the Senator told his colleagues, "vote for 
this amendment. But if you just want to give a little star 
dust for political purposes, don't." Connally received 
some support for his controversial plan from both sides of 
the aisle. It would have authorized bounties on farm ex­
ports equal to half the import tariff on the commodity. It
17was, he said, a "reversal" of the industrial tariff. Con­
nally reminded the Senate that it had passed a similar pro­
vision before. "If it was good enough to help Mr. Hoover
out of the bog in 1929," he argued, "it ought to be good
JL 8enough now . . .  to keep us on the highway."
Basil Rauch, The History of the New Deal, 1933- 
1938 (New York, 1944), 213-'H%1
^^New York Times, February l4, 1936, p. 6.
1 OIbid., February I5, 1936, p. 2.
158
His arguments failed to convince enough of his col­
leagues, however, many of whom feared retaliation by foreign 
governments against efforts of the United States to subsi­
dize farm e3q)orts. The Administration also opposed Connally, 
saying that the quota system used by some countries to re­
strict American imports would make the proposed export deben-
19ture program impracticable. The Senate defeated the Con-
20nally amendment by a vote of forty-two to thirty-two. On 
the Senate's final passage of the bill known as the Soil 
Conservation and Domestic Allotment bill, Connally never­
theless cast his vote in favor of the Administration and
for the relief that the bill afforded the many farmers of 
21his State. It became law March 1.
On other legislative matters relating to agriculture, 
Connally was largely responsible for the prevention of a 
law which would have prohibited meat packers from buying 
directly from cattle raisers. The bill, proposed by Sena­
tor Arthur Capper of Kansas, would have required meat pack­
ers to buy only at public auction. Connally feared that 
such a law was an unfair restriction against the farmer, 
one that would require him to market his cattle through a
^^Rauch, History of the New Deal, 213.
20New York Times, February 15, 1936, p. 2; U. S., 
Congressional Recordl T^th Cong., 2d Sess., 1936, LXXX,
Pt. 2, 2052.
2XU. So, Congressional Record, ?4th Cong., 2d Sess., 
1936, LXXX, Pt. 2, 2165.
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middleman, and one which would cut into the profits of the 
farmer rather than raise the price he received for his cattle. 
Connally grudgingly supported a less objectionable law spon­
sored by Senator Louis Murphy of Iowa, which gave the Sec­
retary of Agriculture power to supervise packer-owned stock­
yards . It passed as a substitute for the original bill,
22largely as a result of Connally's efforts.
Connally also met head-on an attempt by Republican 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg to embarrass the Democratic Party 
on the eve of the National Democratic Convention by expos­
ing the number of *'farmers" who had received in excess of 
$10,000 per year in payments under the Agricultural Adjust­
ment Act. Vandenberg introduced a resolution which would 
have required Secretary of Agriculture Wallace to make avail­
able such a list of names. Because the Democrats could not 
afford to vote against the resolution, they introduced a 
number of amendments intended to embarrass the Republicans.
A Connally amendment required the Tariff Commission "to fur­
nish the Senate forthwith" the names of the three largest
corporations benefiting from the protection of such items
2 3as aluminum, steel, cameras, and chemicals. The Commission
^^New York Times, April 3, 1936, p. 48; ibid., April 
6, 1936, p. 4.
^^The entire list of items read as follows: "(l)
Aluminum; (2) steel and iron; (3) photo cameras and films;
(4) chemicals and dyes; (5) electric appliances and equip­
ment; (6) cellophane and rayon; (7) plate glass; (8) cast- 
iron pipe and fittings; (9) articles or wares manufactured 
of tin. U. S., Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 
1936, LXXX, Pt. é, 6174.
16 0
was further instructed to inform the Senate the dollar bene­
fit each industry received and an estimate on the percentage
oIlof effectiveness. While Vandenberg demanded to know how 
many farmers benefited in a large way from the AAA, Connally 
asked the Michigan Senator why he had not also demanded to 
know about the "untold millions Andrew W. Mellon reaped 
from the aluminum trust or the salary of $100,000 and the 
bonus of $1,635,000 Eugene Grace drew from the Bethlehem 
Steel C o m p a n y . C o n n a l l y ' s  amendment, along with several 
otners, was accepted, and the enlarged Vandenberg resolu-
26tion was passed. The effect of it all on the outcome of 
the 1936 presidential contest was slight at most, although 
Connally received hearty approval of his efforts from some 
of his own constituents. A San Antonio voter wrote :
I want to commend you highly for your very 
prompt action in proposing the publication of 
the names of high tariff beneficiaries, and I 
trust you will fight[,] as never before, to 
approve the Vandenberg resolution with your own 
amendment attached. Democrats have nothing to 
be ashamed of when making public the names and 
amounts of AAA benefits, but when the country 
learns the names and amounts paid to special 
privilege in the shape of robber tariffs for 
the last half century, the average voter can
2^Ibid.
^^New York Times, April 28, 1936, p. 11.
S., Congressional Record, ?4th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 1936, LXXX, Pt. 6, 6193-6l94.
161
then see and understand WHY certain industries 
are so bitterly opposed to the re[-]election 
of Mr. Roosevelt.27
Besides farm legislation, another issue which re­
ceived Connally's attention was the Administration's tax 
bill of 1936* In order to obtain new revenues to help 
pay for the recently enacted veterans' bonus bill and to 
help pay the cost of the Soil Conservation and Domestic 
Allotment Act, President Roosevelt favored levying a new 
tax based solely on the undistributed profits of industry. 
The House of Representatives approved the President's re­
quest with only a few alterations, but in the Senate, it 
met heavy opposition. After listening to scores of indus­
trialists and their representatives testify, several mem­
bers of the Senate Finance Committee favored a more moderate 
tax against industry than the President had requested. Con­
nally proposed one of several plans, all of which were sim­
ilar. After lengthy discussions, the committee endorsed 
his plan. It called for retention of the existing corporate 
income tax structure plus a moderate surtax of 12% per cent
28on undistributed profits. Connally and other members of 
the committee were swayed by such arguments as that of the 
railroads, which were unable to make major repairs and
E. Price to TTC, April 29, 1936, TCP, con.
123. Although this is but a single example, it might be 
noted that not one letter was found in the Connally Papers 
which criticized the AAA payments.
pO New York Times, May 8, 1936, p. 1.
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improvements with the earnings of a single year. To accum­
ulate their earnings under the Administration's proposal 
would be to subject the railroads to a heavy tax penalty.
Even the small businessman would seemingly be forced to de­
pend on the common money market if he hoped to expand. Fin­
ally even the President seemed willing to accept a compro­
mise, including a time limit on the operation of the undis­
tributed profits tax so that if the law did not work as
29anticipated it would automatically be repealed. Not only 
was the moderate Connally plan accepted, but also the Texan 
worked in a special feature which served to protect his own 
constituents in the oil business. He secured a provision 
which limited to 30 per cent the tax on the proceeds of 
the sale of an oil well, ho"matter how high the tax might 
otherwise have been under the terms of the capital gains
. 3 0provision.
Connally did not consider himself in rebellion 
against the President as he worked to enact a tax law that 
differed from whatuthe President had requested. He had plenty 
of company, especially in the Senate, in opposing a simple 
undistributed profits tax. The press, however, gave some 
attention to the differences between the President and var­
ious members of the Democratic Party in Congress, despite 
protests from Democratic leaders such as Pat Harrison of
^^Ibid., May 9, 1936, pp. 1, 4.
^^Ibid., May 30, 1936, pp. 1, 6 .
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31Mississippi that a "revolt" did not exist. Nevertheless, 
Connally found, for one reason or another, that his influence 
at the White House diminished during the spring of 1936.
When an opening occurred in a federal district court 
in Texas that year, Connally promoted the candidacy of his 
former campaign manager and long-time friend, J. Percival 
Rice. Texas Governor James V. Allred supported the nomina­
tion of T. Whitfield Davidson, a former president of the 
Texas Bar Association, Roosevelt appointed Davidson, and 
then did his best to smooth over his shunning of Connally's 
advice with a note to the Senator in which he stated that
32"this could be called a personal appointment on my part." 
Connally was not at all pleased with his lack of effective 
control over the State's patronage, nor was it the last 
time Connally would disagree with the President.
More important to Connally than any intra-party 
fight, however, was the success of the Democratic Party 
on the national level. The Roosevelt Administration had 
given ample help to Connally in his campaign for re-election 
in 193 r̂. aud as the presidential election year of 1936 neared, 
the Texas Senator enthusiastically supported the Roosevelt- 
Garner ticket. At the Democratic National Convention in 
Philadelphia, Connally seconded the nomination of the
3^Ibid., May 9, 1936, pp. 1, 5.
^^FDR to TTC, January 21, 1936 (copy), FDR Papers,
PPF 1349, 208-L5 clipping from Austin American-Statesman, 
February 10, 1936, TCP, con. 92.
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unopposed Roosevelt and was pleased by the renomination of
3 3Vice President Garner. His only disappointment at the 
Philadelphia Convention was the abolition of the century- 
old rule requiring a candidate to receive two-thirds of the 
votes cast for nomination. Here his strain of Southern 
conservatism overcame his usual acceptance of whatever 
Roosevelt wanted. He saw in the move an attack on the tra­
ditional Southern power within the Democratic Party and re­
sented ' greatly. He made a personal appeal to the conven­
tion's Rules Committee to reject the change, but to no 
avail.
In the campaign that followed the convention, Con­
nally happily gave his services where ever needed. Roose­
velt included him in the strategy sessions at Hyde Park 
which preceded the campaign, and the national committee as­
signed him a rather heavy speaking schedule which carried 
him to ten States between late September and early Novetn-
ber.35
Besides presidential politics. Senator Connally
3 3Connally was chairman of the Texas delegation, 
another indication of his superior political power in the 
State as compared with that of Senator Sheppard. Demo­
cratic Party, National Convention, Official Report of the 
Proceedings . . . (Philadelphia, 1936 ), 166, 275-27^ 
Speech of Senator Tom Connally of Texas Seconding Nomina­
tion of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 26, 1936 
(mimeographed), TCP, con. 555*
3 4Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, I82-I83.
^^Ibid. ; New York Times, September 25, 1936, p. 2,
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also involved himself in a Texas congressional election dur­
ing the summer of 1936. Thomas Blanton, the Abilene Congress­
man who had been one of Connally's opponents for the Senate 
in 1928, appealed to the Senator, whom he had supported in 
the run-off primary against Earle Mayfield, to help him in 
his bid for re-election to Congress. It was the Senator's 
opinion that open aid, such as personal appearances and pub­
lic speeches, would hinder rather than help his West Texas 
friend. But he agreed to contribute some support by sending 
his personal secretary and manager of his Marlin office,
Robert Jackson, to make speeches in Blanton's behalf. This 
created much concern on the part of Blanton's opponents, 
who objected noisily. It was quite out of keeping for Con­
nally to become involved in the campaigns of other State 
politicians, and as a rule, he stayed completely clear of 
such affairs. While the campaign was going on, and while 
Jackson was in the Abilene district making speeches, Con­
nally "went fishing." Not until several days later did he 
make an effort to answer the complaints sent to him by his 
Marlin office, and then he denied that he had sent Jackson 
to West Texas. Writing to the leader of Blanton's opposi­
tion at Eastland, Texas, Connally said: "Let me say that
my secretary was taking his vacation and stopped off in 
Sweetwater to visit friends of his while en route to El 
Paso where his mother resides. I did not know that he made 
a speech there and, of course, did not know he expected to 
do so."
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Similar messages of denial were sent to other leaders 
of Blanton's opposition. The significance of the affair is 
not that Connally aided in the re-election of Blanton but 
rather that he broke an admirable rule not to become in­
volved in local political affairs other than his own, and, 
even more significant, that he was guilty of being something 
less than candid in his denial that he had ordered Jackson 
to make the campaign tour. It is one of the few times that 
Connally was proved dishonest in either his actions or his 
statements.
If Congressional activity had been comparatively 
uneventful during the 1936 session, the First Session of 
the Seventy-fifth Congress which convened in January, 1937, 
made up for it. And whereas Connally previously had served 
as a faithful supporter of President Roosevelt when it 
really mattered, suddenly the Texan found himself one of 
the principals in a major fight against his party chieftain-- 
a fight that threatened to destroy not only the political 
friendship of the two men but also the very essence of the 
Democratic Party.
Thomas L. Blanton to TTC, July 26, 1936 ; TTC to 
Thomas L. Blanton, August 4, 1936; Thomas Blanton McCord 
to TTC, telegram, August 7, [1936]; Robert M. Jackson to
Eleanor Crow or TTC, telegram, August 7, 1936; TTC to Robert 
M. Jackson, telegram, August 8, 1936; Eleanor Crow to 
Thomas Blanton McCord, telegram, August 8 , 1936; J. W. 
Cockrill to TTC, August 10, 1936; TTC to J. W. Cockrill, 
August 24, 1936; TTC to Thomas Blanton McCord, August 24, 
1936; TTC to Earl Conner, August 24, 1936, TCP, con. 92.
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Stories of Roosevelt's intense displeasure of de­
cisions made by the United States Supreme Court in 1935 and 
1936 were common, and rumors were afloat around Washington 
that following the election of 1936, the President intended 
to do something about removing the obstacle to his New Deal 
programs. The possibility of an open attack by the execu­
tive on the judiciary frightened Connally, but he found some 
relief in the President's annual message to Congress in 
January, 1937, when Roosevelt failed to outline a specific 
plan to deal with the Court.
It was not until early February that Roosevelt fin­
ally made his move. He summoned the principal Congressional 
leaders to a conference February 4, and sent a message out­
lining his proposed court reform to the Congress the next 
day. It called for the appointment of an additional Supreme 
Court justice for every existing one over seventy years of 
age who refused to retire, up to a maximum of fifteen jus­
tices. In addition, it proposed less controversial reforms 
in the lower courts which called for more rapid expedition 
of cases. Normally, Connally, as a member of the Senate 
Finance Committee and Foreign Relations Committee, would 
not have been so closely connected to a matter of this na­
ture. He had become a member of the Senate Judiciary Com­
mittee, however, just prior to this move by the President. 
This was all the more extraordinary because seldom was a 
Senator named to three major committees concurrently. The
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unusual appointment explains Connally's extra concern for 
this major judicial matter.
Connally first denounced the proposed court reform 
in a speech to the Senate February 9, just four days after 
Congress received the President's message. He recognized 
the need for judicial reform, but he opposed the scope and 
method proposed;
I am opposed to an increase in the Supreme 
Court to fifteen judges in the method and under 
the circumstances proposed. In the matter of 
the inferior courts I am of the opinion that 
there can be reform in the matter of expediting 
business and providing for government represen­
tation in cases in which the government is in- __ 
terested and favor proper action in that regard.
It would have suited Connally to isolate the worst feature 
of the President's proposal--that dealing with the retire­
ment of Supreme Court justices--and enacting the other 
needed and less controversial requests. This was in direct 
contrast to the attitude of his colleague, Senator Sheppard, 
who told the Senate on the same day, "I am in favor of the
o QPresident's proposal in its entirety."
According to Mark Goodwin, Washington correspondent 
for the Dallas Morning News, the letters and telegrams being 
received by members of the Texas delegation were "almost
^^New York Times, February 10, 1937» p. 13» Dallas 
Morning News, February 10, 1937.
o QIbid. Actually the Dallas Morning News carried 
the quote as follows: "I have in no way changed my posi­
tion and shall continue to support the President's plan 
in its entirety."
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39unanimous" in opposition to court reform. Delegations
from other States, however, reported perhaps a 70 to 30
per cent split against Roosevelt. "These communications,"
reported Goodwin, "are largely from attorneys and local
bar associations, with a sprinkling of merchants and other
40laymen, and a few women."
In late February, Connally journeyed to Texas to 
attend the funeral of Congressman James P. Buchanan. While 
he was in the State, he was invited to speak to the Legis­
lature on the traditional occasion of Texas Independence Day. 
He used the occasion, against the advice of some members of 
the Legislature, to make clear the difference between himself
and the President and to justify his stand against the pro-
41posed court reform.
The theme of his address was that his opposition to 
Roosevelt came in spite of his long and faithful service 
to the New Deal Administration and his personal admiration 
for the President. "If this were a matter purely of personal 
friendship, I should be standing beside the President of the 
United States," he maintained. But he saw in the proposed 
change the establishment of a dangerous precedent that would
39Dallas Morning News, February 10, 1937.
^°Ibid.
4lRobert M. Jackson to W. W. Glass, February 24,
1937, TCP, con. 92; clipping from Houston Post, February 27, 
1937, TCP, con. 602; Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, I87. 
According to a report in the Dallas Morning News, March 2, 
1937, Connally was requested to address himself to this sub­
ject by State Senator T. J. Holbrook of Galveston.
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"rise up to face us in all of the long years of the future."
He continued with this warning:
Let some reactionary administration obtain power, 
and it would immediately say: "The Democrats
• stacked the Court, and now we have as much right 
to restack as they have had, and we will thereby 
add enough Judges so that we will have a respon­
sive Court, a Court that will do the bidding of 
this reactionary administration, and with the 
instrumentality of that Court we will overthrow 
and repeal by judicial enactment all of the lib­
eral laws placed on the statute books by this 
administration in the 4 years that have already 
gone."
Do you want to establish that sort of a
p r e c e d e n t ? ^ 2
Connally continued his lengthy address, which was spoken 
largely without notes, advocating protection of the inde­
pendence of the court system by rejecting the President's 
plan.
The membership of the Texas Legislature consisted 
of many persons who supported each side of the argument.
The Senate had passed a resolution condemning the proposed 
reform bill by three votes, while the House had narrowly 
defeated a resolution supporting the measure. But Connally 
had to be admired for speaking his convictions so plainly.
One editorial which appeared after Connally's speech praised 
him for his courage in speaking out. "To vote for the Roose­
velt court plan while he has that conviction would leave
— ^ ^ ---------------------------------------------------------The speech, as taken down by a stenographer, was
printed in its entirety in the Congressional Record. U.
S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1937)
LXXXI, Pt. 9, 4Ü9-‘595^
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him foresworn." Another editor, R. T. Craig of the Athens 
(Texas) Review, wrote the following public letter:
It must be gratifying to a large number of 
Texans to learn of Senator Tom Connally's stand 
on the President's proposal to stack the Supreme 
Court. The stand of Connally rather refutes the 
statement of the Texas Congressman who rushed to 
the radio to holler "it is the same old crowd that 
has always fought the President that is now op­
posing his court bill." No one has been a more 
staunch supporter of the President than Connally.
In fact if we had any criticism to make of Con­
nally 's tenure of office it would be that he has 
followed the President too far.
But when the real crisis arose Tom Connally 
proved his metal. Possibly it will cost him a 
tender of a judgeship or some other office that no 
one believes he would accept. But it will add 
to the estimation of Texans who have long con­
sidered him presidential timber.’’
Back in Washington, Connally joined an a^ hoc steering
45committee made up of opposition.Senators. The purpose of 
this organization was to devise a strategy to defeat the bill 
and to organize the opposition in the face of the Administra­
tion's forces. In the Judiciary Committee, seven were known 
to favor the bill, seven to oppose it, and four seemed un­
decided as the hearings began. The opposition steering com­
mittee decided first to hear from the affirmative witnesses,
^^Dallas Morning News, March 4, 1937; ibid., Feb­
ruary 11, 1937.
44R. T. Craig to the News, Dallas Morning News, 
February I6 , 1937*
^^It included Josiah Bailey (North Carolina), Harry 
Byrd (Virginia), Edward R. Burke (Nebraska), Walter F.
George (Georgia), Bennett Clark (Missouri), Millard Tydings 
(Maryland), Frederick Van Nuys (Indiana), David J. Walsh 
(Massachusetts), Peter G. Gerry (Rhode Island), Burton K. 
Wheeler (Montana), and Connally. Connally, My Name Is Tom 
Connally, I89.
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arguing with them at length, and then hopefully, as objec­
tions to the bill were better advertised, to call in wit­
nesses for their side until Roosevelt would be willing to
46give up the fight.
The hearings drew large crowds which expected gruel­
ing cross-examinations. They began March 10, the day after 
President Roosevelt's second emotion-filled appeal to the 
people by radio. Popular opinion seemed to be on the side 
of the President at that point, so the opposition Senators 
avoided heated personal confrontations with the witnesses. 
Rumors circulated the day before the first session that Con­
nally had been tapped to lead the cross-examination of the 
first witness. Attorney General Homer S. Cummings, and the 
hearing room was packed. Late in the session, Connally fin­
ally asked his first question, and a hush fell on the room. 
But the audience and reporters were disappointed as Connally 
refused to engage in a battle of words. After a few ques-
4?tions, which proved nothing, Connally sat back. So it 
was, with only a few exceptions, with most of the government 
witnesses who followed.
One witness. Justice Ferdinand Pecora of the New 
York State Supreme Court, attempted to embarrass Connally
^^Ibid., 189-190.
4?U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judi­
ciary, Hearings, on Ŝ. 1392, to Reorganize the Judicial 
Branch of the Government, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1937, Pt.
1, 3 0 - 3 ^  New York Times, March 11, 1937, p. 15 «
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before the committee by reminding him of his objections to 
the appointment of Charles Evans Hughes to the Supreme Court 
in 1930. Connally had spoken against Hughes and voted 
against his confirmation on the ground that he was biased 
in favor of big business and would not be an honest judge.
It was basic to Connally's position that the Senate must 
examine the economic philosophy of nominees to determine 
their fitness. Why, Pecora asked Connally, is it not just 
as right for Roosevelt to object to biased judges and seek 
new ones with good biases as it was for Connally to object 
in 1930? Connally retorted that he "was opposed in 1930 to 
the addition of one man with prejudices and predilections, 
and that he was all the more opposed to adding six such men 
now. "
Opposed as he was to Roosevelt's tampering with the 
Court, Connally was not opposed to altering its make-up 
through constitutional amendment. Following the March 25 
appearance of Young B. Smith, Dean of the law school of 
Columbia University, before the Judiciary Committee, Con­
nally announced that he was drafting an amendment which was 
substantially the same as that advocated by Dean Smith.
48U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judi­
ciary, Hearings, on 1392, to Reorganize the Judicial 
Branch of the Government. 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1937, Pt.
2, 433-^3"47" Ï41-442 ; New York Times, March 21, 1937, P* 4l.
49U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judi­
ciary, Hearings, on S_. 1329, to Reorganize the Judicial 
Branch of the Government, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1937, Pt.
3, 720-721.
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The amendment offered a change in the make-up of the Court, 
while maintaining at least the appearance of the status quo 
in the organization of the Court. It would require justices 
to retire at the age of seventy-five and would fix the num­
ber of justices at nine. Thus, it would force the resigna­
tion of no less than five members of the Court while at the 
same time making it impossible for any president to "pack" 
the Court in the manner Roosevelt was attempting. He pro­
posed further to require that States call conventions to 
consider the amendment, thus placing the question before the 
people, "where it belonged."
Although Connally did not say when he intended to 
introduce his resolution, he maintained that his was the 
most sensible solution to the question yet proposed. He 
made it clear, however, when talking to reporters, that this 
did not represent a weakening of his stand against the 
President's reorganization plan. He even hinted that he 
might refrain from introducing his resolution after draft­
ing it, pointing to a number of pending compromise proposals 
which could be adopted before Connally was prepared to act. 
He also understood that before his amendment could become
law, Roosevelt would have to give consent to it as a sub-
50stitute proposal. An editorial appearing in the Dallas 
Morning News, which had steadfastly opposed the Roosevelt
^^New York Times, March 27, 1937» pp. 1, 4.
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proposal, suggested that Connally might go even one step 
further and allow the Court to have the power to also re­
move one of its own members "whose mental or physical powers 
may have failed so much before reaching automatic retire­
ment age so as to justify the action.
Among Southern Senators in March, 1937» Connally
found himself in a minority in his opposition to Roosevelt.
52He and five others opposed the reorganization proposal
5 3 54while twelve favored it. Only four of the twenty-two
55Southerners refused to make their views public. But Con­
nally 's opposition was more significant than that of nor­
mally conservative Southerners like Carter Glass, because 
heretofore he had been such a staunch supporter of the Roose­
velt Administration. Furthermore, unlike most, he was a 
member of the Judiciary Committee which considered the bill. 
There he was one of seven Democrats opposed to the bill out 
of a total of eight on the committee. And all seven oppon­
ents had previously been regular supporters of the more
^^Dallas Morning News, April 1, 1937.
^^Carter Glass and Harry Byrd (Virginia), Josiah 
Bailey (North Carolina), Ellison Smith (South Carolina), 
Walter George (Georgia).
C OKenneth McKellar and Nathan Bachman (Tennessee), 
Robert Reynolds (North Carolina), James Byrnes (South Caro­
lina), Claude Pepper (Florida), John Bankhead and Hugh Black 
(Alabama), Pat Harrison and Theodore Bilbo (Mississippi),
Joe Robinson and Hattie Caraway (Arkansas), and Morris 
Sheppard (Texas).
^^Richard Russell (Georgia), Allen Ellender and John 
Overton (Louisiana), and Charles Andrews (Florida).
55n6w York Times, March 28, 1937, Sec. IV, p. 10.
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important liberal legislation of the New Deal.^^
So far as Texas politics was concerned, Connally was
not following a clearly popular path. Harold Ickes noted
in his Secret Diary that Connally admitted in private that
90 per cent of the people in Texas supported the President's 
57plan. Although that estimate was unquestionably an ex­
aggeration, the President did have a great deal of support 
in Texas, and Connally ran some risk of endangering his 
own political life by opposing the court reorganization 
bill. The liberal Congressman Maury Maverick of San Antonio, 
for one, seemed anxious to take advantage of Connally's un-
c Q
popular stand to challenge him for the Senate seat in 1940.
A special election held April 10, 1937s to fill the vacancy 
caused by the death of Congressman Buchanan served to show 
the attitude of a segment of Texas voters. Lyndon B. Johnson, 
recently resigned State director of the National Youth Admin­
istration, gave unqualified endorsement to the President, 
while six of his opponents were anti-New Deal in general and 
at least two of his stronger opponents denounced the court 
reform bill specifically. The voters of Texas' Tenth Dis­
trict, at least, did not favor the position taken by Senator
^^New York Times, May 19, 1937, p. 22; William E. 
Leuchtenburg, Franklin D̂. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New 
York, 1963), 2W .
^^Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L.
Ickes, Vol. IX, The Inside Struggle (New York, 1 9 5 4 ) l4l.
^^Ibid., 105.
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Connally. Johnson received almost twice as many votes as
his nearest opponent and won the election over the field of
59seven other candidates.
All the signs, however, were not bad. For Connally, 
a re-election campaign was still over three years away, 
leaving plenty of time for him to redeem himself if he lost 
in the present battle and more than ample time for the voters 
to forget any "mistake" on his part. There was also a grow­
ing concern in the South about the possibility of antilynch- 
ing legislation, and many Southerners--including some Texans 
--were beginning to wonder about the wisdom of altering the 
conservative nature of the Supreme C o u r t . T h e  Gladewater 
Times reviewed the situation in an editorial and concluded 
that Connally was in no serious political difficulty:
ONE DIFFERENCE DOESN'T MAKE TOM ANTI
Texans are not going to turn against Tom 
Connally just because he took the wrong side in 
the Supreme Court issue . . . .  That Texas and
59This was the only congressional election to occur 
during the debate on the court reform bill anywhere in the 
United States, and considerable attention was given it by the 
national press. Lyndon B. Johnson maintained in an inter­
view years later that the court bill was "the major issue" 
of the campaign. See Lionel V. Patenaude, The New Deal and 
Texas (unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Texas, 
1953), quoted in George B. Tindall, The Emergence of the New 
South, 1913-1945 (Baton Rouge, 1967)1 S"22 ; Booth Mooney, The 
Lyndon Johnson Story (New York, 1964), 24-27; Rowland Evans 
and Robert Novak, Lyndon ]B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power
(New York, I966), 7-8 ; New York Times, April I3, 1937, p .
21; Dallas Morning News, April 11, 1937*
^^Clipping from Dallas Times Herald, April 19, 1937, 
TCP, con. 104; George B. Tindall, The Emergence of the New 
South, 1913-1945 (Baton Rouge, I967), ^21.
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the whole country is strongly Rooseveltian [can] 
be seen . . . .  But Texas is also strongly Con- 
nally-minded, and will continue to be in favor 
of the jovial, friendly, able Senator Tom unless 
he makes the issue anti-administration.
. . . He is perhaps still one of the strong­
est administration friends in Washington, despite 
his mistake in taking the tory side of the court 
issue. We still believe him the common man's 
friend.
. . . He's regular and will remain so.
Connally and others like him expressed a great re­
lief when^ the Supreme Court upheld the Wagner Labor Rela­
tions Act April 12. He maintained for the benefit of the 
press that the decision represented "the definite end" of 
the need for reorganization,^^ but in reality he knew that 
there was bitter fighting ahead.
Finally the hearings before the Judiciary Committee 
came to an end. On the night before the Committee was to 
make its recommendation, Connally met with a group of fif­
teen Democratic Senators who opposed the bill to analyze 
their situation and plan their strategy. They had confi­
dence that the committee would report the bill unfavorably, 
and they pledged themselves to work to the end against it 
on the f l o o r . T h e  next day, the opposition was favored 
by news of the resignation of Justice Willis Van Devanter 
just as the committee assembled for its final vote, although
^^Clipping from Gladewater Times, June 8, 1937i 
TCP, con. 602A.
6 2New York Times, April 13, 1937, p. 1. 
^^Newspaper clipping, May l8, 1937, TCP, con. 599*
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the report was not credited with changing the minds of any 
of the committee. Seven Democrats, including Connally, 
were joined by three Republicans, and the committee voted
6kten to eight to report the bill to the Senate unfavorably. 
With his usual ability to see the lighter side of things, 
Connally caused an outburst of laughter from the committee 
by noting that the Administration had received another five 
to four decision.
A rumor circulated briefly in mid-May that Connally 
might be weakening in his opposition to the court plan. 
Secretary Ickes noted that the Senator had been in communi­
cation with Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper who in turn 
reportedly told Postmaster General James Farley "that if he 
[Feirley] sent for Connally he might be able to work some­
thing out with h i m . I f  there was any truth to the rumor, 
nothing was ever "worked out." Interviewed at the home of 
his son in Houston the next month, Connally told reporters 
that the Supreme Court plan was "dead." Connally admitted 
that a compromise might yet be worked out--even one that 
would admit as many as two new justices--but the Senator 
"firmly disapproved" even that.^^
By the time the bill was reported from committee,
64New York Times, May 19, 1937, p . 1.
^^Ibid., p. 19.
fxfiIckes, Secret Diary, II, l4l.
^^Clipping from Houston Post, June l4, 1937, TCP, 
con. 602A.
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its chance for success had been seriously weakened, but its 
foes could not afford to let down their guard prematurely. 
Connally was still among those heading the opposition when 
the bill reached the floor of the Senate in July. Contin­
ually he made the point that the bill's sponsors were sim­
ply trying to force the resignation of certain justices, 
which was in violation of the spirit of the Constitution.
He said that the bill was only a little less brutal than 
one that would cause a justice not to receive his salary 
and thus be forced to retire. "The Senator from Texas con­
cedes that the Senate has the brutal physical power to do 
what is proposed, of course. . . . We have the power, but
not the r i g h t . H e  firmly continued his opposition not 
only to the original bill but also to a substitute brought 
in by Majority Leader Joe Robinson that would have put two 
new justices on the bench. "It is just as bad as the or-ig-
69inal plan," he maintained, "if not worse."
Another serious blow to the Administration came 
July l4, with the unexpected death of Senator Robinson. 
Without his leadership, the chances of the bill's success 
declined further. The opposition moved to recommit the 
bill to the unfriendly Judiciary Committee and thus to kill
S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1937, LXXXI, Pt. 6, 6888-6890.
^^New York Times, July 6, 1937, p. I8 ; clipping 
from Port Worth Press, July 15, 1937, TCP, con. 602.
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it.' This was accomplished July 22 by a vote of seventy to 
70twenty, and thus the battle ended.
In the way of an epilogue, Connally finally came 
forward with a resolution proposing a constitutional amend­
ment which would make unnecessary a future battle such as 
the one just concluded. The principal features of the pro­
posed amendment were that the number of justices would be 
fixed at nine, voluntary retirement would be permitted at 
age seventy, compulsory retirement would be required at 
seventy-five, only one justice would be permitted on the 
bench from any one judicial circuit, and no justice could 
become a candidate for any federal legislative or executive
office. The amendment would not apply to the existing 
71court. How serious Connally was in proposing this con-
72stitutional amendment is not clear. No action was taken
73on it other than to refer it to committee.
Whereas Connally was pleased with the defeat of 
the court reorganization bill, he was not fully satisfied
70U. S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1937, LXXXI, Pt. 7, 73W1.
71Draft of proposed Constitutional amendment, type­
script, c_a. 1937, TCP, con. 137; Statement of Senator Tom 
Connally of Texas Regarding Joint Resolution Introduced by 
Him with Respect to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
August 20, 1937, mimeographed, TCP, con. 55^j New York Times, 
August 21, 1937, p. 6 .
72No mention of it is made in his autobiography.
73U. S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1937, LXXXI,. Pt. 8 , 9413-9415.
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with the outcome of two subsequent events. Joe Robinson's 
death required in effect two new appointments: a majority
leader to be elected by the Democrats in the Senate and 
someone to replace Van Devanter on the Supreme Court. Con­
nally went through the form of nominating Judge J. C. Hutch­
eson of Houston for the Court appointment, knowing full well 
that his own recent opposition to Roosevelt precluded chances 
that any nominee of his would be considered. When Senator 
Hugo Black received the President's nomination, Connally was 
disappointed, primarily because of Black's former associa­
tion with the Ku Klux Klan. But he supported the nomination
in the Senate out of party loyalty, voting for confirmation
7 kboth in committee and on the final ballot.
On the matter of a new Senate Majority Leader, Con­
nally favored the selection of Pat Harrison over the Admin­
istration's candidate, Alben Barkley. His preference was 
based largely on personal feelings. Tremendous pressures 
were applied by the President on a number of Senators to 
support Barkley, who favored the court reform bill. An
effort to elect Harrison failed by a vote of thirty-seven
75to thirty-eight, with Barkley winning.
Connally's position on the court reform bill marked 
the beginning of a shift in his political image from liberal
U. S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1937, LXXXI, Pt. 9102-9103 ; Connally, Name Is Tom 
Connally, 192-194; New York Times, August 17, 1937, P- 1.
75Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 193-
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to conservative. A further shift occurred as a result of 
debates on various antilynching bills that appeared before 
the Congress in the later years of the New Deal. On this 
issue, Connally was even more outspoken, and he was in a 
position of greater responsibility in carrying on the fili­
busters that resulted.
His position on the issue was made clear from the 
beginning and it never changed. He unquestionably felt 
that segregation of the races was both legal and moral.
Within that framework, he then maintained that Negroes 
had certain rights, including the right to be protected 
from mob violence. He considered lynching of anyone, Negro 
or white, murder and a violation of State law. But, he 
maintained staunchly, this was the concern of only the States, 
and interference by the federal government as called for in 
the various antilynching bills was a violation of States' 
rights. He frequently pointed out the continuing decline 
in lynchings which had set in by the time legislation was 
being considered in the mid-1930's, and maintained that 
the States were able to handle the situation. Thus, to 
him, not only was antilynching legislation unconstitutional, 
it was also unnecessary.
Politically, Connally's position was much safer on 
this issue than on the court issue. For one thing. President
7^Ibid., 170.
l84
Roosevelt was less personally interested in the antilynching
bills that came before Congress. "At the most, his was a
77position of benevolent neutrality . . . ." And in Texas, 
northern-sponsored antilynching bills were anything but pop­
ular among the mass of white voters, and Negroes were not 
yet permitted to vote in Democratic primaries. Besides, 
lynching never reached the panic proportions in Texas that 
other Southern States experienced. Connally was defending 
a position which he sincerely believed was right, and he 
was absolutely politically safe in doing it.
The first extensive debates on an antilynching bill 
began after consideration of the court reform bill in the 
summer of 1937» although bills had been before the Congress 
almost constantly since 1934, when Senators Robert Wagner 
and Edward Costigan had introduced a measure prepared by
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
79People. Efforts were made in 1937 to attach antilynch­
ing provisions to an unrelated bill dealing with railroads. 
Connally blasted these efforts with the same arguments 
that he would use repeatedly for several years to come;
^^Frank Freidel, F̂. D_. R. and the South (Baton 
Rouge, 1965), 97-
7 ftNo lynchings occurred in Texas in 1931» one in 
1932, two in 1933, one in 1934, one in 1935 and none after­
wards. Jessie Daniel Ames, The Changing Character of Lynch­
ings : Review of Lynching, 1931-1941 (Atlanta, 1942TT 49.
Copy in TCP, con. II3.
Deal, 186.
79Leuchtenburg, Franklin D_. Roosevelt and the New
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"This is a geographical bill. This is a political bill.
This is a vote-getting bill. This is a bill advocated by 
Senators who are determined that they are net going to let
80the Republican Party get all the colored vote." Even­
tually even Walter White, Secretary of the NAACP, admitted
this was true so far as some of its supporters were con- 
8 3.cerned. Meanwhile, Connally pointed out in one of his
more telling arguments on the political nature of the bill,
that it specifically exempted "gangsters" and "racketeers"
or "any incident in connection with any 'labor dispute'" from
its terms. But Connally was opposed to the bill no matter
whom or what it included:
. . . Congress has no right to legislate upon 
this question, because it relates purely and 
entirely and exclusively to the police powers 
of the States. If you can do this, why can you 
not pass a Federal law with regard to assault, 
fist fights, excessive motor speeds, or any 
other kind of criminal act . . .
. . . I am just as much in favor of protect­
ing the life of a colored man in my State as I 
am in favor of protecting the life of a white 
man; but I am also interested in preserving 
the integrity of the Constitution and the in­
tegrity of the States. I do not want to take 
from my State the responsibility that is ours."^
After debating the bill for over three weeks, and accom­
plishing practically nothing, a truce was arranged by the
80U. S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1937, LXXXI, Pt. 8, §759.
81U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judi­
ciary, Hearings, on H. R. 8OI, to Prevent the Crime of 
Lynchingl 7&th Cong., 3d Sess., 19^0, 66-67.
®^Ibid.
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Democratic leadership in the Senate between those for and 
those against the bill. It was to be laid aside until 
after action on the pending farm bill. Thus it was carried
O o
over to the next session.
A special session of Congress was called in the fall 
of 1937 to deal with crop control legislation. By the agree­
ment of the previous session, the antilynching bill would 
be debated only after the feirm bill had been completed. But 
once Congress was in session, Senator Wagner and supporters 
of antilynching legislation made efforts to have his bill 
called up, causing Connally and his allies to swing into 
action with a filibuster. Few, if any, new arguments against 
the bill were produced by the Southerners, but their efforts 
succeeded not only in stopping debate on the antilynching 
bill ahead of schedule, but also action on it during the
84special session.
When Congress reconvened January 3, 1938, Senator 
Wagner renewed his efforts in behalf of the bill, known by 
that time as the Wagner-Van Nuys bill, saying that "the 
measure would be kept under consideration until it came to 
a vote." Senator Connally answered, "a number of Senators 
undoubtedly will want to make extensive remarks concerning 
the bill," which was taken as a warning that a major fili­
buster might be organized if necessary.
G^ibid., Pt. 8, 8759.
G^ibid., Pt. 2, 1934.
^^New York Times, January 4, 1938, p. 1.
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Senator Barkley did his best to keep peace between 
the warring factions of his party and to prevent a filibuster 
from developing. He quickly tired of Connally's efforts to 
hold up action on the Wagner-Van Nuys bill, and after a little 
over two days' debate, he warned that if the stalling con­
tinued, he would seek limits to debate through stricter en­
forcement of the rules. It was clear to everyone that a 
cloture resolution could not pass, and Connally confidently 
predicted "that night sessions or any enforcement of the more 
rigid rules would not deter his forces from their expressed 
determination to prevent the bill ever reaching a vote."
"We have plenty of ammunition," he said.^^ There was simply 
no stopping the Southerners under Connally's leadership.
Actually Connally took little part in most of the 
long-winded and irrelevant speeches. His role as leader of 
the group, however, required his close attention to the pro­
ceedings. He would ask leading questions of those who were 
talking when they ran short of ideas, and he would interrupt 
for quorum calls when his speakers seemed to be tiring. And 
to keep the discussions from getting too boring, and to en­
tertain the galleries from time to time, he employed his 
famous parliamentary knowledge and sarcastic wit to the 
limit.
After nearly a week of filibuster, Senator Barkley 
Ibid., January 9, 1938, p. 1.
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began tightening his enforcement of the rules, but Connally 
and his associates were ready to play by the strictest of 
rules. They claimed to be gaining strength through their
87opposition, and they promised to talk indefinitely. And 
to heighten the tension and to produce as much embarrass­
ment to the proponents of the bill as possible, Connally 
and Senator Allen Ellender threatened in mid-January to 
introduce a number of racial amendments to the bill and 
to force roll-call votes on them in order to show that the
northerners were not really friends of the Negro as they
1 • . . . 88 claimed to be.
After over two weeks of filibustering, Connally
showed no signs of weakening. He maintained further that
his group was in no way responsible for delaying other
legislation which was in need of consideration. They would
be more than happy to permit other pending legislation to
replace the antilynching bill at any time. "But if the
leadership wants to subordinate everything else to this
bill, then that is their responsibility." Legislation no
less important than the appropriation bill and an adminis-
89trative reorganization bill was waiting to be considered. 
Beginning January 24, Barkley began holding night sessions
^^Ibid., January l4, 1938, p. 8.
00
Ibid., January 15, 1938, p. 3*
^^Ibid., January 23, 1938, p. 5*
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in order to increase the pressure on the filibusterers, but 
they stood firm. As the talkathon entered its second month, 
a second cloture motion was defeated, and although it picked 
up some votes over the previous attempt, it was still a long 
way from the necessary two-thirds. The sponsors of the bill 
weakened at last. They finally saw that they could not dis­
lodge the Southerners, and they came under increasing pres­
sure to withdraw their bill so that other business could be 
91attended to. February 22, with Wagner, Van Nuys and Con­
nally all voting in the majority, a motion passed by a vote 
of fifty-eight to twenty-two to proceed to the pending
appropriation bill, thus ending the filibuster and killing
92the antilynching bill for that session.
By his opposition to Roosevelt's court reform plan 
in 1937 and his continuing leadership in the antilynching 
fight, Connally strained his relationship with Roosevelt to 
its weakest point of his entire Senate career. Although he 
was not himself a candidate for re-election in 1938, he 
did experience some of the punishment loosed by Roosevelt 
in his political "purge" of that year. A federal judgeship 
had opened in southern Texas, and Connally proposed that it 
be filled by Walton D, Taylor of Houston, Roosevelt, however,
9°Ibid.
^^Ibid., February 17, 1938, p. 12.
92U. S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 
1938, LXXXIII, Pt. 2, 2210.
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chose to ignore the Connally nomination, an action that was 
not without precedent. What was significant, however, was 
the manner in which the nomination was announced by the 
President.
Roosevelt traveled across northern Texas by train 
in July, 1938, as a part of the midterm campaign. He was 
accompanied by both Senator Connally and Governor Allred. 
When the train arrived in Wichita Falls--Allred's hometown-- 
Roosevelt summoned his guests to the rear of the train, 
where he announced his nomination of Allred to the judge­
ship. A reporter at the scene snapped a telling photograph 
of the occasion. After requesting Connally to present him­
self on the train's rear platform during the stop-over, the 
President totally ignored the Senator during his presenta­
tion speech to the crowd. Connally reacted to the treatment 
by clinching the iron rail with both fists and staring
angrily forward. His anger was obvious to any who looked
at him. He took his punishment at the time, and later
he made no attempt to block the confirmation when it came
before the Senate. He did, however, insert in the Con­
gressional Record a letter which he wrote to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in which he registered his displeasure 
with the nomination. He pointed out that the appointment 
was irregular to the degree that Allred was from northern 
Texas and the judgeship was in the southern district. Nor­
mally, though certainly not always, judgeships were filled
191
by residents of the district. Fortunately the incident was
soon forgotten, and it did not permanently damage the rela-
93tionship between the President and the Senator.
The 1938 antilynching filibuster represented the cli­
max of the antilynching bill fight, but in every Congress 
between then and the outbreak_of World War II, numerous bills
94were introduced. Senators Wagner, Van Nuys, and Capper 
co-sponsored one such bill when Congress convened in January, 
1939.^^ Immediately Connally warned, "Any attempt to revive 
this bill will result in wasting half the time of this Senate 
and accomplishing nothing. It will not passJ^^ The threat 
of a filibuster was enough to prevent further action in 1939.
The next January, the same situation presented it­
self, as Wagner and Van Nuys again threatened to seek an 
antilynching law. Connally replied to them by summoning 
reporters and announcing, "As far as I am concerned, there
will be no antilynching legislation. There may be a bill,
97but that is not legislation." But this was an election 
year, making at least discussion of the subject of great
^^New York Times, July 11, 1938, p. 4; ibid., July 
12, 1938, p. 1; ibid., July 12, 1938, p. 4; TTC to H. P. 
Guerra, September 11, 1938, TCP, con. 92; U. S., Congres- 
sional Record, ?6th Cong., 1st Sess., 1939, LXXXIV, Pt.
2 , 1490.
94Copies of twelve separate bills introduced into 
the 1939 session are filed in TCP, con. 128.
95Introduced first into the House of Representatives 
by Joseph A. Gavagan of New York as H. R. 8OI.
96New York Times, January 21, 1939, p. 3* Similar 
comments were repeated on the floor of the Senate. See U.
S., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1939,
LXXXIV, Pt. 1, 559-5^o7
^^New York Times, January 2, 1940, p. 12.
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political importance to some of the Northern Democrats. Thus, 
they were not frightened away so easily as they seemed to 
have been the year before.
Congressman Joseph A. Gavagan of New York first re­
newed the fight over the still pending bill of the previous 
98session. After a week of debate and a few minor amendments,
the bill passed the House January 10 by a vote of 252 to 
99131. The next day it was referred to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. In spite of a promised filibuster if the bill
got to the Senate floor, hearings were conducted under Van 
Nuys' chairmanship. After five days of hearings that stretched 
over a month, in which Connally questioned some witnesses un­
mercifully, the committee reported the bill favorably and un­
amended by a vote of eleven to four, with Connally in the 
minority. Undaunted, he announced, "This bill will be re­
sisted to the utmost. The Mannerheim Line won't even be a 
starter to the fight we'll put on."^^^
The need for Connally's threatened filibuster never 
arose, however. The presence of the bill on the Senate
qQU. s., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 
1940, LXXXIV, Pt. 1, 127-137.
99lbid., 253-254. 
l°°Ibid., 264.
^^^Ibid., Pt. 4, 4l08; U. S. Congress, Senate, Sub­
committee of the Committee on the Judiciary,_ Hearings, on
H. R. 801, to Prevent the Crime of Lynching, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess., 1^0; U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the 
Judiciary, Report to Accompany H. R. 80I , Rept. No. I380,
76th Cqng., 3d Sess., 19^0, ÏT7 j clipping from Dallas News, 
March'27, 1940, TCP, con. 127.
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calendar achieved most of what Wagner and his associates de­
sired in the way of attention and opportunity. With Roose­
velt's nomination for a third term during the summer of 1940 
and the apparent need for solidarity within the Democratic 
Party, Senate Majority Leader Barkley announced quietly that
the House bill would not be called up. "To do so would in-
102vite the usual filibuster by Southerners," he noted, it 
might endanger the Democratic candidates in the general elec­
tion the following month. Thus, amidst unusual calm, the 
antilynching bill died, ending Northern politicians' un­
successful efforts that extended back to the early days of 
the New Deal.^^^
Connally's stand against antilynching legislation 
differed vastly from his stand against the President's court 
reform bill, although both tended to change his political 
label from liberal to conservative. The big difference was 
that the President was not personally involved in the anti­
lynching squabble. In addition--and partly as a result-- 
Connally was on very safe ground at home on this stand. 
Whatever loss in popularity he may have suffered over the
TOP New York Times, October 9, 1940, p. 15.
103Five separate antilynching bills were introduced 
into the House of Representatives during the first session 
of the 77th Congress, which convened January, 1941, but 
all of them, including one by Congressman Gavagan, died in 
the Committee on the Judiciary. One such bill was intro­
duced into the second session, which convened in January, 
1942. No such bill was introduced into the next Congress, 
which convened in January, 1943.
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court bill he easily regained by his States' rights stand
against the antilynching bill. The timing seemed perfect
as the Senator came up for re-election in campaign of 1940.
Connally's loudest and most publicized efforts of
the latter years of the New Deal may have been those against
court reform and antilynching legislation, but at the same
time he continued his efforts to help the farmer. On the
important Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Connally 
lo4voted "yea." But as in the case of the 1933 law, he
played no leading part in securing its passage. He sup­
ported the adoption of an amendment to a 1938 cotton crop 
control bill which provided that compliance could be deter­
mined on the basis of acreage planted rather than harvest 
yield, thus speeding up the dispersal of some $130 million 
in payments to the f a r m e r s . H e  had supported the Bank- 
head-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937» but he continued to 
press for larger appropriations. Talking to a meeting of 
Farm Security Administration officials in Texas, he said:
While the beginnings of the Federal program 
[established by the Bankhead-Jones Act] are 
quite modest, while the amount of money appro­
priated for the current year is not as large as 
I should have wished, it is our hope that the 
success of the project may be such as to justify 
increased appropriations from year to year.lOG
104U. S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 
1938, LXXXIII, Pt. 2, 1Ô81.
^^^New York Times, May 5» 1938, p. 8.
l^^TTC, Press Release, August 4, 1938, TCP, con.
554.
195
A few weeks later, speaking before the Gulf Coast Council 
of Agriculture, he maintained that Southern agriculture de­
served further relief through elimination of discriminatory
107freight rates, and he promised to work toward that end.
In the following session, he introduced a bill sim­
ilar to several others which were aimed at correcting this 
p r a c t i c e . A l s o ,  in 1939s he proposed the distribution 
of three million bales of surplus cotton through the Commod­
ity Credit Corporation and the Works Projects Administration
in the form of mattresses and "other cotton articles for
109home consumption" to the needy. He further worked to
protect the cotton farmer by introducing a bill to forbid 
government administrators from calling in loans or from 
making deductions from price-adjustment payments as a pen­
alty for the production of poor grade c o t t o n . T h e  
farmer--especially the cotton farmer, with whom Connally 
always identified--received a great deal of the Senator's 
attention throughout the period, although farmers received 
fewer benefits than the Senator would have liked.
One of Connally's few personal defeats on the
^°^Ibid., August 25, 1938, TCP, con. 554.
^®^New York Times, February 21, 1939, p. 30.
109ttc, Press Release, January I8, 1939, TCP, con. 
554; clipping from Kyle (Texas) News, January 27, 1939,
TCP, con. 123.
S.g Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1939, LXXXIV, Pt. 3, 3l44.
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legislative front during the later years of the New Deal 
came in 1939» when Congress considered amendments to the 
Social Security Act. He proposed that the federal govern­
ment increase its aid to States for old-age assistance so 
that for every dollar up to fifteen which the State pro­
vided, the federal government would provide two. In Texas, 
that would have provided an income for the aged of $4? per 
month rather than $30. In the Finance Committee, the more 
conservative members, such as Senator Byrd, opposed the 
measure on the grounds that it would require an additional 
expenditure of $80 million a year by the federal govern­
ment. The committee rejected the proposal by a vote of
112ten to five. When the bill reached the floor of the
Senate, however, Connally succeeded in getting his amend-
113ment reinserted by a vote of forty-three to thirty-five.
But the conservatives were not to be outdone. When the
bill went to a conference committee, the provision was
again rejected, even though Connally and Senator George,
who also favored the idea, were both appointed conferees 
ll4for the Senate. Both houses then accepted the deletion
and the bill passed.
111New York Times, July 12, 1939» p. 5*
IIPIbid*5 July 7, 1939, p. 3-
-  ll^Ibid., July 13, 1939, p. 1. 
ll4 ̂ Ibid., August 5, 1939, p. 1.
^^^Ibid., August 6, 1939, p. 1.
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The total effect of Connally's legislative efforts, 
however, was positive. His move toward the conservative camp, 
especially.in the matter of antilynching legislation, kept 
his popularity high among the bulk of Texas voters. And 
although his stand against Roosevelt's court reorganization 
bill was not clearly popular at first, Connally's political 
strength was not impaired by it in the end. On most other 
cases he stood with the Administration, for the farmer and 
usually for the laborer and the downtrodden. Toward the 
Negro, Connally had a patronizing attitude, and his sympathy 
for the worker was more theoretical than it was practical. 
Organized labor was extremely weak in Texas during the 1930*s, 
and Negroes were even less significant as a political force. 
Connally did oppose the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 on 
the grounds that it served only the well organized groups, 
that it recognized no wage differential for Southern labor, 
and that it--like the NIRA before it--permitted Congress to 
delegate legislative authority to a board not subject to 
its direct control. But organized labor was itself not in 
full agreement as to the usefulness of the law.^^^ As if 
by design, Connally found himself in no heated controversy 
with the Administration or with any powerful State political 
interests as his second term neared its end and the 19^0 
campaign approached.
S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1937, LXXXI, Pt. 7, 7865, 7866, 7892, 7957.
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Connally's popularity with the voters was no secret» 
That the more capable and ambitious politicians of the State 
sensed it was underscored when none of them sought to challenge 
the still-junior Senator. Rumors had suggested at one time 
or another during the past six years that Congressman Maury 
Maverick, former Governor and Judge James V. Allred, and 
Governor W. Lee O'Daniel were each considering the race.
But in the end, only two candidates opposed Connally for the 
Democratic nomination. One was Guy B. Fisher, who had lost 
miserably to Connally in lf^4, carrying only his home county, 
San Augustine. He fared only slightly better two years 
later when he sought to unseat Senator Sheppard in the Demo­
cratic primary of 1936. A weak candidate and a loser, he 
announced for a third time. The other opponent was A. P. 
Belcher of Erath County. His candidacy posed even less 
of a challenge than that of Fisher.
Connally’s most serious threat in 19^0 was his 
health. In February, he collapsed while attending a ban­
quet in Washington. He was sixty-two years old at the time, 
and reportedly suffered from a chronic heart condition. But 
his opposition made little effort to exploit this. His col­
lapse and brief stay in a Washington hospital was well
covered by the national press at the time, but it was ab-
117sent from discussion during the campaign. He was
^^^New York Times, February 17, 1940, p. 7.
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sufficiently recovered by April l8, however, to undertake 
the entertainment of seventy-two ladies for breakfast in
X 3- 3his bachelor apartment! Perhaps that was proof enough
of his stamina. “
Due to a combination of factors, Connally's efforts 
for renomination fell far short of those extended in pre­
vious campaigns. He was well known, his opposition was 
exceedingly weak, his health was poor, and there was pres­
sing business in Washington. Whereas in 1928 he was but 
one of the many Congressmen and in 1934 he was but one of 
many Senators, in 1940 he found himself suddenly closer 
to the center of action as world tensions mounted because 
of the belligerent activities of Germany and Japan. Con­
nally was the third-ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and therefore was deeply involved in 
neutrality, preparedness, and defense legislation. It 
was not so easy for him to leave Washington to campaign 
as it had been in previous years.
His campaign was left almost entirely in the hands 
of others. The Senator did not return to the State "for even 
a single speech or public appearance. Whether a cause or 
a result, it was an exceedingly dull race. Except for a 
minimum amount of advertisements in the newspapers, Connally 
made but one appeal to the voters. Tuesday before the
113Austin Statesman, April l8, 1940.
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Saturday election, he spoke over a seven-city radio hook-up
by transcription. But that was all that was necessary to
. , 119insure victory.
When the votes of the Democratic primary were tabu­
lated, Fisher had carried only two counties: San Augustine
and Newton. (See Map 7? p. 201.) The first was his home 
county; the other was adjacent to it. In both cases, Con­
nally ran a strong second. In speirsely populated Donley 
County in the Texas Panhandle, both men received 179 votes. 
As for Belcher, he failed to carry a single county. Only
in Erath, his home county, did he run even a strong second.




Tom Connally 923,219 84.8
Guy B. Fisher 98,125 9.0
A. P. Belcher 66,962 6.2
Totals 1,088,306 100.0
The general election in November was, as usual in 
Texas, a mere formality. The Republican candidate, George
I. Shannon, ran unusually strong by comparison with past 
Republican nominees for United States Senator, but his 
strength was actually nothing more than a reflection of
^^^Wichita Falls Record News, July 27, 19^0.
120Heard and Strong, Southern Primaries and Elec­
tions, 174-177.
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anti-third-terra sentiraent against President Roosevelt and
the Democratic ticket. Connally carried every county of
the State against both the Republican nominee and Homer
Brooks, candidate of the Communist Party. Their vote is




Tom Connally Democratic 978,095 94.2
George I. Shannon Republican 59,340 5.7
Homer Brooks Communist 4o8 O.0I22
Totals 1,037,843 99.9
Connally was only slightly more concerned about pres­
idential politics in 19^0 than he was about his own campaign. 
In principle, he opposed a third term for anyone, and he 
preferred Vice President Garner for the Democratic nomination. 
He was more practical, however, than the Vice President, and 
when Roosevelt finally showed his hand, Connally fell in line. 
He attended the national convention in Chicago, where for a 
brief moment he engaged in a move to name Sam Rayburn as the 
vice presidential candidate, but it was stopped abruptly when 
word was circulated that Roosevelt favored Secretary of Ag­
riculture Henry Wallace. Following the convention, Connally
1 ? 1£bid., 177-179.
1 More exactly 0.04.
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extended his services, as usual, as a campaign speaker,
touring several States in behalf of the Democratic ticket.
He was "reconciled to the idea that the Democrats had better
make sure of winning. . . and prevent the Republican isola-
123tionists from taking control." Foreign affairs moved
more to the fore for Connally as well as for the nation.
^^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 235
CHAPTER VIII 
NEUTRALITY, DEFENSE, AND THE APPROACH OF WAR
Foreign affairs had always been of some concern to 
Connally during his years in Congress, although he had been 
primarily interested in domestic questions. But as a member 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee from 1917 to 1929 and 
as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after 
1931, he was continually aware of the issues in that field. 
In the early weeks of the Roosevelt Administration, he urged 
the passage of an Administration-sponsored resolution which 
would place an embargo on arms shipments to any aggressor 
nation. When it became apparent that the Foreign Relations 
Committee intended to expand the resolution to include na­
tions attacked as well as aggressors, the Administration re-
1quested that the subject be dropped, and it was.
Connally applauded Administration efforts to improve 
relations with Latin American nations. He was pleased with 
the results of the Montevideo Conference in 1933 when the 
United States pledged to refrain from interference in the
^Tom Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg, My, Name 
Is Tom Connally, (New York, 1954), 205-206.
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internal affairs of other nations. "This,” he maintained,
"was a wholesome change from the policy of previous adminis- 
2trations." The following year he eagerly supported the 
treaty with Cuba that abrogated the Platt Amendment, ending
3United States control of Cuban affairs. Connally also sup­
ported the Administration on the question of recognizing 
Soviet Russia and on the passage of the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act. On the latter he worked for passage both 
in the Senate Finance Committee and on the floor of the Sen- 
ate. "I was for it," he said, "as strong as horse radish." 
After its passage, and at the request of President Roosevelt, 
he explained to a national radio audience that the law would 
in large measure remove the issue of tariff policy from con­
gressional politics without Congress abdicating its respon­
sibilities and controls in the field. It would strengthen 
the president, and thus the nation, in bargaining with other 
nations for trade concessions. In short, it would provide 
an efficient way of dealing with the tariff.^
As an old Wilsonian, Connally never completely gave 
up hope of United States membership in the League of Nations, 
although by the 1930's he realized the possibility was
^Ibid., 207.
3Ibid.; U. S., Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess., 193%T"LXXVIII, Pt. 9, 10116.
^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 207-208; U. S.,
Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 193^, LXXVIII,
Pt. 10, 10395.
^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 209.
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remote. Nevertheless, he looked upon American participation 
in the World Court as desirable in itself as well as a pos­
sible step toward joining the League. He was briefly op­
timistic about the future of both goals in early 1935 when 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee overrode the desires 
of Chairman Key Pittman and reported to the Senate a bill 
calling for participation in the court. On Friday, January 
25, there seemed to be enough votes in favor of participation 
to get the necessary two-thirds majority. But Majority 
Leader Robinson insisted that the vote be postponed until 
the following (Tuesday. In the meantime, opponents of the 
bill staged a large-scale propaganda campaign against it, 
and when the final vote was taken, the World Court proposal 
was short by seven votes--fifty-two to thirty-six.^
Connally was disappointed by this defeat, but when 
a special committee was formed to inquire into the activities 
of munitions makers at the time of the outbreak of World War 
I, he was incensed. He resented not only the attempts by 
the committee members, especially Gerald Nye, Bennett Clark, 
and Arthur H. Vandenberg, to gain attention for themselves 
through sensational "half-truths and utter falsehoods," 
but also their efforts to malign the memory of Woodrow Wil­
son by implying that he had been dishonest with the American 
people in leading them into war.
^Ibid., 210-211; U. S., Congressional Record', 74th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 1935, LXXIX, Ptl 1̂  1146.
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In reply-to the Nye Committee findings, and partially 
to minimize their effect, the Administration advocated a law 
to tax wartime profits to such an extent that no future busi­
ness would be likely to encourage United States involvement 
in a war merely to increase its profits. Such a law was 
first introduced into the House of Representatives by John
7J. MeSwain of South Carolina in February, 1935 9 where it
8was passed and sent to the Senate in April. There it was 
submitted in turn to three committees--the Special Committee 
on Investigation of the Munitions Industry, the Committee on 
Military Affairs, and the Committee on Finance--but no final
9action came before the session adjourned. The following 
year, during the Second Session of the Seventy-fourth Con­
gress, the Finance Committee finally reported the bill as 
redrafted by the special subcommittee headed by Connally.
In making his report to the Senate, he said:
It was the purpose of the committee so to 
draft the measure as not entirely to destroy 
the profit motive in time of war, because it 
seemed desirable that industrial plants and 
others supplying war materials might continue 
to function with their regular organizations; 
but it has been our purpose so to levy the 
rates of taxation as to take out of their profits 
that particular factor which is attributable
nU. s., Congressional Record, 7^th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1935, LXXIX, Pt. 2, 1703.
o
Ibid., Pt. 5, 5326. Connally maintained in his 
autobiography that he introduced such a bill into the 
34th Congress, but there is no record of it in the Con­
gressional Record.
^Ibid., 5446; ibid., Pt, 6, 6839; ibid., Pt. 9,
9257.
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to a state of war and to allow them only-
normal and ordinary returns.^®
The bill did not reach the floor for general debate. By 
that time the Nye Committee's influence was beginning to 
fade, and interest in the war-profits bill also declined.
It would reappear later when war seemed closer at hand.
As questions of foreign affairs loomed more import­
ant during the second half of the 1930'Sy and as the ques­
tion of American isolation versus internationalism became 
more serious, the isolationists in the Senate definitely 
had the upper hand. The aggressive isolationist leadership 
captured headlines, while the Administration forces and non­
isolationists like Connally were still more concerned with 
domestic affairs. Labor laws, public works projects, court 
reform, and antilynching held attention despite events in 
Europe and the Far East. On the critical Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Chairman Pittman could hardly be char­
acterized as an aggressive leader. Some even held him re­
sponsible for selecting Nye to head the munitions investiga­
tion.^^ Furthermore, Pittman had also opposed the Reciprocal
12Trade Agreements Act and membership on the World Court.
^°Ibid., 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 1936, LXXX, Pt. 9,
9191.
^^Cordell Hull was one. He contended that Vice Pres­
ident Garner would have appointed anyone Pittman might have 
named. See Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New 
York, 1948), 215-216, 398. Fred L. Israel, the principal 
biographer of Pittman, provides evidence, but not proof, 
that Pittman was not responsible. Fred L. Israel, Nevada's 
Key Pittman (Lincoln, Nebraska, I963), 138n.
^^Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman, 129, 134-135.
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The next ranking Democrat on the committee was Majority 
Leader Robinson. He was far too busy with the mechanics 
of the Senate to provide effective leadership for the inter­
nationalists. The next member was Walter F. George, fol­
lowed by Pat Harrison. Both of these men gave most of 
their attention to the Senate Finance Committee. Likewise, 
the next two Democrats on the committee in order of rank, 
Robert Wagner and Hugo Black, were interested primarily in 
labor legislation. Connally ranked seventh among the Demo­
crats, too low to be of great influence, and like most
members, more involved with domestic questions than with
13foreign affairs.
Connally considered himself more of an internation­
alist than the President. In one meeting they had on farm 
legislation, the conversation drifted to the world situation. 
Connally suggested that the President might consider a 
stronger internationalist position, but Roosevelt reportedly 
replied, "The time isn't yet ripe . . . .  We have to get our 
own economic house in order before we can do anything in the 
foreign field." To this Connally claimed to have warned,
"Unless you take a direct hand in leading our foreign policy
1^the isolationists are going to fill the vacuum."
13
^Ibid., 218 . _ .
Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 216. 
14.
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The isolationists did assume the initiative soon 
thereafter, and whether or not as a result of Connally's 
prodding, the Administration finally became more active in 
foreign affairs legislation. Two bills, both written by 
members of the Nye Committee, came before the Foreign Re­
lations Committee in the spring of 1935» One prohibited 
loans to belligerents and the other denied Americans pass­
ports to Wcir zones. Connally was opposed to both measures, 
which passed from the Committee to the Senate in June. He 
further disapproved of Secretary Hull’s compromise plan 
offered in July. The Hull proposal was less objectionable 
to the Administration because it gave the President dis­
cretionary powers to apply sanctions against belligerents, 
but Connally held that the compromise would simply encourage 
the isolationists to continue their efforts. They could 
claim that the President too was concerned about aiding
belligerents, and in fact they did soon demand a law that
15would require a complete arms embargo.
Hull's proposal was rejected by a committee vote, 
and the isolationists' more extreme neutrality bill went 
before the Senate late in August. Connally was horrified 
at the narrow limits it placed on the president once he 
proclaimed a state of war in existence. In the first place,
^^Ibid., 219; Hull, Memoirs, 4lO. Some of the de­
tails of the bill's history are given in Israel, Nevada's 
Key Pittman, 137-144.
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the Senator felt that it was "a serious invasion of the Pres­
ident's powers to initiate and direct our foreign policy. 
Secondly, as he told the Senate during the debate on the bill, 
the provision applying an arms embargo to both sides was 
danger ous :
Mr. President, that is not neutrality; that is 
a form of unneutrality. That is a form of declara­
tion which announces that the United States will 
take the side of the strong and the powerful against 
the weak, the unprepared, and the defenseless. Why 
not leave that determination to the President of the 
United States when and if, in his conduct of our 
foreign relations, it becomes a sound American policy 
for him to take a position in a crisis of that kind?l?
He asked what the United States would do in case Canada were
18attacked. Refuse to sell her needed supplies? He objected
during the brief debate and complained, "1 do not believe
that the Committee on Foreign Relations or the Senate itself
has had sufficient time for deliberation and proper consider-
19ation of the joint resolution." In the end, Connally ac­
cepted the embcirgo provision and voted for the joint resolu­
tion known as the Neutrality Act of 1935* But he did so 
with serious reservations, and only because it was a tempor­
ary measure, to expire February 29, 1936.
Connally personally hoped that the resolution might 
still fail by reason of presidential veto. The Senate
l^Ibid., 220.
17U. s.. Congressional Record, 7^th Cong., 1st Sess., 




completed Congressional action Saturday, August 24, and ad­
journment was scheduled for Monday, August 26. Veto would 
have been an easy matter, either through the normal manner 
or by pocket veto. Connally later reported that he had 
intended to encourage the President's veto, but the follow­
ing Monday, as the Senate was about to adjourn, his wife's 
death occurred. Affairs of state were forgotten as he left 
Washington to make arrangements for her burial in Marlin.
When he later learned that Roosevelt had vacillated about 
signing or vetoing the resolution, he wondered what differ­
ence it might have made if he could have added his slight
20influence to the argument for veto.
The fight was renewed when Congress came back into 
session in January, 1936. Connally was pleased to learn 
from the President that Secretary of State Hull was pre­
paring a bill that would limit the sale of all goods to 
belligerents to their pre-war levels. When this was pre­
sented to the Foreign Relations Committee, however, numerous 
objections were raised. Such a law would seriously restrict
20Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 220-221. Charles 
Callan Tansill relates that when the bill came to Roosevelt, 
"Secretary Hull indicated several provisions that were dis­
tasteful to him [?]. But the President waved aside these 
objections and approved the bill . . . ." Charles Callan 
Tansill, Back Door to War ; The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 
1933-1941 (Chicago, 1952), 221. A biographer of Cordell 
Hull, on the other hand, writes that"Roosevelt signed the 
bill with the gravest misgivings." Harold B. Hinton, Cordell 
Hull ; A Biography (Garden City, New York, 1942'), 292. For 
his part, Hull remembered pointing out shortcomings in the 
bill but claims to have suggested to the President that he 
sign the bill rather than provoke a fight with Congress.
Hull, Memoirs, 413-415.
213
American exports and profits. Hull's proposal died in the
committee, which instead reported out another compromise
bill broadening the terms of the first law and extending it
to May 1, 1937» Connally was displeased both with the ex-
21tension of the date and the expansion of the terms.
Again the isolationists put forward charges that 
Woodrow Wilson had lied to the United States in 191? about 
the causes of war, and the present legislation was needed 
to insure that the United States would not again be need­
lessly dragged into war. Connally could not resist the temp­
tation to defend his great hero of the past:
Mr. President, I was not an intimate of President 
Woodrow Wilson. I was only a new Member of the 
House of Representatives when the war began; but, 
without that intimacy, I as one of his admirers-- 
not always as a supporter in every detail of his 
policies, but one of his admirers--desire to ex­
press my own resentment of the coarse, common in­
sult which the Senator from North Dakota [Gerald 
Nye] has heaped upon one of the great figures in 
American History.
I am not speaking as a Democrat. Let us for 
the moment forget partisanship. Whether you loved 
Woodrow Wilson or whether you hated him, whether 
you agreed with him or whether you opposed him, when 
the history of this Republic shall be written, his 
titanic figure will tower above some of the puny 
pigmies who now bark at his memory as Pike [']s Peak 
towers above the fog and the bog of [an] Arkansas 
swamp. . . .22
O 1Ibid., 221-222; Hull, Memoirs, 463; Israel, Nevada's
Key Pittman, l45-l48.
22U. s., Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 
1936, LXXX, Pt. 1, 502. A more verbose, more colorful, and 
slightly stronger version of these remarks is given in Con­
nally 's autobiography and was reported in abbreviated form 
by the New York Times. Connally was known frequently to alter
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With considerable reservations and frustration, Connally 
again supported the Neutrality Act, judging that the mood
of Congress and the nation would not permit repealing or
2 3weakening it at that time. With more encouragement from 
the Administration, he would likely have voted against it.
But like the President, he did not think it politically 
wise at the time to make a strong stand against the Neutral­
ity Act even though he did not favor it.
In 1936, the Spanish Civil War began, presenting a 
problem not covered by the Neutrality Act. Connally spoke 
to Roosevelt at Hyde Park just previous to the 1936 national 
elections, and learned, to his disgust, that Roosevelt favor­
ed extending the Act to cover the Spanish Civil War. When 
the resolution came before Congress in early January, Con­
nally did not press his opposition, but rather voted with 
the eighty-one to zero majority that passed the resolution
24in the Senate. Then, during the next few weeks, the matter 
of extending the 1936 Neutrality Act past its expiration date 
had to be considered. The only change in the law as it be­
came permanent in March was a provision that belligerents
the record after making strong personal comments from the 
floor. He mistakenly attributed this speech to his argu­
ments of 1935 instead of 1936 in his autobiography. See 
Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 214, and New York Times, 
January 17, 1936, p. 31
2 3No record vote was taken in the Senate, but his 
vote against attempts to amend the resolution with stronger 
isolationist terms indicates his general support of the 
Administration in not opposing the bill.
24U. S., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1937, LXXXI, Pt. 1, tJO.
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could buy goods from the United States if the terms were
"cash and carry." Connally's contribution to debates on the
NeutraJ-ity Act were negligible, since the fight against the
court reorganization bill held his attention almost entirely
during these weeks. Upon the Senate's first approval of the
extension, he was absent and did not vote, but it was announced
25that if present he would have voted "aye." The Senate ver­
sion differed slightly from that of the House, and when the 
Senate voted on the compromise resolution in late April, Con­
nally supported the law with the majority of forty-one to 
f i f t e e n . T h i s  is one time when Connally was not following 
his convictions in casting his vote.
The status of American neutrality remained unchanged 
through 1938 and 1939* The Senate Foreign Relations Commit­
tee, which was already fairly weak when it came to initiating 
neutrality legislation, was further weakened by the serious 
and extended illness of its chairman. Senator Pittman. Con­
nally conferred with President Roosevelt March I6 , 1939, 
about the possibility of repealing the arms embargo act, and 
the decision was reached that such a move should begin in the 
House of Representatives. The House, under the leadership 
of Sol Bloom, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
passed a bill that would have changed the existing situation 
little if any, but Connally had some hope of amending it in
25lbid., Pt. 2, 1807. 
2^Ibid., Pt. 4, 3962.
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the Senate committee so that the arms embargo would be re­
pealed. When he moved that the committee proceed to the 
bill, however, no one seconded his motion. Immediately, Sen­
ator Clark moved that the committee put off all considera­
tion of neutrality legislation until the next session of
Congress. The isolationists carried the motion, with Con-
27nally voting in the minority.
A week later Connally was once again involved in dis­
cussions with President Roosevelt over neutrality legislation. 
Roosevelt asked that the arms embargo be repealed, expressing 
a fear that war might erupt in Europe at any moment. The 
Neutrality Act would obviously work to the detriment of the 
democracies of Europe, and Roosevelt admitted that it had
28been a mistake to pass the law in the first place. It was 
at this conference that Senator Borah insisted that there 
would be no general European war in 1939, despite intelli­
gence reports to the contrary. Roosevelt failed at this 
meeting to bring pressure on Congress to repeal the Neutral­
ity Act before it adjourned. Although Connally would have
been pleased if he had, Connally showed no initiative in the
29matter himself.
Shortly after Congress adjourned in 1939, the gen­
eral European war did erupt, and it became abundantly clear
2 7Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 226-227»
98Ibid., 227; Hull, Memoirs, O93.
^^Connally, Name Is Tom Connally, 227-228.
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how foolish the American Neutrality Act really was. Connally 
was one of the Congressional leaders attending a White House 
conference that preceded the special session September 21. 
Following the conference, Chairman Pittman asked Connally to 
lead the floor fight for repeal of the Neutrality Act. Pitt­
man was definitely ailing, and others who ranked higher than 
Connally on the Foreign Relations Committee were passed over 
for the task for various reasons.
After listening to the requests of the President, Con­
nally drafted a bill which would permit "cash and carry" sale 
of arms to belligerents. "The important thing," he told re­
porters, "is the carrying in foreign ships of supplies for
belligerents. The method of payment, whether in cash or
TOcredit, is not vital." He experienced little difficulty 
in getting the bill approved by the committee; the trouble 
came on the Senate floor. The isolationists proposed numer­
ous amendments including one which would have prohibited the 
sale of offensive weapons but not defensive weapons. Con­
nally, now working with the full cooperation of the Senate 
leadership, answered each challenge as it was presented. 
Senator Rush Holt of West Virginia tried to embarrass Con­
nally by pointing out the Texan's voting record on the Neu­
trality Act since 1935» "The Senator [Holt] is at liberty 
to read my record as he chooses," Connally replied. "I
30New York Times, September 20, 1939? P» l6.
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have already told the Senate that I was sorry that I voted 
for the embargo when it was first passed--that I made a 
mistake--and I don't mind anybody knowing that I intend
31 ,voting to correct that mistake." After a month's debate,
the bill finally emerged much as Connally had written it,
32passing by a vote of sixty-three to thirty.^ It passed 
the House easily and became law November 4, 1939. This 
was Connally's first personal contribution to foreign affairs 
legislation. And he was justly proud when, at the signing 
ceremony at the White House, Roosevelt told him, "This is 
the most important action that has taken place in our for-
33eign policy during my administration."
As the European war moved into 1940, Connally became 
a central figure in Washington as one of a group of Senators
who held weekly conferences on foreign affairs with the Pres­
ident. As he grew closer personally to Roosevelt, it is less 
surprising that he carefully avoided getting too involved in 
any of the anti-third-term political campaigns, especially 
that of Vice President Carner. Roosevelt continued to look 
to Connally for help in getting administration policy passed 
through the Senate, although Connally was still not a high- 
ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
^^Ibid., October 24, 1939, p. 12.
^^Ibid., October 28, 1938, pp. 1, 2; U. S., Congres­
sional Record, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 1939, LXXXV, Pt. 1, 1024,
3  3^Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 228-230.
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Following the announcement that France was going to ask 
Germany for an armistice, Roosevelt asked Connally to secure 
a resolution from the Senate to the effect that French prop­
erty in the Western Hemisphere could not be transferred to
another non-American country. This was accomplished June 17
34by a unanimous vote. Undoubtedly it could have been accom­
plished by any other Senator, but it was significant that the 
President requested Connally to act as his spokesman.
Acting on another suggestion from the President, 
Connally introduced a bill requiring the registration and 
fingerprinting of aliens, permitting the deportation of cer­
tain aliens, requiring the registration of foreign-controlled 
agencies and organizations, and making unlawful any attempt 
to interfere with the operations of the Army, Navy, and 
Coast G u a r d . I t  was approved June 2?»^^ Then he renewed 
his interests, which went well back into the 1930's, of in­
creasing the size and strength of the navy. In 1938, he 
had called for the "biggest, most powerful navy in the world," 
because, as he said, "If we had the world's best navy no
37power would dare attack the shores of the United States."
Now, in 1940, with Britain under attack from Germany, the
34U. S., Congressional Record, 7oth Cong., 3d Sess., 
1940, LXXXVI, Pt. «,8394.
^^Ibid., 8340-8347, 8952; New York Times, June I6 ,
1940, p. 23.
^^U. S., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 
1940, LXXXVI, Pt. 8, 9127.
^^New York Times, November 9, 1938, p. 24.
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United States had less reason to rest on the strength of the 
British navy, and Connally began urging the establishment of 
a two-ocean navy. Again, at the request of the President, 
he undertook to convince the general public through a national 
radio broadcast that this move was necessary. Public opin­
ion was sufficiently stirred that the Administration had no 
difficulty in getting Congress to begin the giant naval- 
armament program.
As time passed, Connally became more interested in 
defense and preparedness measures. In August, 19^0, a major 
military appropriation bill held the attention of the Senate, 
and Senator Vandenberg, still the obstructionist leader of 
the isolationists, attempted to amend the bill with a pro­
vision that would create a joint committee of Congress to 
supervise the President's expenditure of funds already appro­
priated. Connally belittled the idea, showing how ridicu­
lous it would be if such a committee sat arguing about petty
3 8details at a time of crisis. The amendment was defeated.
Another of Connally's interests in 19^0 was the war- 
profits tax which he had first proposed, without success, 
in 1936. Not only would such a tax discourage business from 
desiring war in order to make extra profits, but also it 
would provide a means to help finance a war if one were to 
occur. He kept the idea alive by introducing similar bills
38 ■U. S., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.,
1940, Pt. 6 , 6591-6592.
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in 1937» 1938, and 1939» but no vote was ever t a k e n . O n l y
in 1938 did it get out of committee. In June, 19^0, as the
possibility of American involvement in the war increased,
Connally reintroduced the measure in the form of an amendment
to the general tax bill. It provided for a complex system
of taxation which would go into effect automatically if war 
40were declared. A more drastic war tax was also submitted 
by Senator Homer T. Bone of Washington which would have vir­
tually confiscated incomes above a moderate level in times 
of war. When comparing the two bills, Connally admitted 
that his proposal "milks the old cow right down to the point 
of exhaustion," but it differed from the Bone amendment in“ 
that "it don't exhaust her." The Connally amendment, which
was really the work of many persons, was accepted in the
4lSenate by a vote of fifty-one to twenty-eight. But in 
spite of Connally's efforts in the Senate, Congress removed 
the war-profits provision before final passage. A second 
tax bill, one dealing with excess profits, came before Con­
gress later in the summer of 1940, and Connally again suc-
42ceeded in getting his proposal attached as a rider. But
^^New York Times, February 2, 1937» p. 12; ibid., 
January 30, 1938, p. 7; TTC, Press Release, April I3, 1939, 
TCP, con. 554; New York Times, April l4, 1939» P* 8 .
S., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 
1940, LXXXVI, Pt. W, #304; New York Times, June I6 , 1940, 
p . 23 •
^^New York Times, June 20, 1940, p. 1; Ü. S., Con­
gressional Record, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 1940, LXXXVI, Pt.
8, 8630.
42U. S., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 
1940, LXXXVI, Pt. 11, 12312.
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it too failed to survive the conference committee, and the 
43idea died.
Right in the midst of the presidential campaign, 
after Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie had been nominated by 
their respective parties, Congress considered the Selective 
Service Bill. Senators Robert Taft, Burton Wheeler, and 
Vandenberg led the opposition. They demanded that only 
volunteers be added to the army. The position of the Ad­
ministration was that this would not suffice. The volun­
teer system would not increase the size of the army fast 
enough. Following a formal speech by Vandenberg on the 
strengths and virtues of the volunteer system, Connally 
rose for rebuttal, statistics in hand. Keeping in mind 
the home States of his chief opponents, he noted that Ohio, 
Montana, and Michigan, as well as Senator Nye’s North Dakota, 
all had volunteer enlistment records of less than one per ten 
thousand eligible men. In fact, Michigan had the lowest rate 
in the Union. Prior to the Connally speech, the Democratic 
Whip had feared the Administration bill would be defeated, 
but on the final vote, it passed fifty-eight to thirty-
44one.
Connally's star continued to rise. His leadership
^^New York Times, September 20, 1940, p. 1; ibid., 
September 26, 1940, p. 22; ibid., September 30, 1940, p. 9»
44U. S., Congressional Record, ?6th Cong., 3d Sess., 
1940, LXXXVI, Pt. 10, 11142; Connally, Name Is Tom Con­
nally. 238-239.
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abilities in foreign affairs were recognized by the President 
and by his colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Commit­
tee. In November, 1940, Chairman Pittman died, advancing Con-
45nally to the position of fourth-ranking Democrat. Above 
him were Pat Harrison, Walter George, and Robert P. Wagner. 
Harrison was already chairman of the Finance Committee, and 
did not intend to give up that for Foreign Relations. Wagner 
was chairman of the Banking and Finance Committee. Senator 
George ranked second on the Finance Committee and would logi­
cally succeed to the chairmanship, but his main interests 
were in tax matters. He hinted to Connally as the two traveled 
back from the Pittman funeral that he might pass up the chair­
manship of Foreign Relations in favor of Connally. When the 
time came, hovever, he changed his mind and assumed the head 
position. Connally remained the fourth-ranking Democrat,
but in effect was next in line to be chairman and in practice
46assumed much of the burden of leadership on the committee.
Following.Roosevelt's post-election vacation cruise 
in the fall of 19kO, Connally was called to the White House 
once again. Roosevelt explained in some detail the need for 
increasing aid to Britain through a lend-lease program. The 
President requested that Connally steer through the Senate a 
bill providing such a program. Connally carried a full share
45Due to death and departure, Joseph Robinson and 
Hugo Black were no longer in the Senate.
46U. S., Congress, Official Congressional Directory, 
77th Cong., 1st Sess., 19^1, 179; Connally, Name Is Tom 
Connally, 241.
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of the burden in quizzing witnesses who appeared before the
Foreign Relations Committee. Alf M. Landon, former governor
of Kansas and the 1936 Republican candidate for president,
pleaded for "limited” aid with greater congressional controls
attached than the proposed bill called for. Connally, who
was usually jealous of congressional prerogatives, argued
that Congress would still be in control because of its con-
47trois over expenditures. To Judge Herbert A. O'Brien,
chairman of the New York Committee to Keep America Out of
War, Connally reiterated his own desire to keep America at
peace and reminded the witness that only Congress could de- 
48d a r e  war. To candidates friendly to the lend-lease bill, 
he often failed to ask a single question, although when Wen­
dell Willkie, 1940 Republican presidential candidate appeared 
to testify in favor of the bill, Connally said to the commit­
tee, "I think Mr. Willkie has made a very fine American state­
ment before this committee. I personally am very much obliged
49to him for coming here." After a month of hearings, the 
Committee approved the bill by a vote of fifteen to eight.
Debate in the Senate proved more heated than the 
hearings had been. Senator Burton K. Wheeler charged, "This 
is not a ̂ ill to keep war away. It is a bill to permit the
4?U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Re­
lations, Hearings, on Ŝ. 273, Bill Further to Promo e the 
Defense of the United States, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1941,
Pt. 2, 670.
^^Ibid. , 643.
^^Ibid., Pt. 3, 897.
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President to carry on undeclared -war."^^ Senator Bennett
Clark echoed this with the charge that the bill was nothing
more than a war bill. Connally replied that the President
did not need this law to go to war; he could get the nation
into a war any time he wanted to with his powers as commander-
in-chief. Thic? proposal, Connally maintained, was to keep
the United States out of war if at all p o s s i b l e . A t  last
the isolationist opposition was overcome and the Lend-Lease
52Act passed the Senate by a vote of sixty to thirty-one. 
Connally served the President well in getting the measure 
approved.
Connally worked closely with Roosevelt through the 
spring and summer of 1941, keeping informed about develop­
ments in foreign affairs. Without exception, he approved 
the actions and policies of the Administration, including 
the application of the Lend-Lease Act to Russia following 
Germany's invasion of that country in June. He also ap­
proved the Administration's decision to take over the
Danish possessions of Greenland and Iceland, after Denmark
- 5 3was occupied by Germany. Connally was unquestionably one
^^New York Times, March 9, 1941, p. 21.
^^Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 242-243; U. S.,
Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1941, LXXXVII,
Pt. 2, 1152- llSol
52U. S., C .igressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1941, LXXXVII, Pt. 2, 2097.
^^Connally, ^  Name Is Tom Connally, 244-245.
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of the most faithful and most important supporters the Admin­
istration had in the Senate as American involvement in the 
war drew closer.
Since the fight over American neutrality had begun 
in 1935s Connally had taken an increased interest in foreign 
affairs. His concern for inflation, farm relief, oil regu­
lation, and his opposition to court reform and antilynching 
legislation had continued to hold most of his attention 
through the 1930's, but his interest was definitely shifting 
with the needs of the times.
So far as basic changes in domestic policies were 
concerned, the days of the New Deal were at an end. He ad­
vanced to the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on the eve of war. Senator Harrison died June 22, 
19^1, leaving one of two chairmanships open to Connally. 
Senator George was given his choice of the Finance Committee 
or Foreign Relations Committee, and he chose to head the 
former. Thus Connally advanced in name to a position he 
had held in practice for some months. Connally, in his 
last pi'e-war effort for the Administration, aided in the 
Senate passage of an amendment to the Neutrality Act which 
permitted merchant ships to be armed and allowed American
vessels to enter the war zones. The bill passed the Senate
I 5450 to 37 and the House 212 to 194.^
54U. S., Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1941, Pt. 8, 8680, 8891.
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As one of the Senate's chief spokesmen for the Roose­
velt Administration on foreign policy during the war years, 
and throughout the Administration of Harry Truman that fol­
lowed, Connally would become a far more famous person than 
he was by 1941. But that should not detract from his sig­
nificance during the years of the New Deal and the contribu­
tions he made--positive and negative--in the domestic affairs 
of the nation. As depression, unemployment, and peace gave 
way to war, an era came to an end for Tom Connally as well 
as for a nation.
CHAPTER IX 
CONNALLY AT MID-CAREER
When the United States entered World War II, Tom 
Connally had served a little over half of his Senate career. 
Already it was one of more than average significance. Con­
nally was fortunate in many ways. His election to the Senate 
in 1928 was really more than he should have expected as a 
little known Texas Congressman against an incumbent Senator 
of only one term. He was fortunate that other more famous 
and more powerful Texas politicians did not seek the seat 
and heighten the competition. For surely had John Nance 
Garner, Sam Rayburn, Pat Neff, or Dan Moody also been a 
candidate against Earle B. Mayfield that year, Connally 
would not have attained a run-off position. And that likely 
would have ended his political career.
Once elected to the Senate, however, he had the good 
luck of being the only Democrat to enter the Senate that 
year, thus greatly increasing his potential seniority from 
the beginning. Of course to explain his subsequent rise 
within the Senate and party framework, it is imperative to 
understand that Connally had immense natural ability, skill,
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and drive, or he could never have capitalized on his oppor­
tunities.
Connally stood out in any crowd of his contemporaries. 
He was superior to many of his colleagues and inferior to few. 
His political friends valued him, his political enemies re­
spected him, and the general public that was aware of him 
admired him. He was a Southerner, but as V. 0. Key, Jr., 
has pointed out in describing Connally, "Not all southern 
politicians are rabble-rousers."^
He was the champion of the cotton farmers and the 
Texas oil industry. He was a believer in States' rights, 
but he was also a believer in States' responsibilities. He 
was a strong supporter of much of the reform legislation of 
the 1930's, and, although he was a great admirer of Presi­
dent Roosevelt, he was a blind follower of no one. His sup­
port of inflationary legislation_and work programs, his sup­
port of agricultural control and subsidy, his "Hot Oil" Act, 
and his support of social security legislation, indicate 
that he was interested in and sympathetic with the whole 
gamut of lelief, recovery, and reform for which the New Deal 
became noted. But there was an obvious limit to his support 
of Roosevelt's programs. His opposition to the National In­
dustrial Recovery Act, to the President's court reform pro­
posal, and to politically motivated antilynching legislation
^V. 0. Key, Jr., with the assistance of Alexander 
Heard, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York,
19(19)5 facing p. 260.
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all reveal Connally as a man of courage and conviction. How­
ever, his convictions did not carry over into the field of 
Negro rights.
Most of Connally's actions can be explained by remem­
bering his origin, training, and experience. His admiration 
for his father, who was in Connally's lifetime a central lê iaa 
cotton farmer, plus the fact that Connally himself owned a 
respectable amount of cotton land, explain much of his in­
terest in farm legislation. His training as a lawyer and 
his education in the midst of States' rights attitudes ex­
plain much of his respect for constitutional law and the 
courts. His lengthy service in the legislative bodies of 
Texas and the nation explain his loyalty toward legislative 
prerogatives and his fear or jealousy of executive encroach­
ments .
To evaluate Connally's career, especially in the later 
years of the New Deal and during the period leading up to 
American involvement in World War II, it is appropriate to 
ask what difference Connally's presence in the Senate act­
ually made. In domestic affairs, Connally's biggest effort 
came in 1937, when he fought both the court reform plan and 
the attempt by Senator Robert F. Wagner to obtain an anti­
lynching law. Without Connally these two proposals doubtless 
would have failed; there is no evidence to support the idea 
nor is there reason to theorize that Connally was indispen­
sable in blocking either. But neither is it possible to deny 
that he carried a major share of the burden in the effort and
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did it as well as could have been expected of anyone. In 
less publicized efforts, Connally contributed to the estab­
lishment of Roosevelt's tax policies in the later years of 
the New Deal, concentrating especially in the field of excess 
and war profits. Again, however, he was hardly indispensable.
Connally's riae to the chairmanship of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on the very eve of World War II 
was both remarkable and fortunate. As for the speed of his 
advancement in seniority, he was, of course, in no way re­
sponsible except in that he succeeded in being re-elected to 
the Senate in 193^ and i9^0. But it was indeed significant 
that a man of Connally's stature was suddenly thrust into 
the position at such a critical juncture in the history of 
the United States. What if Key Pittman had lived another 
year or two, tired, ill, and unable to rise to the moment 
of crisis and then died in the midst of wartime? What if 
some less qualified Senator had acceded to the chairmanship? 
What if one of the-isolationist members of the committee 
had become chairman? It is only possible to conclude that 
the entire nation benefited from Connally's being there in­
stead.
So much in Connally's background gave him the exper­
ience necessary to handle the new job that was his for the
2remainder of his Senate career. During his twelve years
2Connally was chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela­
tions Committee when the Democratic Party controlled the 
Senate (19^1-1946, 1949-1953), he was ranking minority mem­
ber when the Republican Party was in control (1947-1948).
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in the House of Representatives he served in the House For­
eign Affairs Committee,.which enjoyed an unusual sense of 
importance during the period of World War I and the argu­
ments over the League of Nations. And although Connally had 
to wait two years to gain membership on the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee after he entered the Senate, he was given 
extra duties on that committee in later years by Chairman 
Pittman when his health began to fail. Thus, responsibility 
and leadership were not new to Connally when he actually be­
came the chairman himself, and for that the nation profited.
Tom Connally is remembered for many things. He was 
the Senator who looked like a Senator. He was the author of 
the "Hot Oil" Act. He was the long-winded leader of the 
filibuster against antilynching legislation. Then, in the 
period that lies outside this study, he is remembered as 
being the author of the "Connally Resolution," by which the 
Senate went on record as favoring United States membership 
in the United Nations. For many years people looked upon 
him as the mouthpiece of the Truman Administration in the 
Senate, at least in the realm of foreign affairs. Even­
tually, and quite unfairly, people came to associate him 
with what was called "the mess in Washington." Finally, 
he grew old and withdrew from public life.
In his earlier days, Connally was known as a liberal, 
or at least he liked to think of himself as one. To him, 
that meant one who was for the common man--especially the
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farmer and the laborer. By the end of his Senate career, he 
was anything but the darling of the liberal wing of the TexuS 
Democratic Party. That is not to say that he was closely 
associated with the far right, but his strong States' rights 
stand against the court reform bill and his noisier stand 
against the various antilynching bills marked him as sym­
pathetic to the views of politicians from the old South and 
unsympathetic to the rights and dreams of the American Negro 
community. Connally must, however, be judged at least partly 
in the light of his own times. He was the product of the 
late nineteenth century, and had he been or acted differently, 
it is likely that he would have been far less successful in 
politics than he was.
Unquestionably Connally was something less than great, 
but he was a significant man. An editorial in a major I968 
Texas newspaper noted:
Texas has had a powerful "voice" in Washington 
for 38 years--ever since the late John Garner was 
elected speaker of the house and later vice pres­
ident. Then followed the era of Speaker Sam Rayburn 
and Lyndon Johnson. All three were giants in the 
political arena.3
Allowing for a certain amount of State pride^ there remains 
a certain element of truth in that statement. Without mean­
ing to suggest that Tom Connally's influence ever approxi­
mated theirs, it must be pointed out that on the level of 
public figures of the twentieth century that rests just below
^Dallas Times Herald, May 1, 1968, p. 1.
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that of Garner, Rayburn, and Johnson, no one competes with 
the Senator from Marlin for fame and significance.
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